On Logical connectives and quantifiers as adjoint functors by Mengato, Stefano
UNIVERSITA` DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA
DIPARTIMENTO DI MATEMATICA
CORSO DI LAUREA MAGISTRALE IN MATEMATICA
On Logical Connectives and Quantifiers
as
Adjoint Functors
Master Thesis in
Mathematics
Supervisor: Student:
prof.ssa Maria Emilia Maietti Stefano Mengato 1132550
Date: 22nd September, 2017
Academic Year: 2016/17

Abstract
This thesis deals with the issue of treating logical connectives, quantifiers and equality in categor-
ical terms, by means of adjoint functors combined into the notion of hyperdoctrine, introduced by
Francis William Lawvere in 1969.
After proving the general Theorem of Soundness and Completeness for the intuitionistic predi-
cate logic with equality with respect to hyperdoctrines, we formulate instances of such categorical
models by using H-valued sets and Kleene realizability, in order to produce easily models and
countermodels for logical formulas.
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Introduction
The main purpose of the thesis is the proof of the Theorem of Soundness and Completeness for
predicate logic with equality with respect to the categorical semantics of Lawvere’s hyperdoc-
trines. Categorical logic was introduced during the 1960s and 1970s by Lawvere and can roughly
be defined as the treatment of logic in a category-theoretic framework. In this framework the
semantics of logical connectives and quantifiers is defined by means of adjoint functors, thus it
differs from the well-known and extensively used semantics for intuitionistic and classical logic,
namely complete Heyting and Boolean algebras respectively. More precisely, category theory, and
thus categorical logic, allows an extremely general treatment of algebraic structures, hence we
should more properly assert that categorical semantics extends the canonical algebraic semantics.
We should also underline that categorical logic allows a full constructive direct proof of the Theo-
rem of Soundness and Completeness, whereas this is no longer possible with a canonical algebraic
approach to logic.
Next to a close attention to the mathematical aspects of the issue, also a sketch of the underlying
historical events can be found in the thesis. There are two main reasons why we opt for such a
choice. First, we do think that mathematical constructions go hand-in-hand with historical facts,
and thus that the former can more accurately explain and be explained by the latter. Second,
we have to recognize that categorical logic is a really wide and organic subject, despite its recent
formulation, and that the part we are going to take into consideration is just a drop in the bucket.
However, it represents the starting point of many other developments in research, which can be
depicted, if not in their many formal aspects, at least by giving a clue of their historical importance.
Exactly for the same reasons, the historical and the formal treatments of the issue are not kept
separated, but rather they weave together drawing strength one from the other. On facing such a
project, one or two things have to be born in mind, though. In the first place, we should underline
the lack of an accepted historiography on the subject, which is motivated by the recent historical
developments of category theory and categorical logic. Secondly, the authors of the very few
publications dealing with this matter are most of the times the leading actors of the events they
are reporting, therefore an external point of view cannot be provided yet.
The thesis can be in some sense divided into four parts. At the beginning, an introduction of
the basic concepts of category theory is imperative: as we already said, categorical logic can in
fact be thought of as a branch of category theory. Afterwards, the basics of categorical logic are
introduced: logical connectives and quantifiers, as well as the equality in a language, are shown to
be characterized by an essentially adjoint-functorial nature. Finally, the proof of the Theorem of
Soundness and Completeness for categorical predicate logic with identity is presented. In the very
end, one can find a sketchy introduction to the basics of Kleene’s realizability theory, presented
in the form of hyperdoctrine.
Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 introduce the basic notions of category theory. First
of all, the concept of category is introduced. Different categories can be related one to another
via functors. Sometimes different functors behave in a really similar fashion, so it is possible
to pass from one to another via natural transformations. More importantly, the way certain
adjoint functors can be composed often spots pivotal patterns in the mathematical landscape:
undoubtedly, adjunction turns out to be the most important construction of category theory and
as such it weaves together the many different concepts and arguments this thesis tackles. Whereas
adjunction describes relationships between categories, limits (and their dual, colimits) provide
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an internal view of categories and formalize many mathematical constructions such as products,
sums, pullbacks and many others under a unique notion.
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 deal with preorders and Heyting, Boolean and Lindenbaum algebras.
They are so intimately related one to each other that at some points notions described in the
latter can be necessary to understand those of the former. Indeed, algebras and preorders have
at their cores the same mathematical structures, which can be described by means of category
theory. We decided to present the matters following this order because some observations at the
end of Chapter 5 are hints that prepare the reader for the passage from a an algebraic treatment
of logic to a category-theoretic one.
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are in fact the first real chapters about categorical logic as such.
The main concern of these two chapters is to ”translate” in a purely categorical framework logical
connectives and quantifiers: whereas the remarks of Chapter 5 give the idea for a categorical
introduction of all connectives, this is not the case for quantifiers. The categorical treatment of
logical quantifiers passes through the formalization of the notion of hyperdoctrine. Hyperdoctrines
provide in addition the means to formalize categorically the identity in logical languages.
Chapter 8 represents the core of the thesis: the proof of the Theorem of Soundness and
Completeness for predicate logic with equality is provided. Besides, since categorical toolkit allows
a very general treatment of mathematical concepts, the proof of the Theorem is also presented in
a particular case, which will be useful for the construction of a countermodel for the well-known
non-intuitionistically valid formula ∀x1∀x2.(x1 = x2 ∨ x1 ≠ x2).
Chapter 9 is all devoted to an example of application of the categorical notions so far in-
troduced. More specifically, we will propose a treatment of Kleene’s theory of realizability for
predicate logic in category-theoretic terms and we will use this to show that the rules of classical
logic, unlike those of intuitionistic logic, are not valid in Kleene’s realizability.
Chapter 1
Basic concepts of category theory
The main purpose of this chapter is introducing the basic notions of category theory, such as
category, functor and natural transformation. A category is a formalization of the most general
idea of a mathematical structure: inside a given structure, we can find the mathematical objects
that belong to it, as well as some mathematical connections between them. Different structures
can be somehow connected one to each other: this idea gives rise to the notion of functor. Besides,
the ways of connecting different structures can turn out to have something in common between
them: this is formalized in the notion of natural transformation.
1.1 Halfway between category theory and logic
Categorical logic is logic in the setting of category theory. Exact though this definition might
be, it is undoubtedly much too poor and shallow to be accepted with no further comments. We
find more instructive to look at categorical logic as a ”generalization of the algebraic encoding of
propositional logic to first-order, higher-order and other logics” ([MR11], pg 1.): in the same way
(either intuitionistic or classical) propositional logic can be encoded by algebraic logic by means
of Lindenbaum-Tarki algebras, so categorical logic encodes first-order and higher order logics by
means of categories with specific properties and structures.
It becomes apparent now the reasons why the history and development of categorical logic is
deeply related to the birth and evolution of category theory. Unavoidably, we have to begin by
introducing the basic notions of category theory, in order to pass on later to treat categorical logic.
Category theory appeared officially in 1945 in the paper General Theory of Natural Equiv-
alences ([ME45]) by Samuel Eilenberg (September 30, 1913 – January 30, 1998) and Saunders
MacLane (August 4, 1909 – April 14, 2005). In MacLane’s words, the paper was ”off-beat” and
”far out” ([Mac02], pg 130).
S. Eilenberg
S. MacLane
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The initial idea of the two mathematicians was to provide an autonomous framework for the
concept of natural transformation, which they came across during their studies and whose
generality, pervasiveness and usefulness became soon clear to both of them. For this reason,
their initial project turned into that one of devising an axiomatic system in which natural trans-
formations would arise naturally from a stable and self-consistent theoretic grounding. After
they realized that a natural transformation is nothing but a family of maps providing a sort of
”deformation” between two ”collections of interrelated entities” within a given structure, they
introduced what are now called functors, which played the role of the ”deformation” of a natural
transformation. The ”collection of interrelated entities” was soon formalized through the defini-
tion of category. Noteworthy is the fact that MacLane and Eilenberg explicitly avoided using a
set-theoretical terminology and notation.
Out of sheer historical interest, we report here the very first definition of category ever, as it
appeared in MacLane and Eilenberg’s paper.
Definition 1.1. A category A = (A,α) is an aggregate of abstract elements A (for example,
groups), called the objects of the category, and abstract elements α (for example, homomor-
phisms), called mappings of the category. Certain pairs of mappings α1, α2 determine uniquely
a product mapping α = α2α1 ∈ A subject to the axioms C1, C2, C3 below. Corresponding to each
object A ∈ A there is a unique mapping, denoted by eA or by e(A), and subject to the axioms C4
and C5. The axioms are:
C1 The triple product α3(α2α1) is defined if and only if (α3α2)α1 is defined. When either is
defined, the associative law
α3(α2α1) = (α3α2)α1
holds. This triple product will be written as α3α2α1.
C2 The triple product α3α2α1 is defined whenever both products α3α2 and α2α1 are defined.
A mapping e ∈ A will be called an identity of A if and only if the existence of any product eα or
βe implies that eα = α and βe = β.
C3 For each mapping α ∈ A there is at least one identity e1 ∈ A such that αe1 is defined, and at
least one identity e2 ∈ A such that e2α is defined.
C4 The mapping eA corresponding to each object A is an identity.
C5 For each identity e of A there is a unique object A of A such that eA = e.
Since we can find a one-to-one correspondence between the collection of all objects of a category
and the set of all its identities, the concept of object plays a secondary role and thus can be even
omitted in the definition of category.
The extent of the crucial importance of the concept of category in mathematics did not ap-
peared immediately clear to Eilenberg and MacLane. We are not meaning that the two mathe-
maticians did not see the ingenuity of the mathematical structure they had just introduced, indeed
in 1945 paper itself, we read:
”In a metamathematical sense our theory provides general concepts applicable to
all branches of abstract mathematics, and so contributes to the current trend towards
uniform treatment of different mathematical disciplines. In particular, it provides
opportunities for the comparison of constructions and of the isomorphisms occurring
in different branches of mathematics; in this way it may occasionally suggest new
results by analogy.
The theory also emphasizes that, whenever new abstract objects are constructed
in a specified way out of given ones, it is advisable to regard the construction of the
corresponding induced mappings on these new objects as an integral part of their def-
inition. The pursuit of this program entails a simultaneous consideration of objects
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and their mappings (in our terminology, this means the consideration not of individual
objects but of categories). This emphasis on the specification of the type of map-
pings employed gives more insight into the degree of invariance of the various concepts
involved.” ([ME45], pg 236)
Nevertheless, categories were not doing any mathematical work, rather they were simply a
handy language for systematizing data, however clever it might be.
”It should be observed first that the whole concept of a category is essentially an
auxiliary one; our basic concepts are essentially those of a functor and of a natural
transformation (the latter is defined in the next chapter). The idea of a category is
required only by the precept that every function should have a definite class as domain
and a definite class as range, for the categories are provided as the domains and ranges
of functors. Thus one could drop the category concept altogether and adopt an even
more intuitive standpoint, in which a functor such as ”Horn” is not defined over the
category of ”all” groups, but for each particular pair of groups which may be given. The
standpoint would suffice for the applications, inasmuch as none of our developments
will involve elaborate constructions on the categories themselves.” ([ME45], pg 247)
It took a dozen years before mathematicians started elaborating constructions on categories
themselves. On those occasions, the fact that the concept of category has a pivotal role in many
mathematical structures became clear and questions concerning the nature of categories came to
light. Among the others, also MacLane tackled those foundational problems in the late 1950s and
early 1960s ([Mac61]).
It is worth mentioning the fact that, although MacLane and Eilenberg introduced functor cate-
gories, they did not explore the possibility of a category of categories, neither did they notice that
categories compose in two different natural ways. Also, we can assert that they did not investigate
into the various properties of categories and functors, nor did they use them systematically: for
these reasons it is acceptable to claim that they did not introduce category theory as such (see
e.g. [MR11], pg 7). The turning point came with the publications of the books Foundations of
Algebraic Topology ([SE52]) and Homological Algebra ([CE56]), where Eilenberg, Steernrod and
Cartan applied category theory to algebraic topology: diagrams became a foundamental tool in
proofs, functors began to play a crucial role and categories were considered in themselves (i.e.
formal contexts in which one could identify, define and develop mathematics).
1.2 Categories
Definition 1.2. A category C consists of:
• a class Ob(C) of objects;
• for all A,B ∈ Ob(C), a collection C(A,B) of maps (also called arrows or morphisms) such
that:
(a) for each A,B,C ∈ Ob(C) there exists a function called composition given by
C(B,C) × C(A,B) Ð→ A(A,C)(g, f) z→ g ○ f
(b) for each A ∈ Ob(C) there exists an element 1A of A(A,A) called identity on A.
Also, the following two axioms are satisfied:
(i) (associativity) for each f ∈ C(A,B), g ∈ C(B,C), h ∈ C(C,D): (h ○ g) ○ f = h ○ (g ○ f);
(ii) (identity) for each f ∈ C(A,B): f ○ 1A = 1B ○ f = f .
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Every map in a category has a definite domain and codomain: if f ∈ C(A,B), we call A
the domain and B the codomain of f . Also, in the definition above we are assuming thatC(A,B) ∩ C(A′,B′) = ∅ unless A = A′ and B = B′, given that it is possible to intersect arbitrary
pairs of classes.
Example 1.1. There is a category Set, whose objects are sets and whose maps are functions
between sets. Composition in the category is the ordinary composition of functions, and identities
are the identity maps.
Example 1.2. There is a category Grp, whose objects are groups and whose maps are group
homomorphisms. Composition and identities are the ordinary ones.
Example 1.3. There is a category Ring, whose objects are rings and whose maps are ring homo-
morphisms. Composition and identities are the ordinary ones.
Example 1.4. There is a category Vectk, whose objects are vector spaces over k and whose maps
are linear maps between them. Composition and identities are the ordinary ones.
Example 1.5. There is a category Top, whose objects are topological spaces and whose maps are
continuous maps between them. Composition and identities are the ordinary ones.
Example 1.6. Let’s consider some language L. There is a category Der, whose objects are first
order formulas in the language L. We say that there is a map from ϕ to ψ if there is a derivation
in the classical natural deduction system with ϕ as the only uncancelled assumption(s) and ψ
as the root of the derivation tree. Given maps pi ∶ ϕ Ð→ ψ and pi′ ∶ ψ Ð→ χ, which means that
pi is a derivation tree with ϕ as the only uncancelled assumption(s) and ψ as the root and pi′
is a derivation tree with ψ as the only uncancelled assumption(s) and χ as the root, then their
composition is obtained by placing the derivation tree pi above every uncancelled assumption ψ in
the derivation tree pi′. The identity of a first order formula ϕ in the language L is given by the
derivation tree of depth 0 with ϕ both as the only uncancelled assumption and as the root.
Example 1.7. A monoid (M, ⋅) is a set equipped with an associative binary operation and a two-
sided unit element. It can be represented as a category with one only object. Indeed, there is
a one-to-one correspondence between monoids and one-object categories, sending every element
of the monoid in a map from the only object into itself and sending the identity of the monoid
into the only identity map in the category, and such that the operation ⋅ between elements of the
monoid corresponds to the composition of maps in the correspondent one-object category.
Definition 1.3. A map f ∶ A Ð→ B in a category C is an isomorphism if there exists a map
g ∶ B Ð→ A in C such that g ○ f = 1A and f ○ g = 1B. If this is the case we write A ≅ B.
Example 1.8. The isomorphisms in Set are bijections.
Example 1.9. The isomorphisms in Grp and Ring are group and ring isomorphisms, respectively.
Example 1.10. The isomorphisms in Top are the homeomorphisms. We notice that, in contrast to
the situation in the previuos examples, a bijective map in Top is not necessarily an isomoprhism:
as a counter example it suffices to consider the map:[0,1) Ð→ {z ∈ C∣∣z∣ = 1}
t z→ e2piit
Example 1.11. A group (G, ⋅) is a monoid in which every element is invertible. Exactly as in the
previous example in which a monoid was seen as a one-object category, we can regard every group
as a one-object category in which every map in an isomorphism.
Given some categories, it is possible to build new categories, basically in two different ways.
Indeed we can define the opposite category and the product category as follows.
Definition 1.4. Given a category C, the opposite category (or dual category) Cop is described
by:
Ob(Cop) = Ob(C)
and Cop(A,B) = C(B,A) for each A,B ∈ Ob(C).
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Due to the existence of the opposite category for any category we can consider, we can reverse
every result (which means every theorem, law, observation or property) and we can find a new
one, which is the dual of the previous one.
Definition 1.5. Given two categories C and D, the product category C ×D is described by:
Ob(C ×D) = Ob(C) ×Ob(D)
and
(C ×D)((A,B), (A′,B′)) = C(A,A′) ×D(B,B′) for each (A,B), (A′,B′) ∈ Ob(C ×D).
In the definition of category, the very general word “class” is used, in order to indicate the
collection of all the objects of an arbitrary category. It is well-known, though, that in mathematics
the distinction between small (the collections of elements that give rise to sets) and large classes
(the collections of elements that cannot be regarded as sets) is crucial: some results that holds
for sets cannot be applied while working with large classes and viceversa. For this reason, we
introduce a distinction between categories according to the size of their collections of objects.
Definition 1.6. A category C is said to be a small category if the class of all its maps is small,
otherwise it is said to be a large category. It is called a locally small category if for each
C,C ′ ∈ Ob(C) the class C(C,C ′) is small. It is called an essentially small category if it is
equivalent to some small category1.
It follows that a category is small if and only if it is locally small and its class of objects is
small.
Example 1.12. The category Set is locally small, because for any two sets X and Y the functions
from X to Y form a set. However, it is not essentially small, and in order to prove this it suffices
to show that the class of isomorphism classes of sets is large. This means that if I is a set and(Ai)i∈I is a family of sets, then we have to show that there exists a set not isomorphic to any of
the sets Ai. It is sufficient to consider
A ∶= ℘(∑
i∈IAi)
and for each j ∈ I the inclusion Aj Ð→ ∑i∈I Ai. It follows that:∣Aj ∣ ≤ ∣∑
i∈IAi∣ < ∣A∣
hence ∣Aj ∣ < ∣A∣ and in particular Aj ≇ A.
Similarly, Grp, Ab, Ring and Top are locally but not essentially small.
1.3 Functors
The definition of functor formalizes the notion of map between categories.
Definition 1.7. Let C and D be categories. A (covariant) functor F ∶ C Ð→ D consists of:
• a function Ob(C)Ð→ Ob(D), sending any object C ∈ Ob(C) into an object F (C) ∈ Ob(D);
• for each C,C ′ ∈ Ob(C), a function C(C,C ′)Ð→ D(F (C), F (C ′)), f z→ F (f), such that:
(i) F (f ′ ○ f) = F (f ′) ○ F (f) for every f ∈ C(C,C ′) and f ′ ∈ C(C ′,C ′′);
(ii) F (1C) = 1F (C) for every C ∈ Ob(C).
A contravariant functor from C to D is a (covariant) functor Cop Ð→ D.
1The meaning of equivalence between categories is made clear in Definition (1.13).
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We can now consider a category in which the objects are categories themselves and the maps
between them are functors. This is indeed a category, and we call it CAT. We are not going to use
this category very often, since most of the times we prefer not to work with really big collections
of objects. To this purpose, we introduce the category of small categories and funtors between
them and we denote it Cat.
Among all examples of functors, two kinds of them play a major role in category theory:
forgetful and free functors.
Example 1.13. The term forgetful functor is informal, that is it has no precise definition. It
indicates a general way of defining particular types of functors. Here are some examples.
(a) There is a functor U ∶ Grp Ð→ Set sending a group G ∈ Ob(Grp) into the set U(G) of
its elements and every group homomorphism f into the function f itself. In other words,
U forgets about the group structure of groups and group homomorphisms. Similarly we can
define a forgetful functor U ∶ Ring Ð→ Set forgetting about the ring structure of rings and
ring homomorphisms, as well as a forgetful functor U ∶ Vectk Ð→ Set forgetting about the
vector space structure of vector spaces and about linarity of linear maps.
(b) Forgetful functors need not forget about the whole structure of a category. For instance there is
a functor U ∶ Ring Ð→Ab, where Ab is the category of all abelian groups, forgetting about the
multiplicative structure of a ring but remembering the underlying additive group. Similarly, if
Mon is the category of monoids and monoid homomorphisms, there is a functor U ∶ Ring Ð→
Mon that forgets the additive structure and remembers the underlying multiplicative monoid.
In addition to that, we can also consider the functor U ∶ Ab Ð→ Grp that forgets about the
commutativity of abelian groups.
Example 1.14. We can also consider the free functors, which are in some sense dual to the
forgetful functors (to be precise, there is an adjunction between them). There is a functor F ∶
Set Ð→ Grp, sending a set S into the free group F (S) on S and every function f ∶ S Ð→ S′
in Set into the group homomorphism F (f) ∶ F (S) Ð→ F (S′)2. Similarly, there is a functor
F ∶ Set Ð→ CRing, where CRing is the category of commutative ring and ring homomorphims
between them, sending every set S into the ring of polynomials over Z in commutative variables{xs}s∈S . Also, there is a functor F ∶ Set Ð→ Vectk, sendind very set S into a vector space with
basis S (any two such vector spaces are isomorphic).
Example 1.15. Let G be a group regarded as a one-object category G. A functor A ∶ G Ð→ Set
assigns to the unique object G ∈ G a set S and to every map g in G a function A(g) ∶ S Ð→ S,
satisfying the conditions in the definition of functor. If we write (F (g))(s) = g ⋅ s, we notice that
the functor A amounts to a set S together with a function
G × S Ð→ S(g, s) z→ g ⋅ s
such that (gg′) ⋅ s = g′ ⋅ (g ⋅ s) and 1G ⋅ s = s, for every g, g′ ∈ G, s ∈ S. Therefore, the functor A is a
set equipped with a left action by G.
Example 1.16. Let’s fix a vector space W over the field k. For any k-vector space V we can
define the vector space Hom(V,W ) of the linear maps from V to W where the operations are
defined pointwise, and for any linear map f ∶ V Ð→ V ′ we can define the linear map Hom(f,W ) ∶
Hom(V ′,W )Ð→Hom(V,W ) by Hom(f,W )(q) ∶= q ○f for every q ∈ Hom(V ′,W ). This defines
a contravariant funtor Hom(−,W ) ∶ Vectopk Ð→Vectk. Similarly, if we consider the field k in place
of the vector spaceW , we can define a contravariant functor (−)∗ = Hom(−, k) ∶ Vectopk Ð→Vectk,
which turns out to send each k-vector space into its dual.
2More precisely, we can think of the elements of F (S) as formal expressions or words built from the elements
of S. For instance, the word yx−4z3y−1 is obtained from the elements x, y, z of some set. Furthermore, any map
between sets gives rise to a group homomorphism. For instance, if we take the map f ∶ {x, y, z} Ð→ {u, v} defined
by f(x) = f(y) = u and f(z) = v, this gives rise to a group homomorphism F (f) ∶ F ({x, y, z}) Ð→ F ({u, v}) which
for example sends the word yx−4z3y−1 ∈ F ({x, y, z}) to uu−4v3u−1 = u−3v3u−1 ∈ F ({u, v}).
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Definition 1.8. A functor F ∶ C Ð→ D is faithful [full] if for every C,C ′ ∈ Ob(C) the function
C(C,C ′) Ð→ D(F (C), F (C ′))
f z→ F (f)
is injective [surjective].
In other words, a functor F ∶ C Ð→ D is faithful if and only if for each C,C ′ ∈ Ob(C) and
g ∈ D(F (C), F (C ′)), there is at most one arrow C Ð→ C ′ in C that sends F into g, and it is full
if for each C,C ′ ∈ Ob(C) and g ∈ D(F (C), F (C ′)), there is at least one arrow C Ð→ C ′ in C that
sends F into g.
Definition 1.9. Let C be a category. A subcategory S of C consists of:
• a subclass Ob(S) of Ob(C);
• for each S,S′ ∈ Ob(S) there is a subclass S(S,S′) of C such that it is closed under composition
and identities.S is said to be a full subcategory if for all S,S′ ∈ Ob(S) it happens that S(S,S′) = C(S,S′).
Whenever S is a subcategory of C we can find an inclusion functor:
I ∶ S Ð→ C
S z→ S
f ∶ S Ð→ S′ z→ f ∶ S Ð→ S′
Trivially, the inclusion functor I is faithful and it is full if and only if S is a full subcategory.
Generally speacking, the image of a functor is not a subcategory.
1.4 Natural transformations
Other than the notion of map between categories, which is a functor, we can also take into account
the notion of map between functors. For this reason we introduce the following definition.
Definition 1.10. Let C, D be two categories and F,G ∶ C Ð→ D be two functors between them. A
natural transformation α ∶ F Ð→ G is a family (αC ∶ F (C) Ð→ G(C))C∈Ob(C) of maps in D
such that for every f ∶ C Ð→ C ′ in C the following square commutes:
F (C) F (C ′)
G(C) G(C ′)
F (f)
αC αC′
G(f)
(1.1)
We write C DF
G
α to mean that α is a natural trasformation from F to G.
Example 1.17. Given a commutative ring R, the matrices Mn(R) over the ring R form a monoid,
with the matrix multiplication as operation. Given a ring homomorphism R Ð→ S, then there is
a monoid homomorphism Mn(R) Ð→ Mn(S). Hence, we can define a functor Mn ∶ CRing Ð→
Mon. Also, we can consider the forgetful functor that forgets the additive structure of a commu-
tative ring, giving rise to a monoid: U ∶ CRing Ð→Mon.
We can consider the natural transformation
CRing Mon
Mn
U
det
18 CHAPTER 1. BASIC CONCEPTS OF CATEGORY THEORY
defined by the family (Mn(R) detRÐ→ U(R))R∈Ob(CRing).
Indeed, from the property of the determinant detR(XY ) = detR(X)detR(Y ) and detR(I) = 1, we
infer that detR is a monoid morphism, thus a map in Mon, for every ring R. In addition, for
every f ∈ CRing(R,S) the following square commutes:
Mn(R) Mn(S)
U(R) U(S)
CRing(f)
detR detS
U(f)
since for every X ∈Mn(R): f(detR(X)) = detS(f(X)).
We can easily notice that we can compose natural trasformations. For instance, let’s consider
the natural trasformations α and β such that:
C DF
G
α
C DG
H
β
Then there is a composite natural transformation
C DF
H
β○α
defined by (β ○ α)C = βC ○ αC , for all C ∈ C. In addition, we can also consider the identity
natural transformation C DF
F
1F . Therefore, the natural transformations admit composition
and identities. The following definition makes sense.
Definition 1.11. Let C, D be two categories. The functor category DC from C to D is the cat-
egory whose objects are the functors from C to D and whose maps are the natural transformations
between them.
Given two functors, we do not often care at all whether the functors are equal. In fact, we are
more interested in their structures, and in the way those reflect their jobs. As a consequence, we
introduce the notion of natural isomorphism.
Definition 1.12. Let C and D be two categories, F and G functors and α a natural trasformation
C DF
G
α . α is said to be a natural isomorphism if equivalently:
(i) α is an isomorphism in the functor category DC;
(ii) αC ∶ F (C)Ð→ G(C) is an isomorphism for all C ∈ Ob(C).
If this is the case we write F ≅ G, and we say that F (C) ≅ G(C) naturally in C for every
C ∈ Ob(C).
Lemma 1.1. The two definitions (i) and (ii) of natural isomorphism are equivalent.
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Proof. (i) Ð→ (ii) Let α ∶ F Ð→ G be a natural transformation from C to D and assume it to be
an isomorphism in the category DC . Hence, there is β ∶ G Ð→ F in DC such that β ○ α = 1F and
α ○ β = 1G. This means that βC ○ αC = 1F (C) and αC ○ βC = 1G(C), for all C ∈ C. So, αC is an
isomorphism for every C ∈ C.(ii) Ð→ (i) Let α ∶ F Ð→ G be a natural transformation from C to D and assume that
αC ∶ F (C) Ð→ G(C) is an isomorphism for all C ∈ C. Then for each C ∈ C there is some
βC ∶ G(C) Ð→ F (C) such that βC ○ αC = 1F (C) and αC ○ βC = 1G(C). Now the family of maps
in D given by (βC)C∈Ob(C) can be regarded as a natural transformation β, so as a map in DC .
Therefore we have found β ∈ (DC)(G,F ) such that β ○α = 1F and α ○β = 1G, which means that α
is an isomorphism in DC .
Example 1.18. Given a field k, let FDVectk be the category of finite dimensional k-vector spaces
and linear maps between them. There is a contravariant functor
(−)∗ = Hom(−, k) ∶ FDVectk Ð→ FDVectk
defining the dual vector space construction. Similarly, we can define a covariant functor
(−)∗∗ ∶ FDVectk Ð→ FDVectk
sending every vector space into its dual. Moreover there is a canonical isomorphism αV ∶ V Ð→ V ∗∗
for every V ∈ Ob(FDVectk).
Having said that, we can construct a natural isomorphism
FDVectk D
1FDVectk
(−)∗∗
α
thus V ≅ V ∗∗ naturally in V .
Definition 1.13. An equivalence (F,G, η, ε) between two categories C and D consists of a pair
of functors C DF
G
and a pair of natural isomorphisms
η ∶ 1C Ð→ G ○ F , ε ∶ F ○GÐ→ 1D.
If this is the case, we say that C and D are equivalent and that the functors F and G are
equivalences. We write C ≃ D.
Definition 1.14. A functor F ∶ C Ð→ D is essentially surjective on objects if for all D ∈ D
there exists C ∈ Ob(C) such that F (C) ≅D.
Proposition 1.1. A functor is an equivalence if and only if it is full, faithful and essentially
surjective on objects.
Proof. (⇒) Let F ∶ C Ð→ D be an equivalence, hence there exists a functor G ∶ D Ð→ C such that
η ∶ 1C ∼Ð→ G ○ F and ε ∶ F ○G ∼Ð→ 1D.
F is faithful. Since η is an isomorphism, ηC ∶ C ∼Ð→ GF (C) for any C ∈ C, and for any f ∈ C(C,C ′)
the following diagram commutes:
C C ′
GF (C) GF (C ′)
f
ηC ηC′
GF (f)
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Thus, if F (f) = F (f ′) then applying G one gets GF (f) = GF (f ′) and so, by the commutativity
of the previous diagram and the fact that ηC and ηC′ are isomorphisms, f = f ′. So F is faithful.
Similarly also G is.
F is full. Let g ∈ D(F (C), F (C ′)). We consider:
C C ′
GF (C) GF (C ′)ηC ηC′
G(g)
Being ηC′ an isomorphism, we can define f ∶= (ηC′)−1 ○G(g) ○ ηC . Also, by the commutativity of:
C C ′
GF (C) GF (C ′)
f
ηC ηC′
G(g)
we infer that GF (f) = G(g). But G is faithful, hence F (f) = g, thus F is full.
F is essentially surjective on objects. Let D ∈ Ob(D). We know from ε ∶ F ○ G ∼Ð→ 1D that
εD ∶ D Ð→ FG(D) is an isomorphism so D ≅ FG(D), and G(D) ∈ Ob(C). Therefore F is
essentially surjective on objects.(⇐) Suppose F faithful, full and essentially surjective on objects. Take an arbitraryD ∈ Ob(D).
By essential surjectivity on objects, there exists an object of C such that its image through F is
isomorphic to D. Take G(D) ∈ Ob(C) to be this object and consider εD ∶ FG(D) ∼Ð→ D. Let
g ∈ D(D,D′) and consider:
FG(D) FG(D′)
D D′
εD εD′
g
so one gets (εD′)−1 ○ g ○ εD ∶ FG(D) Ð→ FG(D′). But F is faithful and full, so for every
D,D′ ∈ Ob(D) there exists unique G(g) ∶ G(D) Ð→ G(D′) (more formally: for every couple of
elements D,D′ there are unique C,C ′ such that F (C) = D and F (C ′) = D′ and such that there
is a morphism between them; so we define G on g as we did). Also, by the previous diagram, we
deduce that FG(g) must be exactly (εD′)−1 ○ g ○ εD. Defined in such a way, G is clearly a functor
from D to C and ε ∶ F ○ G Ð→ 1D defined on every D as before gives clearly rise to a natural
isomorphism.
Let’s take now C ∈ Ob(C). Then F (C) ∈ Ob(D) and we can consider, given what has just been
said, εF (C) ∶ F (C) ∼Ð→ FGF (C). Since F is faithful and full, we can well-define F −1(εF (C)) ∶
C
∼Ð→ GF (C). This gives rise to a natural isomorphism (since ε is) η ∶ 1C Ð→ G ○ F .
Example 1.19. Let M be the full subcategory of Cat whose objects are the small one-object
categories. By the definition of category, the maps from an object of a small one-object category
to itself form a monoid under composition. So, there is a functor F ∶ M Ð→ Mon sending a
one-object category to the monoid of maps from the single object to itself. F is full, faithful and
surjective on objects. Therefore M ≅ Mon.
Corollary 1.1. Let F ∶ C Ð→ D be a full and faithful functor. Then C is equivalent to the full
subcategory C′ of D whose objects are those of the form F (C) for some C ∈ Ob(C).
Proof. Let’s consider the functor F ′ ∶ C Ð→ C′ defined by F ′(C) ∶= F (C) for every C ∈ Ob(C). It
is full and faithful, since F is. Besides, it is essentially surjective on objects, by definition of C′.
By the previous proposition we can conclude.
Chapter 2
Adjoint functors
An adjunction between two functors can be defined in many different ways. We want now to
present different definitions of adjunction between two categories (which means that two functors
are one the adjoint of the other), in order to prove then their being equivalent.
The notion of adjunction, as we will see, is the real turning point that makes possible a cate-
gorical treatment of logic. In fact, the category-theoretic approach to logic consists in recognizing
the hidden essentially adjoint-functorial behaviour at the core of logical connectives and quanti-
fiers. Though this great intuition came first to Lawvere’s mind, he was not the first one to realize
the pivotal importance of adjoint functors. The notion of adjoint functor was first introduced in
1956 by Kan. He soon realized that adjunction was the key to unify various results that he had
obtained in the previous years. Before publishing the unified version of those results in 1958, he
had to write a paper on adjoint functors only and on that occasion he realized how truly general
the notion of adjunction is.
Definition 2.1 (Adjunction via isomorphism between categories). Let C DF
G
be categories
and functors. F is left adjoint to G and G is right adjoint to F (we write F ⊣ G) ifD(F (C),D) ≅ C(C,G(D)) (2.1)
naturally in C ∈ Ob(C) and D ∈ D. More precisely, there exists an isomorphismD(F (C),D) Ð→ C(C,G(D))(F (C) gÐ→D) ↦ (C gÐ→ G(D))(F (C) fÐ→D) ↤ (C fÐ→ G(D))
(where f is called the transpose of f) such that the following two axioms are satisfied:
(F (C) gÐ→D qÐ→D′) = (C gÐ→ G(D) G(q)Ð→ G(D′)) (2.2)
(C ′ pÐ→ C fÐ→ G(D)) = (F (C ′) F (p)Ð→ F (C) fÐ→D) (2.3)
for every g, q, p and f .
An adjunction between C and D is a triple (F,G, .) satisfying (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3).
In the conditions (2.2) and (2.3) of the definition, in makes no difference whether to put the
bar over the right-hand side or the left-hand side of the equalities: the bar is self-inverse. Also, it
can be easily seen that the two conditions (2.2) and (2.3) can be replaced by the unique request:
(C ′ pÐ→ C fÐ→ G(D) G(q)Ð→ G(D′)) = (F (C ′) F (p)Ð→ F (C) fÐ→D qÐ→D′)
for every q, p and f .
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Definition 2.2 (Adjunction via unit and counit). Let C DF
G
be categories and functors.
F is left adjoint to G and G is right adjoint to F (we write F ⊣ G) if there exist two natural
transformations:
η ∶ 1C Ð→ G ○ F and ε ∶ F ○GÐ→ 1D
called unit and counit respectively, satisfying the following triangle identities:
F (C) FGF (C)
F (C)1F (C)
F (ηC)
εF (C)
G(D) GFG(D)
G(D)1G(D)
ηG(D)
G(εD) (2.4)
An adjunction between C and D is a quadruplet (F,G, η, ε) where C DF
G
are functors and
η ∶ 1C Ð→ G ○ F , ε ∶ F ○GÐ→ 1D are natural transformations satisfying (2.4).
Definition 2.3. Let C be a category. An object I ∈ Ob(C) is initial if for every C ∈ Ob(C) there
is exactly one map I Ð→ C. An object T ∈ Ob(C) is terminal if for every C ∈ Ob(C), there is
exactly one map C Ð→ T .
It can be easily seen that initial objects, as well as terminal objects (one concept is dual to the
other), are unique up to isomorphism, which means that if I, I ′ are both initial objects in some
category, then there is a unique isomorphism between them. We call 1 the terminal object of the
category CAT, containing only one object and only the identity map of this object.
Definition 2.4. Let A, B, C be categories and P ∶ AÐ→ C, Q ∶ B Ð→ C be functors. The comma
category (P ⇒ Q) is the category where objects are triples (A,h,B) with A ∈ Ob(A), B ∈ Ob(B),
h ∈ C(P (A),Q(B)) and maps (A,h,B) Ð→ (A′, h′,B′) are pairs (f ∶ A Ð→ A′, g ∶ B Ð→ B′) of
maps sich that the following square commutes:
P (A) P (A′)
Q(B) Q(B′)
P (f)
h h′
Q(g)
Let C be a category. Any object C ∈ Ob(C) can be described by a functor C ∶ 1 Ð→ C, namely
the object to which the unique object of 1 is mapped. Let’s consider now the categories C andD, the functor G ∶ D Ð→ C and an object viewed as a functor C ∶ 1 Ð→ C. The comma category(C ⇒ G) has as objects the pairs (D,f ∶ C Ð→ G(D)) and a map (D,f)Ð→ (D′, f ′) in (C ⇒ G)
is a map q ∶D Ð→D′ in D such that the triangle
C G(D)
G(D′)
f
f ′ G(q)
commutes. Dually, we can consider the functor F ∶ C Ð→ D and the object viewed as a functor D ∶
1Ð→ D, and we can form the comma category (F ⇒D). Its objects are pairs (C, g ∶ F (C)Ð→D)
and a map (C, g)Ð→ (C ′, g′) in (F ⇒D) is a map p ∶ C Ð→ C ′ such that the triangle
F (C) D
F (C ′)
g
F (p) g′
commutes.
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Definition 2.5 (Adjunction via initial objects). Let C DF
G
be categories and functors.
F is left adjoint to G and G is right adjoint to F (we write F ⊣ G) if there is a natural
transformation η ∶ 1C Ð→ G ○ F such that ηC ∶ C Ð→ GF (C) is an initial object in the comma
category (C ⇒ G) for every C ∈ Ob(C).
An adjunction (F,G, (ηC)C∈Ob(C)) between C and D is a choice for F , G functors and ηC natural
transformation as above.
In the notation of the definition (2.5) above, given C ∈ Ob(C), claiming that ηC ∶ C Ð→ GF (C)
is an initial object in the comma category (C ⇒ G) means that for any object (D,f ∶ C Ð→
G(D)) ∈ Ob(C ⇒ G) there exists a unique map in the comma category (C ⇒ G) from (F (C), ηC)
to (D,f). And this means that for any (D,f) ∈ Ob(C ⇒ G) there exists a unique map q ∶
F (C)Ð→D in D such that
C GF (C)
G(D)
ηC
f
G(q)
commutes.
We can also have the dual statement of the definition (2.5).
Definition 2.6 (Adjunction via terminal objects). Let C DF
G
be categories and functors.
F is left adjoint to G and G is right adjoint to F (we write F ⊣ G) if there is a natural
transformation ε ∶ F ○G Ð→ 1D such that εD ∶ FG(D) Ð→ D is a terminal object in the comma
category (F ⇒D) for every D ∈ Ob(D).
An adjunction (F,G, (εD)D∈Ob(D)) between C and D is a choice for F , G functors and εD natural
transformation as above.
In the notation of the definition (2.6) above, given D ∈ Ob(D), claiming that εD ∶ FG(D)Ð→D
is a terminal object in the comma category (F ⇒ D) means that for any object (C, g ∶ F (C) Ð→
D) ∈ Ob(F ⇒ D) there exists a unique map in the comma category (F ⇒ D) from (C, g)
to (G(D), εD). And this means that for any (C, g) ∈ Ob(F ⇒ D) there exists a unique map
p ∶ C Ð→ G(D) in C such that
F (C) D
FG(D)
g
F (p) εD
commutes.
We decide now to take the definition (2.1) as the definition of adjunction, and we prove that
the definitions (2.2) and (2.5) are equivalent to the previous one.
Theorem 2.1. An adjunction (F,G, .) between the categories C and D (where C DF
G
are
functors) is completely determined by each one of the following conditions:
(i) (F,G, η, ε) is a quadruplet where F , G are functors and η ∶ 1C Ð→ G ○ F , ε ∶ F ○G Ð→ 1D
(called unit and counit) are natural transformations satisfying the triangle identities (2.4).
(ii) (F,G, (ηC)C∈Ob(C)) is a set where η ∶ 1C Ð→ G ○ F is a natural transformation such that ηC
is an initial object in the comma category (C ⇒ G) for every C ∈ Ob(C).
(iii) (G, (F0(C), ηC)C∈Ob(C)) where, given C ∈ Ob(C), F0(C) ∈ Ob(D) and ηC ∶ C Ð→ GF0(C) is
a map in C such that for any D ∈ Ob(D) and any f ∶ C Ð→ G(D) in C there exists a unique
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q ∶ F0(C)Ð→D such that the triangle
C GF0(C)
G(D)
ηC
f
G(q)
commutes.
(iv) (F,G, (εD)D∈Ob(D)) is a set where ε ∶ F ○GÐ→ 1D is a natural transformation such that εD
is a terminal object in the comma category (F ⇒D) for every D ∈ Ob(D).
(v) (F, (G0(D), εD)D∈Ob(D)) where, given D ∈ Ob(D), G0(D) ∈ Ob(C) and εD ∶ FG0(D) Ð→ D
is a map in D such that for any C ∈ Ob(C) and any g ∶ F (C) Ð→ D in D there exists a
unique p ∶ C Ð→ G0(D) such that the triangle
F (C) D
FG0(D)
g
F (p) εD
commutes.
Proof. The statements (iii) and (v) are straightforward consequences of (ii) and (iv) respectively.
Also, (iv) is obtained from (ii) by duality. Consequently, we will simply show that (i) is equivalent
to the definition (2.1) and to (ii).
(i). Let (F,G, .) be an adjunction, where f ⊣ G and . is the transposition
. ∶ D(F (C),D) ≅Ð→ C(C,G(D))
Let C ∈ Ob(C), hence F (C) ∈ Ob(D) and 1F (C) ∶ F (C) Ð→ F (C) is a map in D by definition of
category. By (2.2), there is a map ηC ∶= 1F (C) ∶ C Ð→ GF (C) in D. Hence, by the arbitrariness
of C ∈ Ob(C), we can define the unit
η ∶ 1C Ð→ G ○ F.
This is a natural transformation, indeed for every p ∶ C Ð→ C ′ in C the following diagram com-
mutes:
C C ′
GF (C) GF (C ′)
p
ηC ηC′
GF (p)
since by (2.2) and (2.3):
ηC′ ○ p = 1C′ ○ p = 1C′ ○ F (p) = F (p) ○ 1F (C′) = GF (p) ○ 1F (C′) = GF (p) ○ ηC .
Similarly we can define the counit
ε ∶ F ○GÐ→ 1D
which is a natural trasformation as well. In addition, the triangle identities (2.4) hold. Indeed, by
(2.3) we infer
(C ηCÐ→ GF (C) 1GF (C)Ð→ GF (C)) = (F (C) F (ηC)Ð→ FGF (C) εF (C)Ð→ F (C))
but the left-hand side is ηC = 1F (C) = 1F (C), so the first identity holds. The second one follows by
duality.
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Let’s consider now a pair of natural transformations (η, ε) satisfying the triangle identities
(2.4), and let’s show that there is an adjunction F ⊢ G in the respect of definition (2.1). We define
the isomorphism D(F (C),D) Ð→ C(C,G(D))(F (C) gÐ→D) ↦ (C gÐ→ G(D))(F (C) fÐ→D) ↤ (C fÐ→ G(D))
by:
g ∶= G(g) ○ ηC
for any g ∶ F (C)Ð→D in D and
f ∶= εD ○ F (f)
for any f ∶ C Ð→ G(D) in C. This is indeed an isomorphism, as g z→ g and f z→ f are mutually
inverse: given a map g ∶ F (C)Ð→D in D the following diagram commutes:
F (C) FGF (C) FG(D)
F (C) D
F (ηC)
1F (C)
FG(g)
εF (C) εD
g
thus
εD ○ FG(g) ○ F (ηC) = g ○ 1F (C)
εD ○ F (G(g) ○ ηC) = g
εD ○ F (g) = g
g = g
and dually f = f for any f ∶ C Ð→ G(D) in C. Finally, given g ∶ F (C) Ð→ D and q ∶ D Ð→ D′ inD, from the way the isomorphism . was defined:
q ○ g = G(q ○ g) ○ ηC = G(q) ○G(g) ○ ηC = G(q) ○ g
which gives exactly the condition (2.2). By duality, also (2.3) holds.
(ii). Let (F,G, η, ε) be an adjunction between the categories C and D with unit η and counit
ε, satisfying the triangle identities (2.4). Let C be an object of C. Then the unit map ηC ∶ C Ð→
GF (C) is an initial object in the comma category (C ⇒ G), which means that for any object
D ∈ Ob(D) and any map f ∶ C Ð→ G(D) in C there is a unique map q ∶ F (C)Ð→D such that
C GF (C)
G(D)
ηC
f
G(q)
commutes. Indeed, by the previous point of the proof we have that G(q) ○ ηC = q, so the previous
triangle commutes if and only if f = q if and only if q = f , and so f is the unique map we were
searching for.
Let’s consider now the functors F and G and ε ∶ F ○G Ð→ 1D a natural transformation such
that εD is a terminal object in the comma category (F ⇒ D) for every D ∈ Ob(D). We need to
show that there exists a unique natural transformation εF ○ G Ð→ 1D such that the pair (η, ε)
satisfies the triangle identities (2.4). Let D ∈ Ob(D) be fixed. We define εD to be the map
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(FG(D), ηG(D))Ð→ (D,1G(D)) in the comma category (G(D)⇒ G).
Naturality. Let q ∶D Ð→D′ in D. The following diagrams commute:
G(D) GFG(D)
G(D)
G(D′)
ηG(D)
1G(D)
G(q)
G(εD)
G(q)
G(D) GFG(D)
G(D′) GFG(D′)
G(D′)
ηG(D)
G(q) GFG(q)
ηG(D′)
1G(D′) G(εD′)
therefore q ○ εD = εD′ ○ FG(q) ∶ ηG(D) Ð→ G(q) in (G(D) ⇒ G) because ηG(D) in initial in(G(D)⇒ G).
Triangle identities. Owing to the way εD was defined for every D ∈ Ob(D), one of the two
triangle identities (2.4) holds straightforwardly. As for the other, we can consider the commutative
diagrams
C GF (C)
GF (C)
ηC
ηC G(1F (C))
C GF (C)
GF (C) GFGF (C)
GF (C)
ηC
ηC GF (ηC)
ηGF (C)
1GF (C) G(εF (C))
hence εF (C) ○ F (ηC) = 1F (C) ∶ F (C) Ð→ F (C), because ηC is initial in (C ⇒ G), then also the
second triangle identity holds.
Uniqueness. Let’s suppose that ε, ε′ ∶ F ○ G Ð→ 1D are natural transformations and that both(η, ε) and (η, ε′) satisfy the triangle identities (2.4). Let D ∈ Ob(D). It follows that the triangle
G(D) GFG(D)
G(D)
ηG(D)
1G(D) G(εD)
commutes and so εD is a map from (FG(D), ηG(D)) to (D,1G(D)) in (G(D) ⇒ G). Exactly
for the same reason, ε′D is too. Due to the initiality of ηG(D), they must be equal, and by the
arbitrariness of D ∈ Ob(D), we infer that ε = ε′.
Lemma 2.1. Let C, D be two categories and let F ∶ C Ð→ D be a functor. If F has a right
[respectively left] adjoint, then it is unique.
Proof. We prove only the uniqueness of the right adjoint to F , since the uniqueness of the left
adjoint follows suit. Let’s suppose that G,G′ ∶ D Ð→ C are right adjoints to F . Then for every
C ∈ Ob(C) and for every D ∈ Ob(D) there are natural isomorphisms
D(F (C),D) ϕC,D≅ C(C,G(D)) and D(F (C),D) ψC,D≅ C(C,G′(D))
and so C(C,G(D)) ψC,D○ϕ−1C,D≅ C(C,G′(D)) is a natural isomorphism too. We need to show that
G(D) ≃ G′(D).
If we consider 1G(D) ∶ G(D)Ð→ G(D) in D, we deduce that
1G(D) ≅ ϕ−1G(D),D(1G(D)) ≅ ψG(D),D(ϕ−1G(D),D(1G(D))) ∶ G(D)Ð→ G′(D),
and if we consider 1G′(D) ∶ G′(D)Ð→ G′(D) in D, we deduce that
1G′(D) ≅ ψ−1G′(D),D(1G′(D)) ≅ ϕG′(D),D(ψ−1G′(D),D(1G′(D))) ∶ G′(D)Ð→ G(D).
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For the sake of neatness we omit the subscripts, for instance we write ϕ in place of ϕG(D),D. By
naturality the following diagram commutes for every p ∶ C ′ Ð→ C in C:
D(F (C),D) D(F (C ′),D)
C(C,G(D)) C(C ′,G(D))
−○F (p)
ϕ ϕ
−○p
hence for p ≡ ψ(ϕ−1(1G(D))), and by applying the commutative square above to ψ−1(1G′(D)), we
have:
ϕ(ψ−1(1G′(D))) ○ ψ(ϕ−1(1G(D))) = ϕ[ψ−1(1G′(D)) ○ F (ψ(ϕ−1(1G(D))))] (2.5)
Similarly, by naturality the following diagram commutes for every p ∶ C ′ Ð→ C in C:
C(C,G′(D)) C(C ′,G′(D))
D(F (C),D) D(F (C ′),D)
−○p
ψ−1 ψ−1
−○F (p)
hence for p ≡ ψ(ϕ−1(1G(D))), and by applying the commutative square above to 1G′(D), we have:
ψ−1(1G′(D)) ○ F (ψ(ϕ−1(1G(D)))) = ψ−1(1G′(D) ○ ψ(ϕ−1(1G(D)))) (2.6)
Finally, we gather that ϕ(ψ−1(1G′(D)))○ψ(ϕ−1(1G(D))) (2.5)= ϕ[ψ−1(1G′(D))○F (ψ(ϕ−1(1G(D))))] (2.6)=
ϕ[ψ−1(1G′(D)○ψ(ϕ−1(1G(D))))] = ϕ[ψ−1(ψ(ϕ−1(1G(D))))] = ϕ[ϕ−1(1G(D))] = 1G(D). Similarly we
can also show that ψ(ϕ−1(1G(D))) ○ ϕ(ψ−1(1G′(D))) = 1G′(D). Concluding: G(D) ≃ G′(D).
Example 2.1. Forgetful and free functors are usually one the adjoint of the other. For instance,
given a field k, there is an adjunction
Set Vectk
F
U
⊣
Let S be a set and V a vector space. Let g ∶ F (S) Ð→ V be a linear map in Vectk and f ∶ S Ð→
U(V ) be a map in Set. Then we can define the isomorphism
. ∶ Vectk(F (S), V ) Ð→ Set(S,U(V ))
g ↦ g
f ↤ f
where g(s) ∶= g(s) for all s ∈ S and f(∑s∈S λss) ∶= ∑s∈S λsf(s) for all formal linear combinations∑s∈S λss ∈ F (S). These two maps are one the inverse of the other, indeed for any linear map
g ∶ F (S)Ð→ V in Vectk:
g(∑
s∈S λss) = ∑s∈S λsg(s) = ∑s∈S λsg(s) = g(∑s∈S λss)
for all ∑s∈S λss ∈ F (S), and for any map f ∶ S Ð→ U(V ):
f(s) = s = f(s)
for all s ∈ S. Furthermore, the unit η ∶ 1Set Ð→ U ○ F is defined as
ηS ∶ S Ð→ UF (S) = {formal linear sums ∑s∈S λss}
s z→ s
and the counit ε ∶ F ○U Ð→ 1Vectk is defined as
εV ∶ FU(V ) = vector space of the formal linear sums ∑v∈V λvv Ð→ V∑v∈V λvv z→ actual value of ∑v∈V λvv in V
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Theorem (2.1) claims in particular that an adjunction between two categories C and D is
a quadruple (F,G, η, ε) where F ∶ C Ð→ G, G ∶ D Ð→ C are functors and η ∶ 1C Ð→ G ○ F ,
ε ∶ F ○ G Ð→ 1D are natural transformations satisfying the triangle identities. This definition
resembles really closely the definition of equivalence. However they are not interchangeable!
Lemma 2.2. Let C and D be categories and (F,G, η, ε) be an adjunction between them. Let
Fix(GF ) be the full subcategory of C whose objects are those C ∈ Ob(C) such that ηC is an
isomorphism and let Fix(FG) be the full subcategory of D whose objects are those D ∈ Ob(D)
such that εD is an isomorphism. Then the adjunction (F,G, η, ε) restricts to an equivalence(F ′,G′, η′, ε′) between Fix(GF ) and Fix(FG).
Proof. By definition of adjunction F ∶ C Ð→ D, G ∶ D Ð→ C are functors and η ∶ 1C Ð→ G ○ F ,
ε ∶ F ○ G Ð→ 1D are natural transformations satisfying the triangle identities (2.4). We need
to prove that (F ′,G′, η′, ε′) is an equivalence between Fix(GF ) and Fix(FG). Therefore we
need to prove that F ′ ∶ Fix(GF ) Ð→ Fix(FG), G′ ∶ Fix(FG) Ð→ Fix(GF ) are functors and
η′ ∶ 1Fix(GF ) Ð→ G′ ○ F ′, ε′ ∶ F ′ ○G′ Ð→ 1Fix(FG) are natural isomorphisms.
F ′, G′ are functors. It suffices to show that F sends objects of Fix(GF ) into objects of
Fix(FG), because from the fact that both Fix(GF ) and Fix(FG) are full subcategories we infer
that every morphism in the former category is sent by F (and then by F ′ as well) into a morphism
of the latter. Also, F ′ respects composition and identity, since F does. Let C ∈ Ob(Fix(GF ), so
ηC ∶ C Ð→ GF (C) is an isomorphism, that is there exists i ∶ GF (C) Ð→ C such that i ○ ηC = 1C
and ηC ○ i = 1GF (C). We notice that also F (ηC) is an isomorphism, since by the fact that F
respects composition and identity: F (i) ○ F (ηC) = F (i ○ ηC) = F (1C) = 1F (C) and similarly
F (ηC) ○F (i) = 1F (GF (C)). By one of the triangle identities (2.4): εF (C) ○F (ηC) = 1F (C). Also, by
composing to the left with F (ηC) and to the right with F (i), we get F (ηC) ○ εF (C) = 1FGF (C).
Hence, also F (C) is an isomorphism. By definition: F (C) ∈ Ob(Fix(FG)), hence we conclude
that F restricts to a functor from Fix(GF ) to Fix(FG).
η′ and ε′ are natural isomorphisms. We need to prove that η and ε restrict to natural iso-
morphisms. However this follow straightforwardly from the fact that Fix(GF ) and Fix(FG) are
subcategories.
Lemma 2.3. Let C and D be categories and (F,G, η, ε) be an equivalence between them. Then F
is left adjoint to G (F ⊣ G).
Proof. Let’s consider (F,G, η, ε) an equivalence of categories, so F ∶ C Ð→ D and G ∶ D Ð→ C are
functors, η ∶ 1C Ð→ G○F and ε ∶ F ○GÐ→ 1D are natural isomorphisms, i.e. ηC ∶ C Ð→ GF (C) and
εD ∶ FG(D)Ð→D are isomorphisms in C and D respectively for every C ∈ Ob(C) and D ∈ Ob(D).
We need to show that there is a quadruplet (F,G, η′, ε′) such that η′ ∶ 1C Ð→ G ○ F and
ε′ ∶ F ○G Ð→ 1D are natural transformations satisfying the triangle identities (2.4). It suffices to
define η′C ≡ ηC for every C ∈ Ob(C) and ε′D given by the composition
FG(D) FG(ε−1D )Ð→ FG(FG(D)) F (η−1G(D))Ð→ FG(D) εDÐ→D
for every D ∈ Ob(C). Then it is straightforward to see that η′ and ε′ are natural transformations
and that they respect the triangle identities (2.4).
Chapter 3
Limits and colimits
The notions of limits and colimits are one the dual of the other. They provide a way of describing
what is going on inside categories and formalizing many common mathematical constructions.
3.1 Limits
Definition 3.1. Let C be a category and I a small category. A functor D ∶ I Ð→ C is called a
diagram in C of shape I.
Definition 3.2. Let C be a category, I a small category and D ∶ I Ð→ C a diagram in C. A cone
on D is a pair (C, (fI ∶ C Ð→D(I))I∈Ob(I))
where C is an object in C, called the vertex of the cone, and (fI)I∈Ob(I) is a family of maps in C
such that the triangle
D(I)
C
D(J)
Du
fI
fJ
for all maps u ∶ I Ð→ J in I.
In fact, we simply say that a cone on a diagram D ∶ I Ð→ C is given by a family of maps(fI ∶ C Ð→D(I))I∈Ob(I) satisfying the property above.
Definition 3.3. Let C be a category, I a small category and D ∶ IÐ→ C a diagram in C. A limit
of D is a cone (pI ∶ LÐ→D(I))I∈Ob(I) with the property that for any cone
(fI ∶ C Ð→D(I))I∈Ob(I)
there exists a unique map f ∶ C Ð→ L in C such that pI ○ f = fI for all I ∈ Ob(I). The maps pI
are called the projections of the limit.
It is very common to abuse language by referring to L as the limit of D and by indicating it
by L = lim←ID. Emphatically, the cone (pI ∶ LÐ→D(I))I∈Ob(I) is called the limit cone.
We want to give some examples that limits in categories allow us to construct.
We recall that a category is discrete if it has only the identities as maps. Let’s consider the case
in which I is the discrete category on a set I, that is a category whose objects are the elements
of the set I and whose maps are the identities only. A diagram D of shape I in a category C is
simply a family (Xi)i∈I of objects in C, and a cone on D is given by an object C ∈ Ob(C) together
with maps (fi ∶ C Ð→Xi) for each i ∈ I. A limit of D turns out to be a product.
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Definition 3.4. Let C be a category, I a set and (Xi)i∈I a family of objects of C. A product of(Xi)i∈I consists of an object P and a family of maps (P piÐ→ Xi)i∈I , such that for all objects C
and families of maps (C fiÐ→Xi)i∈I there exists a unique map f ∶ C Ð→ P such that pi ○ f = fi for
all i ∈ I.
When the product exists, it is common to denote P as ∏i∈I Xi. In the particular case in which
we consider I to be the discrete category 2 on the set of two elements, we end up finding the
binary product.
Definition 3.5. Let C be a category and X,Y ∈ Ob(C). The binary product of X and Y consists
of an object P and maps
P
X Y
p1 p2
such that for all objects and maps
C
X Y
f1 f2
in the category C, there exists a unique map f ∶ C Ð→ P such that
C
P
X Y
f1 f2
f
p1 p2
commutes. The maps p1 and p2 are called the projections.
Let’s consider the case in which I is the category E with two objects and two morphisms from
the first to the second object, aside from the identities. A diagram D of shape E in a category C
is a pair X Y
s
t
of maps in C, and a cone on D is given by objects and maps
C
X Y
f g
s
t
such that s ○ f = g and t ○ f = g. However, it is clear that g is completely determined by f , so it
needs not be introduced.
Definition 3.6. Let C be a category. A fork in C consists of objects and maps C X Yf s
t
such that s ○ f = t ○ f .
It follows that a cone on a diagram D of shape E turns out to simply be an object C ∈ Ob(C)
and a map f ∶ C Ð→X in C such that
C X Y
f s
t
is a fork. A limit of D is in this case a fork with some universal property, often regarded as an
equalizer.
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Definition 3.7. Let C be a category and X Ys
t
objects and maps in C. An equalizer of
s and t is an object E together with a map i ∶ E Ð→X in C such that
E X Yi
s
t
is a fork and such that for any other fork C X Y
f s
t
there exists a unique map f ∶
C Ð→ E such that
C
E X
ff
i
commutes.
As third and last example, let’s consider the case in which I is the category P, where there are
three objects and a morphism from each of first two to the third one, aside from the identities. A
diagram D of shape P in a category C consists of objects and maps
Y
X Z
t
s
in C, and a cone on D is given by objects and maps
X
C
Z
s
fX
fZ
Y
C
Z
t
fY
fZ
such that s ○ fX = fZ and t ○ fY = fZ . However, it is clear that fZ is completely determined by fX
and fY , so it needs not be introduced. It follows that a cone on a diagram D of shape P turns
out to simply be an object C ∈ Ob(C) and maps f1 ∶ C Ð→X, f2 ∶ C Ð→ Y in C such that
C Y
X Z
f2
f1 t
s
is a commutative square, i.e. s ○ f1 = t ○ f2. A limit of D is in this case a commutative diagram
with some universal property, often regarded as a pullback.
Definition 3.8. Let C be a category and
Y
X Z
t
s
objects and maps in C. A pullback of this diagram consists of an object P ∈ Ob(C) and maps
p1 ∶ P Ð→X, p2 ∶ P Ð→ Y such that
P Y
X Z
p2
p1 t
s
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commutes, and such that for any commutative square
C Y
X Z
f2
f1 t
s
in C, there is a unique map f ∶ C Ð→ P in C such that
C
P Y
X Z
f2
f1
f
p2
p1 t
s
commutes, which means p1 ○ f = f1 and p2 ○ f = f2.
3.2 Colimits
The dual of the notion of limit is the notion of colimit.
Definition 3.9. Let C be a category, I a small category and D ∶ I Ð→ C a diagram in C. Let
Dop ∶ Iop Ð→ Cop be the dual functor of the diagram D. A cocone on D is a cone on Dop, and a
colimit of D is a limit of Dop.
If we want to state it explicitly, a cocone on a diagram D ∶ I Ð→ C in C is given by an object
C ∈ Ob(C), called the vertex of the cocone, and by a family
(fI ∶D(I)Ð→ C)I∈I
of maps in C such that for all maps u ∶ I Ð→ J in I the diagram
D(I)
C
D(J)
Du
fI
fJ
commutes. A colimit of D is a cocone
(pI ∶D(I)Ð→ L)I∈I
such that for any cocone (fI ∶ D(I) Ð→ C)I∈I there exists a unique map f ∶ L Ð→ C such that
f ○ pI = fI for all I ∈ I.
Now, we want to see how the previous examples dualize, giving rise to some examples of
colimits.
The dual of a product is called a coproduct or a sum, hence it is a colimit of shape I for some
discrete category I. As in the case of products, we can give the following definition.
Definition 3.10. Let C be a category, I a set and (Xi)i∈I a family of objects of C. A sum of(Xi)i∈I consists of an object S and a family of maps (Xi piÐ→ S)i∈I , such that for all objects C and
families of maps (Xi fiÐ→ C)i∈I there exists a unique map f ∶ S Ð→ C such that f ○ pi = fi for all
i ∈ I.
3.2. COLIMITS 33
When the sum exists, it is commonly denoted by ∑i∈I Xi or by ∐i∈I Xi. Let’s consider the
case in which I is the set of two elements.
Definition 3.11. Let C be a category and X,Y ∈ Ob(C). The binary sum of X and Y consists
of an object S and maps
X Y
S
p1 p2
such that for all objects and maps
X Y
C
f1 f2
in the category C, there exists a unique map f ∶ S Ð→ C such that
X Y
S
C
f1
f1
f2
f2
f
commutes. The maps p1 and p2 are called the coprojections.
Dualizing the definition of equalizer, we obtain the definition of coequalizer, which is an instance
of a colimit of shape E. We recall that E is the category with two objects and two morphisms
from the first to the second object, aside from the identities.
Definition 3.12. Let C be a category and X Ys
t
objects and maps in C. A coequalizer
of s and t is an object E together with a map i ∶ Y Ð→ E in C such that i ○ s = i ○ t and such
that for any other diagram X Y C
s
t
f
for which f ○s = f ○ t there exists a unique map
f ∶ E Ð→ C such that
Y
E C
fi
f
commutes.
Finally, we look into the dual of a pullback. We recall that P is the category where there are
three objects and a morphism from each of first two to the third one, aside from the identities. A
colimit of shape Pop is called a pushout.
Definition 3.13. Let C be a category and
X Y
Z
s
t
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objects and maps in C. A pushout of this diagram consists of an object P ∈ Ob(C) and maps
p1 ∶ Y Ð→ P , p2 ∶ Z Ð→ P such that
X Y
Z P
s
t p1
p2
commutes, and such that for any commutative square
X Y
Z C
s
t f1
f2
in C, there is a unique map f ∶ P Ð→ C in C such that
X Y
Z P
C
s
t p1
f1
p2
f2
f
commutes, which means f ○ p1 = f1 and f ○ p2 = f2.
3.3 Monics and epics
Let’s consider a function between sets. As it is well-known, studying its being injective and
surjective is crucial for many properties of the function. For a map in an arbitrary category,
though, these two notions do not make any sense, since they are too specific. It is curious that the
generalization of injectivity and surjectivity to the more general context of categories reveals the
complexity these notions hide: the generalization of injectivity, as well as that one of surjectivity,
gives three different new properties.
Definition 3.14. Let C be a category. A map f ∶X Ð→ Y in C is monic (or a monomorphism)
if for every A ∈ Ob(C) and every maps A Xx
x′ :
f ○ x = f ○ x′ ⇒ x = x′
The notion of monomorphism is the generalization of the notion of injection. Indeed, a map
in Set can be proved to be monic if and only if it is injective. Indeed, if f is an injective map,
then the condition of the above definition surely holds and so it is monic; conversely, if f is a
monomorphism, then it suffices to take A ≡ 1 in the definition of monomorphism to see that is is
also injective.
Lemma 3.1. A map f ∶X Ð→ Y is monic if and only if the following square is a pullback:
X X
X Y
1
1 f
f
(3.1)
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Proof. (⇒) Let’s suppose that f ∶ X Ð→ Y is monic in the category C. Therefore for any object
C ∈ Ob(C) and any maps C Xx
x′ , we have that f ○x = f ○x′ Ô⇒ x = x′. Let’s now show that
the diagram (3.1) is a pullback. First of all it commutes, since trivially: f ○ 1 = f ○ 1. Let’s now
consider an arbitrary object C ∈ Ob(C) and maps C Xx
x′ such that the following diagram
commutes:
C X
X Y
x
x′ f
f
Therefore we have that f ○ x = f ○ x′. By the fact that f is monic, it follows that x = x′. We set
f = x, and by doing so we get a map f ∶ C Ð→X such that 1○f = 1○x = x and 1○f = 1○x = x = x′,
and this map is unique since for every possible other map x′′ ∶ C Ð→ X in C we can go through
the same argument with x′′ in place of x′ and deduce that f = x = x′′. Therefore the diagram (3.1)
is a pullback.
(⇐). Let’s suppose that the diagram (3.1) is a pullback. Therefore for any object C ∈ Ob(C)
and any maps C X
x
x′ such that the square
C X
X Y
x
x′ f
f
(3.2)
commutes, there exists a unique map f ∶ C Ð→X such that 1 ○ f = x and 1 ○ f = x′. However this
means that f = x = x′. Also, we are assuming that the diagram (3.2) is commutative, so we are
assuming that f ○ x = f ○ x′. Concluding, taking arbitrary C ∈ Ob(C) and arbitrary C Xx
x′
in C and supposing f ○ x = f ○ x′, we have deduced that x = x′, thus f ∈ C(X,Y ) is monic.
The notion of monomorphism can have different shades, indeed we can define also what follows.
Definition 3.15. Let C be a category. A map f ∶ X Ð→ Y in C is regular monic (or a
regular monomorphism) if there is an object Z ∈ Ob(C) and maps Y Z of which f is
an equalizer.
Definition 3.16. Let C be a category. A map f ∶ X Ð→ Y in C is split monic (or a split
monomorphism) if there exists a map e ∶ Y Ð→X such that e ○ f = 1X .
Proposition 3.1. In any category C the following implications hold:
split monic ⇒ regular monic ⇒ monic
Proof. Let’s consider the map m ∶ AÐ→ B in a category C and let’s suppose that it is split monic.
Therefore there exists a map e ∶ B Ð→ A in C such that
e ○m = 1A (3.3)
Then m is also regular monic, since it is the equalizer of B B
m○e
1B
(we are taking C ≡ B in
the definition of regular monomorphism). Indeed, A B Bm
m○e
1B
is a fork: (m ○ e) ○m =
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m ○ (e ○ m) (3.3)= m ○ 1A = m = 1B ○ m. Let X ∈ Ob(C) be arbitrary and let’s consider a fork
X B B
f m○e
1B
with f ∈ C(X,B). Being it a fork, we have:
m ○ e ○ f = 1B ○ f (3.4)
Then the map f ∶= (e ○ f) ∈ C(X,A) is such that m ○ f = f since m ○ f = m ○ e ○ f (3.4)= 1B ○ f = f ,
and f is uniquely determined by e and f due to the way it is defined (one can argue that e is not
unique; however in order to maintain the validity of the previous equalities, we can in general only
take the exact e which appears in the fork A B Bm
m○e
1B
). Therefore m is in fact also a
regular monomorphism.
Let’s consider now the map m ∶ AÐ→ B in a category C and let’s suppose that it is regular monic.
Therefore there exist an object C ∈ Ob(C) and maps B C in C of which m is an equalizer.
This means that A B Cm
y
y′ is a fork, i.e.:
y ○m = y′ ○m (3.5)
and the universal property of the equalizers hold. Then m is also a monomorphism in C. In order
to show this, let’s consider an arbitrary object X ∈ Ob(C) and maps X Ax
x′ such that
m ○ x =m ○ x′ (3.6)
We can consider the diagram X B C.m○x y
y′ This is a fork since y ○m = y′ ○m by (3.5)
and thus y ○(m○x) = y ○m○x = y′ ○m○x = y′ ○(m○x). Therefore, by the universal property of the
equalizers, there must exist a unique map f ∶X Ð→ A in C such that m ○f =m ○x (3.6)= m ○x′, and
by the uniqueness of f it must be that f = x = x′. Therefore x = x′ and m is effectively monic.
Example 3.1. In Ab, it is possible to show that all monics are regular but not all monics are split.
We can dualize the notions of monic, regular monic and spit monic as follows.
Definition 3.17. Let C be a category. A map f ∶X Ð→ Y is epic (o a epimorphism) if for all
objects Z ∈ Ob(C) and maps Y Zx
x′ :
x ○ f = x′ ○ f ⇒ x = x′
The notion of epimorphism is the generalization of the notion of surjection. Indeed, it is easy
to see that in the category Set of sets a map is surjetive if and only if it is epic: trivially, surjective
implies epic, and to see the converse it suffices to take Z to be the two-sided element {true, false},
x to be the characteristic function of the image of f and x′ to be the function with constant value
true, in the definition above.
Generally speaking, being surjective and being epic do not coincide: in the category Ring of
rings for instance, it is possible to see that the inclusion Z Ð→ Q is epic but not surjective. Also,
this is an example of a map which is monic and epic, but not an isomorphism!
Definition 3.18. Let C be a category. A map f ∶ X Ð→ Y in C is regular epic (or a regular
epimorphism) if there is an object Z ∈ Ob(C) and maps Z X of which f is a coequalizer.
Definition 3.19. Let C be a category. A map f ∶ X Ð→ Y in C is split epic (or a split
epimorphism) if there exists a map e ∶ Y Ð→X such that f ○ e = 1Y .
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Proposition 3.2. In any category C the following implications hold:
epic ⇒ regular epic ⇒ split epic
Proof. It follows by duality from Proposition (3.1).
Theorem 3.1. In any category, a map is an isomorphism if and only if it is both monic and
regular epic.
Proof. Let’s consider a map f ∶ AÐ→ B in a category C and let’s prove that f is an isomorphism
if and only if it is monic and regular epic.
(⇒) Let’s suppose that f is an isomoprhism in C, therefore there exists g ∶ B Ð→ A in C such that
f ○ g = 1B and g ○ f = 1A. Let’s take an object X ∈ Ob(C) and maps X Ax
x′ in C such that
f ○ x = f ○ x′. Then by composing with g it follows that x = 1A ○ x = (g ○ f) ○ x = g ○ (f ○ x) =
g ○(f ○x′) = (g ○f)○x′ = 1A ○x′ = x′, therefore f is monic. Let’s consider now the object A ∈ Ob(C)
and maps A A
1A
g○f in A. Then f is coequalizer of 1A and g ○f . First of all, f ○1A = f ○(g ○f),
therefore A A B
1A
g○f
f
is a fork. In addition, for any object X ∈ Ob(C) and for any fork
A A X
1A
g○f
ξ
, there is a unique map ξ ∶= ξ ○ g ∶ B Ð→ X in C such that ξ ○ f = ξ, indeed:
ξ ○ f = (ξ ○ g) ○ f = ξ ○ (g ○ f) = ξ ○ 1A = ξ, and ξ is uniquely determined by g and ξ.
(⇐) Let’s suppose that f is a monic and regular epic morphism in the category C. We need to find
a map g ∈ C(B,A) such that g ○f = 1A and f ○g = 1B . Since f is regular epic, there exist an object
C ∈ Ob(C) and maps C Ax
x′ for which f is a coequalizer. In particular, f ○x = f ○x′, and by
the fact that f is monic it follows that x = x′. We can consider the diagram C A Ax
x′
1A ,
and by what we have just said, it is a fork since 1A ○ x = x = x′ = 1A ○ x′. Therefore, the
universal property of the coequalizers assures the existence of a unique map g ∶ B Ð→ A inC such that g ○ f = 1A. However it is also true that f ○ g = 1B , indeed from the equalities
f = f ○ 1A = f ○ (g ○ f) = (f ○ g) ○ f we infer that necessarily f ○ g = 1B . Therefore f is an
isomoprhism in C.
It is licit to search for the real reason why the notions of monic, regular monic and split
monic, and by duality those ones of epic, regular epic and split epic, collapse into the single
notions of injectivity and surjectivity respectively in the category Set of sets. Interestingly enough,
the answer deals with the axiom of choice, as the following result shows. Of course, we should
previously generalize the axiom of choice for any category C.
Definition 3.20. Let C be a category. The category C satisfies the axiom of choice if every
epimorphism in C is a split epic.
As regards Set in particular, the axiom of choice states then that every surjection splits.
Proposition 3.3. Assuming that the category Set satisfies the axiom of choice, the following
implications hold:
monic ⇔ regular monic ⇔ split monic
and by duality
epic ⇔ regular epic ⇔ split epic
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Proof. We need only to prove that in Set with the axiom of choice every epimorphism is regular
and that every regular epimorphism is split.
Let’s consider an epimorphism f ∶ X Ð→ Y in Set. Therefore for all sets Z and functions
Y Z
y
y′ if y ○ f = y′ ○ f then y = y′. Also, by the fact that in Set epics coincide with
surjections, we have that f is a section, since the axiom of choice holds: there exists a function
i ∶ Y Ð→ X such that f ○ i = 1Y . We now claim that f is also a regular epimorphism, which
means that there exist a set C and functions C X
c
c′ for which f is a coequalizer. We claim
that it suffices to take C ≡ X, c ≡ i ○ f and c′ ≡ 1X and we show then that f is a coequalizer for
X X
i○f
1X
. First of all, X X Y
i○f
1X
f
is a fork, since: f ○ (i ○ f) = (f ○ i) ○ f = 1Y ○ f .
Let’s consider another fork X X Z
i○f
1X
ξ
. Then there exists a unique function ξ ∶ Y Ð→ Z
such that ξ ○ f = ξ, for it suffices to take ξ = ξ ○ i: ξ ○ f = (ξ ○ i) ○ f = ξ ○ i ○ f ∗= 1X ○ ξ = ξ where (∗)
is given by the fact that X X Z
i○f
1X
ξ
is a fork, and trivially ξ is uniquely determined
by ξ and i. Concluding, f is in fact a regular epimorphism.
Let’s now suppose that f ∶X Ð→ Y in Set is a regular epimorphism, and let’s show that it is split
epic as well. Therefore we are supposed to find a right inverse of f , i.e. a function i ∶ Y Ð→ X
in Set such that f ○ i = 1Y . However we know that a regular epimorphism is epic, which in the
category of Set is equivalent to be a surjection. Therefore f is a surjection, and by the axiom of
choice it has a section, which is exactly the function i that we were searching for.
Chapter 4
The categories of Boolean and
Heyting algebras
In this chapter Heyting and Boolean algebras are introduced. They are algebraic structures where
intuitionistic and classical logic respectively can be interpreted. Moreover, they arise naturally
from any given logical language, as the formalization of Lindenbaum algebras will show. We will
also try to deal with algebras from a purely categorical point of view: this is the turning point at
which categorical logic arises, that is when logic in specific and not only mathematics in general
is tackled with a merely categorical mindset.
4.1 Lattices
Definition 4.1. A semilattice is a couple (X,∗) where X is a set and ∗ ∶ X × X Ð→ X,(x, y)z→ x ∗ y is an operation such that:
• x ∗ x = x;
• x ∗ y = y ∗ x;
• (x ∗ y) ∗ z = x ∗ (y ∗ z).
Definition 4.2. Let (S,≤) be a poset and x, y ∈ S. The infimum of x and y is an element
x ∧ y ∈ S such that:
• x ∧ y ≤ x and x ∧ y ≤ y;
• for all z ∈ S such that z ≤ x and z ≤ y, then z ≤ x ∧ y.
Dually, the supremum of x and y is an element x ∨ y ∈ S such that:
• x ≤ x ∨ y and y ≤ x ∨ y;
• for all z ∈ S such that x ≤ z and y ≤ z, then x ∨ y ≤ z.
It is straightforward to show that the supremum and the infimum, when they exist, are unique.
Proposition 4.1. Let (X,∗) be a semilattice. Define x ≤ y def⇔ x∗ y = x, then (X,≤) is a poset in
which every pair of elements has an infimum. Conversely, given a poset (S,≤) where every pair of
elements has an infimum, define x ∗ y to be the infimum of x and y, then (S,∗) is a semilattice.
Proof. Let’s consider (X,≤) defined as in the statement of the Proposition; ≤ is a partial order:
1. x ∗ x = x, thus x ≤ x;
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2. if x ≤ y and y ≤ x then x = x ∗ y = y ∗ x = y;
3. if x ≤ y ≤ z then x ∗ z = (x ∗ y) ∗ z = x ∗ (y ∗ z) = x ∗ y = x, then x ≤ z.
Let x, y ∈ X. We notice that: (x ∗ y) ∗ x = x ∗ (y ∗ x) = x ∗ (x ∗ y) = (x ∗ x) ∗ y = x ∗ y, so
x ∗ y ≤ x. Similarly x ∗ y ≤ y. Also, for every z ∈ X such that z ≤ x and z ≤ y we have that:
z ∗ (x ∗ y) = (z ∗ x) ∗ y = z ∗ y = z, hence z ≤ x ∗ y. Therefore x ∗ y is an infimum for x, y ∈X.
Conversely, let’s consider (S,∗) as in the second part of the theorem. Then:
• x ∗ x = x since the infimum of an element is the element itself;
• x ∗ y = y ∗ x since the infimum of {x, y} is the same of the infimum of {y, x};
• let inf{−,−} denote the infimum of two elements in S, then inf{inf{x, y}, z} = inf{inf{x, y}, inf{z}} =
inf{x, y, z} = inf{inf{x}, inf{y, z}} = inf{x, inf{y, z}}.
Therefore (S,∗) is a semilattice.
A semilattice with the ordering defined in the previos theorem in usually called a meet-
semilattice, and ∧ substitutes for ∗ . If we consider the dual order, setting y ≤ x def⇔ x∗ y = x, we
usually refer to the associated semilattice as a join-semilattice, and ∨ substitutes for ∗.
Definition 4.3. A lattice is a triple (X,∧,∨) where (X,∧) is a meet-semilattice and (X,∨) is
a join-semilattice such that they induce the same order on X. More precisely, a lattice is a triple(X,∧,∨) such that:
(i) x ∧ x = x and x ∨ x = x (idempotence);
(ii) x ∧ y = y ∧ x and x ∨ y = y ∨ x (commutativity);
(iii) (x ∧ y) ∧ z = x ∧ (y ∧ z) and (x ∨ y) ∨ z = x ∨ (y ∨ z) (associativity);
(iv) x ∧ (x ∨ y) = x and x ∨ (x ∧ y) = x (absorption laws).
Proposition 4.2. Let (X,∧,∨) be a lattice. Define x ≤ y def⇔ x ∧ y = x, then (X,≤) is a poset in
which every pair of elements has an infimum and a supremum. Conversely, given a poset (S,≤)
where every pair of elements has an infimum and a supremum, define x ∧ y to be the infimum of
x and y and x ∨ y to be the supremum of x and y, then (S,∧,∨) is a lattice.
Proof. It follows directly from Proposition (4.1), once we have shown that for every x, y ∈ X
x ∧ y = x⇔ x ∨ y = y. And this is true: if x ∧ y = x then x ∨ y = (x ∧ y) ∨ y = y by the absorption
laws, similarly in the other direction.
Thanks to the previous Proposition, it is possible to think of a lattice as an ordered set where
every couple of elements has an infimum and a supremum. For this reason, we interpret the
symbols ∧ and ∨ as the infimum and the supremum of the elements which they are applied to.
Definition 4.4. Let (X,∧,∨) be a lattice. A sublattice (X ′∧,∨) is a subset X ′ ⊆ X such that
x ∧ y ∈X ′ and x ∨ y ∈X ′ for every x, y ∈X ′.
Definition 4.5. Let (X,∧,∨) and (Y,∧,∨) be lattices. A map X Ð→ Y is said to be a lattice
morphism if f(x ∧ y) = f(x) ∧ f(y) and f(x ∨ y) = f(x) ∨ f(y) for every x, y ∈X.
Definition 4.6. Let (X,∧,∨) be a lattice. It is said to be a distributive lattice if the following
two properties hold:
(i) x ∨ (y ∧ z) = (x ∨ y) ∧ (x ∨ y);
(ii) x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ y).
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Definition 4.7. A lattice (X,∧,∨) is said to be a complete lattice if every subset Z ⊆X has an
infimum and a supremum.
Every finite subset of a lattice has an infimum and a supremum: by induction it is indeed
easy to show that for every n ∈ N the subset {x1, ....xn} of n elements of a lattice has an infimum
and a supremum, which we denote respectively ⋀ni=1 xi and ⋁ni=1 xi. However, there is a priori no
guarantee that any infinite subset of a lattice has an infimum or a supremum, but it suffices to
assure that it has only one of them to have the other too, as the following result shows.
Proposition 4.3. Let (X,≤) be a partially order set in which every subset has an infimum [re-
spectively a supremum]. Then (X,∧,∨) is a complete lattice.
Proof. It suffices to show that every subset of X has a supremum. Let’s consider Z ⊆X and take
Z ′ ∶= {ξ ∈ X ∣∀z ∈ Z(z ≤ ξ)}. By hypothesis, Z ′ has an infimum z′. This is the supremum of the
subset Z, indeed: z ≤ z′ for every z ∈ Z because z′ ∈ Z ′, for any ξ ∈ X such that ∀z ∈ Z(z ≤ ξ) we
have that z′ ≤ ξ, because z′ is the infimum of Z ′.
We can consider the whole lattice as a subset of itself and in the case of a complete lattice the
existence of an infimum and a supremum of the whole lattice is guaranteed. More generally we
define:
Definition 4.8. Let (X∧,∨) be a lattice. An element z ∈ X is said to be the least element of
the lattice if z ≤ x for every x ∈ X. Dually, an element z ∈ X is said to be the greatest element
of the lattice if x ≤ z for every x ∈X.
Of course, if the least and the gretest element in a lattice exist, they are unique. The least and
the greatest elements are usually denoted by 0 and 1 respectively.
Definition 4.9. Let (X,∧,∨) be a lattice with 0 and 1, let x ∈ X. A complement of x is an
element x ∈X such that
x ∧ x = 0 and x ∨ x = 1.
A lattice with 0 and 1 and with a complement x for every x ∈ X is said to be a complemented
lattice.
The complement of an element needs not be unique, but if the lattice is distributive then the
complement is for sure unique.
Proposition 4.4. Let (X,∧,∨) be a distributive lattice. Every element of X has at most one
complement.
Proof. Let x ∈ X and let’s suppose that y, y′ ∈ X are complements of X. Then x ∧ y = 0 = x ∧ y′
and x ∨ y = 1 = x ∨ y′. We have that:
y = y ∨ 0 = y ∨ (x ∧ y′) = (y ∨ x) ∧ (y ∨ y′) = 1 ∨ (y ∨ y′) = y ∨ y′
and similarly y′ = y ∨ y′. Concluding: y = y′.
In a complemented distributive lattice (X,∧,∨), the map . ∶ X Ð→ X, x z→ x sending each
element in its complement is well-defined, besides it is also self dual since x = x.
Example 4.1. Let X be a set. Its power set ℘(X) is a distributive, complete and complemented
lattice with respect to set inclusion ⊆. For every Z,Z ′, Z ′′ ∈ ℘(X):
• Z ⊆ Z;
• if Z ⊆ Z ′ and Z ′ ⊆ Z then Z = Z ′;
• if Z ⊆ Z ′ and Z ′ ⊆ Z ′′ then Z ⊆ Z ′ ⊆ Z ′′, and so Z ⊆ Z ′′.
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Let Z,Z ′ ∈ ℘(X), trivially Z ⊆ Z ∪ Z ′ and Z ′ ⊆ Z ∪ Z ′. Besides, if Y ∈ ℘(X) is such that Z ⊆ Y
and Z ′ ⊂ Y then Z ∪ Z ′ ⊆ Y . We can conclude that the join of two elements in ℘(X) exists and
is exactly their union ∪. Similarly, the meet of two elements in ℘(X) exists and is exatly their
interesection ∩. More generally, we can consider an arbitrary I-family of subsets {Zi}i∈I of X and
we can prove in the same way that ⋃i∈I Zi satisfies the conditions of the supremum and ⋂i∈I Zi
satisfies the conditions of the infimum. As the union and the intersection of an arbitrary family
of subset of a subset always exist, (℘(X),⊆) is a complete lattice.
Elementary set theory shows that ∪ distributes over ∩ and that conversely ∩ distributes over ∪.
Hence, (℘(X),⊆) is distributive.
Trivially, ∅ ⊆ Z and Z ⊆ ℘(X) for every Z ∈ ℘(X), thus ∅ and ℘(X) are the least and greatest
elements of the lattice (℘(X),⊆). We denote Z ∶= ℘(X) ∖ Z for every Z ∈ ℘(X); we notice that
Z ∪ Z = ℘(X) and Z ∩ Z = ∅ always hold. So we have found a complement for each subset of X
and (℘(X),⊆) is also a complemented lattice.
4.2 Heyting algebras
Heyting algebras have the necessary and sufficient structure to interpret intuitionistic logic. We
want now to introduce them and see that they can be enclosed into a category.
Definition 4.10. A Heyting algebra is a structure (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1,→) where (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1) is
a lattice with least element 0 and greatest element 1, ≤ is the partial order associated to the lattice
as in Proposition (4.1) and →∶ X ×X Ð→ X(x, y) z→ (x→ y)
is an operator such that (z ≤ x→ y)⇔ (z ∧ x ≤ y).
Lemma 4.1. Let (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1,→) be a Heyting algebra. The following properties hold for every
x, y, z ∈X::
1. if y ≤ z then x ∧ y ≤ x ∧ z;
2. if y ≤ z then x ∨ y ≤ x ∨ z;
3. x ∧ (x→ y) ≤ y;
4. if y ≤ z then x→ y ≤ x→ z.
Proof. Let x, y, z ∈X. Then:
1. x ∧ y ≤ y ≤ z and x ∧ y ≤ x. Then x ∧ y ≤ x ∧ z;
2. y ≤ z ≤ z ∨ x and x ≤ x ∨ z. Then x ∨ y ≤ x ∨ z;
3. by definition of → we have that (x→ y)∧x ≤ y is equivalent to (x→ y) ≤ x→ y, which holds
by reflexivity;
4. from the previous point x ∧ (x → y) ≤ y, but we also know that y ≤ z, so x ∧ (x → y) ≤ z, or
equivalently (x→ y) ∧ x ≤ z, hence (x→ y) ≤ x→ z.
Proposition 4.5. Let (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1,→) be a Heyting algebra. The distributivity holds, thus for
every x, y, z ∈X:
x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z) and x ∨ (y ∧ z) = (x ∨ y) ∧ (x ∨ z).
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Proof. It suffices to show one of the two equalities, since the other can be proved in a similar way.
Let’s consider the first equality of the statement.
By definition of →: x ∧ (y ∨ z) ≤ (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z) if and only if y ∨ z ≤ x→ ((x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z)). The
last inequality holds if and only if y ≤ x → ((x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z)) and z ≤ x → ((x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z)), and
equivalently if and only if y∧x ≤ (x∧y)∨ (x∧ z) and z ∧x ≤ (x∧y)∨ (x∧ z). Both of them clearly
hold by commutativity and properties of ∨.
Conversely, by definition of infimum: (x∧y)∨(x∧z) ≤ x∧(y∨z) if and only if (x∧y)∨(x∧z) ≤ x
and (x∧y)∨ (x∧z) ≤ (y∨z) both hold. However by definition of supremum (x∧y)∨ (x∧z) ≤ x is
equivalent to x∧y ≤ x and x∧z ≤ x (which both hold), and by definition of infimum (x∧y)∨(x∧z) ≤(y ∨ z) is equivalent to x ∧ y ≤ y ∨ z and x ∧ z ≤ y ∨ z (which both hold).
Lemma 4.2. Let (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1,→) be a Heyting algebra, let (xi)i∈I , y ∈X. Then:
y ∧⋁
i∈I xi =⋁i∈I(y ∧ xi).
Proof. By definition of →: y ∧⋁i∈I xi ≤ ⋁i∈I(y ∧ xi) if and only if ⋁i∈I xi ≤ y → ⋁i∈I(y ∧ xi), and
this holds if and only if xi ≤ y → ⋁i∈I(y ∧ xi) for all i ∈ I, which means xi ∧ y ≤ ⋁i∈I(y ∧ xi) and
this inequality holds by definition of supremum.
Conversely, by definition of infimum: ⋁i∈I(y∧xi) ≤ y∧⋁i∈I xi if and only if both ⋁i∈I(y∧xi) ≤ y
and ⋁i∈I(y ∧xi) ≤ ⋁i∈I xi hold. In fact they are true: the first holds since y ∧xi ≤ y for all i ∈ I by
definition of infimum, the second holds since y ∧ xi ≤ xi for all i ∈ I by definition of infimum.
Example 4.2. Let (X,τ) be a topological space, where τ ∶= {O∣O is an open set } is its topology.((X,τ),⊆) is a Heyting algebra.
It is straightforward to show that ⊆ is an order on τ . Given O1,O2 ∈ τ , their infimum is given
by O1∩O2. Indeed, O1∩O2 ⊆ O1 and O1∩O2 ⊆ O2, and if O′ ∈ τ is such that O′ ⊆ O1 and O′ ⊆ O2
then O′ ⊆ O1 ∩O2. Similarly, the supremum of 01 and O2 is given by O1 ∪O2.
Since ∅ ⊆ O and O ⊆ X for every O ∈ τ , the least and greatest elements of ((X,τ),⊆) are ∅ and
X respectively.
Let O1,O2 ∈ τ , we define:
O1 → O2 ∶=⋃{O ∈ τ ∣O ∩O1 ⊆ O2}
so it is straightforward that O ⊆ O1 Ð→ O2 ⇔ O ∪O1 ⊆ O2.
Lemma 4.3. Let (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1,→) and (X ′,≤,∧,∨,0,1,→) be Heyting algebras and let ϕ ∶X Ð→
X ′ be a ∧-preserving function between them. Then ϕ is a monotone function.
Proof. Let x, y ∈X such that x ≤ y. Then: ϕ(x) = ϕ(x ∧ y) = ϕ(x) ∧ ϕ(y), thus ϕ(x) ≤ ϕ(y).
Definition 4.11. Given the Heyting algebras (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1,→) and (X ′,≤,∧,∨,0,1,→), a ho-
momorphism of Heyting algebras between them is a function ϕ ∶X Ð→X ′ such that for every
x, y ∈X:
• ϕ(0) = 0;
• ϕ(1) = 1;
• ϕ(x ∧ y) = ϕ(x) ∧ ϕ(y);
• ϕ(x ∨ y) = ϕ(x) ∨ ϕ(y);
• ϕ(x→ y) = ϕ(x)→ ϕ(y).
Definition 4.12. The category Ha is the subcategory of Set whose objects are Heyting algebras
and whose maps are the homomorphisms of Heyting algebras.
Ha is indeed a category. If ϕ ∶ X Ð→ X ′ and ψ ∶ X ′ Ð→ X ′′ are homomorphisms of Heyting
algebras, their composition ψ ○ ϕ is as well:
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• ψ ○ ϕ(0) = ψ(ϕ(0)) = ψ(0) = 0;
• ψ ○ ϕ(1) = ψ(ϕ(1)) = ψ(1) = 1;
• ψ ○ ϕ(x ∧ y) = ψ(ϕ(x ∧ y) = ψ(ϕ(x) ∧ ϕ(y)) = ψ(ϕ(x)) ∧ ψ(ϕ(y)) = ψ ○ ϕ(x) ∧ ψ ○ ϕ(y);
• ψ ○ ϕ(x ∨ y) = ψ(ϕ(x ∨ y) = ψ(ϕ(x) ∨ ϕ(y)) = ψ(ϕ(x)) ∨ ψ(ϕ(y)) = ψ ○ ϕ(x) ∨ ψ ○ ϕ(y);
• ψ ○ ϕ(x→ y) = ψ(ϕ(x→ y) = ψ(ϕ(x)→ ϕ(y)) = ψ(ϕ(x))→ ψ(ϕ(y)) = ψ ○ ϕ(x)→ ψ ○ ϕ(y).
The identity map of a Heyting algebra is trivially a homomorphism. Being functions between sets,
homorphisms of Heyting algebras respect associativity and the identity.
4.3 Boolean algebras
Boolean algebras are a particular kind of Heyting algebras and have the necessary and sufficient
structure to interpret classical logic. We want now to introduce them and to enclose them into a
category.
Definition 4.13. A Boolean algebra (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1) is a complemented distributive lattice (≤
is the partial order associated to the lattice as in Proposition (4.1)).
A Boolean algebra is a particular case of Heyting algebra. In order to show this, it is sufficient
to prove that it is possible to define an operation → such that it behaves in the same way as it
does in a Heyting algebra.
Theorem 4.1. Let (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1) be a Boolean algebra. Then it is also a Heyting algebra.
Proof. It suffices to show that it is possible to define an operation →∶X×X Ð→X, (x, y)z→ x→ y
such that z ≤ x → y if and only if z ∧ x ≤ y, for every x, y, z ∈ X. We define x Ð→ y ∶= x ∨ y for
every x, y ∈X, where with x we indicate the complement of x. This is exactly what we need:
• let’s suppose z ∈ X such that z ≤ x → y, then z ≤ x ∨ y. Hence z ∧ x ≤ (x ∨ y) ∧ x ≤(x ∧ x) ∨ (y ∧ x) = 0 ∨ (x ∧ y) = x ∧ y ≤ y;
• let’s suppose z ∈ X such that z ∧ x ≤ y, then x ∨ (z ∧ x) ≤ x ∨ y. By distributivity: (x ∨ z) ∧(x ∨ x) ≤ x ∨ y, so (x ∨ z) ∧ 1 ≤ x ∨ y, which is x ∨ z ≤ x ∨ y. By the definition of supremum:
z ≤ x ∨ y.
We denote ¬x ∶= x→ 0, where → is defined as in the previous Theorem, thus ¬x = x ∨ 0 = x, so¬x coincides with the complement of x. We characterize clearly the connection between Heyting
and Boolean algebras thorugh the following results.
Proposition 4.6. (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1) is a Boolean algebra if and only if it is a Heyting algebra and
for every x ∈X one has x ∨ ¬x = 1.
Proof. (⇒) Let (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1) be a Boolean algebra. Then it is a Heyting algebra by Theorem
(4.1). We noticed some lines above that in a Boolean algebra ¬x coincides with the complement
x, hence by definition of complement x ∨ ¬x = 1 for all x ∈X.(⇐) Let (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1) be a Heyting algebra where x ∨ ¬x = 1 for all x ∈ X. (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1)
is a distributive lattice by Proposition (4.5). It only remains to show that every element x ∈ X
has a complement x ∈X. Let x ∈X, then ¬x is its complement:
• x ∨ ¬x = 1 by hypothesis;
• x ∧ ¬x = 0, indeed 0 ≤ x ∧ ¬x by definition of O in a lattice and x ∧ ¬x ≤ 0 by definition of ¬
and Proposition (4.1).
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Corollary 4.1. Let (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1,→) be a Heyting algebra such that ¬¬x = x for every x ∈ X.
Then it is a Boolean algebra.
Proof. By Proposition (4.6) it suffices to show that x ∨ ¬x = 1 for all x ∈X.
First of all, we notice that ¬0 = 1, since ¬0 ≤ 1 by definition of 1 in a lattice and 1 ≤ 0 by definition
of → (for: 1 ≤ ¬0 = 0→ 0⇔ 1∧0 ≤ 0⇔ 0 ≤ 0). We recall that x∧¬x = 0 for all x ∈X by Proposition
(4.1). Considering the hypothesis x = ¬¬x, it suffices to show that x ∨ ¬x = ¬¬x ∨ ¬x = ¬(¬x ∧ x)
for all x ∈X.
• For all z, y ∈X, given that z = ¬¬z = ¬z → 0, we have:
z ∧ y ≤ z⇔ (z ∧ y) ∧ ¬z ≤ 0⇔ ¬z ∧ (z ∧ y) ≤ 0⇔ ¬z ≤ (z ∧ y)→ 0⇔ ¬z ≤ ¬(z ∧ y)
In particular, if z ≡ x, y ≡ ¬x then x ∧ ¬x ≤ x ⇒ ¬x ≤ ¬(x ∧ ¬x) and if z ≡ ¬x, y ≡ x then¬x ∧ x ≤ ¬x⇒ ¬¬x ≤ ¬(¬x ∧ x). By definition of join we infer that ¬x ∨ ¬¬x ≤ ¬(x ∧ ¬x).
• For all z, y ∈X, given that (z ∨ y) = ¬¬(z ∨ y), we have:
z ≤ z ∨ y⇔ z ∧ ¬(z ∨ y) ≤ 0⇔ ¬(z ∨ y) ∧ z ≤ 0⇔ ¬(z ∨ y) ≤ ¬z
In particular, if z ≡ ¬x, y ≡ ¬¬x then ¬x ≤ ¬x∨¬¬x⇒ ¬(¬x∨¬¬x) ≤ ¬¬x = x and if z ≡ ¬¬x,
y ≡ ¬x then ¬¬x ≤ ¬¬x ∨ ¬x ⇒ ¬(¬¬x ∨ ¬x) ≤ ¬¬¬x = ¬x). Hence by definition of meet¬(¬x ∨ ¬¬x) ≤ x ∧ ¬x, thus ¬(x ∧ ¬x) ≤ ¬¬(¬x ∨ ¬¬x) = ¬x ∨ ¬¬x.
In a nutshell, a Boolean algebra happens to be a distributive lattice with a well-define operation
of negation ¬. We can as well define the operation ¬ in a Heyting algebra, setting ¬x = x → 0.
However, the structure of a Boolean algebra forces more properties on ¬ than a Heyting algebra
does. Crucially, in a Boolean algebra the operation ¬ turns out to be exactly the complement,
which is false in general in a Heyting algebra. In the following Lemma we collect some properties
of ¬ that hold in Heyting algebras.
Lemma 4.4. Let (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1,→) be a Heyting algebra. Then for every x, y ∈X:
1. x ∧ ¬x ≤ 0;
2. if x ≤ y then ¬y ≤ ¬x;
3. x ≤ ¬¬x;
4. ¬(x ∨ y) ≤ ¬x ∧ ¬y;
5. ¬x ∨ ¬y ≤ ¬(x ∧ y).
Proof. 1. By proposition (4.1) we know that x ∧ (x → y) ≤ y. In particular, with y ≡ 0, we
immediately deduce that x ∧ (x→ 0) = x ∧ ¬x ≤ 0.
2. If x ≤ y then x ∧ ¬y ≤ y ∧ ¬y and y ∧ ¬y ≤ 0, because of the previous point. We infer
immediately then: x ∧ ¬y ≤ 0⇒ ¬y ≤ x→ 0⇒ ¬y ≤ ¬x.
3. By the first point of this Lemma and by definition of → we have: x∧¬x ≤ 0⇔ x∧ (x→ 0) ≤
0⇔ x ≤ (x→ 0)→ 0 = ¬¬x.
4. By definition of join: x ≤ x ∨ y and y ≤ x ∨ y, thus by the second point of this Lemma¬(x ∨ y) ≤ ¬x and ¬(x ∨ y) ≤ ¬y. By definition of meet: ¬(x ∨ y) ≤ ¬x ∧ ¬y.
5. By definition of meet: x ∧ y ≤ x and x ∧ y ≤ y, thus by the second point of this Lemma¬x ≤ ¬(x ∧ y) and ¬y) ≤ ¬(x ∧ y). By definition of join: ¬x ∨ ¬y ≤ ¬(x ∧ y).
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Proposition 4.7. Let (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1,→) be a Heyting algebra. The following conditions are equiv-
alent for all x ∈X:
(i) ¬¬x ≤ x;
(ii) 1 ≤ x ∨ ¬x;
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) Let’s suppose that ¬¬x ≤ x for all x ∈ X. By the first point of Lemma (4.4)
applied to ¬x, we get: ¬x∧¬¬x ≤ 0. Besides, by point 4 of Lemma (4.4) with y ≡ ¬x: ¬(x∨¬x) ≤¬x∧¬¬x. Hence ¬(x∨¬x) ≤ 0⇒ 1∧¬(x∨¬x) ≤ 0⇒ 1 ≤ ¬(x∨¬x)→ 0⇒ 1 ≤ ¬¬(x∨¬x). Applying
the hypothesis to (x ∨ ¬x) we infer ¬¬(x ∨ ¬x) ≤ (x ∨ ¬x), and we can conclude 1 ≤ (x ∨ ¬x).(ii) ⇒ (i) Let’s suppose that 1 ≤ x ∨ ¬x for all x ∈ X. Since ¬¬x ≤ 1 ∧ ¬¬x, we deduce¬¬x ≤ ¬¬x ∧ (x ∨ ¬x) = (¬¬x ∧ x) ∨ (¬¬x ∧ ¬x). By the first point of Lemma (4.4): ¬¬x ∧ ¬x ≤ 0,
and by definition of meet: ¬¬x∧x ≤ x. So concluding: ¬¬x ≤ (¬¬x∧x)∨(¬¬x∧¬x) ≤ x∨0 = x.
Definition 4.14. Given the Boolean algebras (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1) and (X ′,≤,∧,∨,0,1), a homomor-
phism of Boolean algebras between them is a function ϕ ∶X Ð→X ′ such that for every x, y ∈X:
• ϕ(0) = 0;
• ϕ(1) = 1;
• ϕ(x ∧ y) = ϕ(x) ∧ ϕ(y);
• ϕ(x ∨ y) = ϕ(x) ∨ ϕ(y);
• ϕ(x→ y) = ϕ(x)→ ϕ(y).
Lemma 4.5. Let (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1), (X ′,≤,∧,∨,0′,1′) be Boolean algebras and let f ∶ X Ð→ X ′ be
a function such that f(0) = 0′, f(1) = 1′, (x ∧ y) = f(x) ∧ f(y) and (x ∨ y) = f(x) ∨ f(y) for all
x, y ∈X. Then f is a homomorphism of Heyting algebras.
Proof. It suffices to show that f(x → y) = f(x) → f(y) for every x, y ∈ X. We recall that in a
Boolean algebra x→ y ≡ x∨y where x is the complement of x, hence x→ y ≡ ¬x∨y. It follows that
f(x → y) = f(¬x ∨ y) = f(¬x) ∨ f(y) and f(x) → f(y) = ¬f(x) ∨ f(y), so it suffices to show that
f(¬x) = ¬f(x) for every x ∈X. This holds since f(x)∨f(¬x) = f(x∨¬x) = f(1) = 1′ = f(x)∨¬f(x)
and f(x) ∧ f(¬x) = f(x ∧ ¬x) = f(0) = 0′ = f(x) ∧ ¬f(x), thus both ¬f(x) and f(¬x) are
complements of f(x) and they must be equal, due to the uniqueness of the complement.
Lemma 4.6. Let (X,≤,∧,∨,0,1), (X ′,≤,∧,∨,0′,1′) be Boolean algebras and let f ∶X Ð→X ′ be a
function such that f(0) = 0′, f(1) = 1′, f(¬x) = ¬f(x) and f(x ∨ y) = f(x) ∨ f(y) for all x, y ∈X.
Then f is a homomorphism of Boolean algebras.
Proof. Let x, y ∈X. We recall that in a Boolean algebra x→ y ≡ x ∨ y where x is the complement
of x, then x→ y ≡ ¬x ∨ y. Therefore:
f(x→ y) = f(¬x ∨ y) = f(¬x) ∨ f(y) = ¬f(x) ∨ f(y) = f(x)Ð→ f(y).
Since ¬(a ∨ b) = ¬a ∧ ¬b and a = ¬¬a for every a, b in a Boolean algebra, we infer:
f(x∧y) = f(¬(¬x∨¬y)) = ¬(f(¬x)∨f(¬y)) = ¬(¬f(x)∨¬f(y)) = ¬¬f(x)∧¬¬f(y) = f(x)∧f(y).
Definition 4.15. The category Ba is the subcategory of Set whose objects are Boolean algebras
and whose maps are the homomorphisms of Boolean algebras.
The fact that Ba is indeed a category follows directly from the fact that Ha is.
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4.4 Lindenbaum algebras
Let T be a logical theory. The Lindenbaum algebra of T is obtained as the quotient of the
sentences of the theory, under the equivalence relation of logical equivalence (i.e., two sentences
are equivalent if the theory T proves that each one of them implies the other, a logical deduction
system being set). This algebra is named after logicians Adolf Lindenbaum and Alfred Tarski: it
was first introduced by Tarski in 1935 as a device to establish correspondence between classical
propositional calculus and Boolean algebras.
Let’s consider a language L for the intuitionistic predicative logic IL. Let FormL be the
collection of all L-formulas and Der(IL) be the collection of all the derivations of LIp in the
language L. We write ϕ ⊢ ψ if there exists a derivation D ∈ Der(IL) such that ϕ appears among
its assumptions and ψ is its conclusion.
Lemma 4.7. (FormL,⊢) is a preorder.
Proof. We need to show that ⊢ is a reflexive and transitive relation. ϕ ⊢ ϕ holds for every
ϕ ∈ FormL by definition of derivation. For all ϕ,ψ,χ ∈ FormL, if ϕ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ χ, then we can
obtain a derivation of ϕ ⊢ χ by juxtaposing the derivations of ϕ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ χ.
We define the equivalence relation ∼ on FormL as follows:
for every ϕ,ψ ∈ FormL ∶ ϕ ∼ ψ⇔ ϕ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ ϕ.
This is indeed an equivalence relation, as it is easy to see, and so gives rise to a quotient class for
every formula ϕ ∈ FormL [ϕ] ∶= {ψ ∈ FormL∣ϕ ∼ ψ}
and to the quotient set
Ai(L) ∶= {[ϕ]∣ϕ ∈ FormL}.
We define the relation ≤ on Ai(L) by
[ϕ] ≤ [ψ]⇔ ϕ ⊢ ψ.
This actually is a well-defined relation on Ai(L). If [ϕ1] = [ϕ2] and [ψ1] = [ψ2] then in particular
there are derivations D′ and D′′′ for ϕ2 ⊢ ϕ1 and ψ1 ⊢ ψ2. Let’s suppose that D′′ is a derivation
for ϕ1 ⊣ ψ1, then the juxtaposition D′ ∪D′′ ∪D′′′ is a derivation for ϕ2 ⊢ ψ2. Similarly, from a
derivation for ϕ2 ⊢ ψ2 we can obtain a derivation for ϕ1 ⊢ ψ1.
Lemma 4.8. (Ai(L),≤) is an order.
Proof. We already know that (FormL,⊢) is a preorder. It only suffices to show that ≤ is antisym-
metric in Ai(L), and this is trivially true since [ϕ] ≤ [ψ] and [ψ] ≤ [ϕ] if and only if ϕ ⊢ ψ and
ψ ⊣ ϕ if and only if ϕ ∼ ψ if and only if [ϕ] = [ψ].
Theorem 4.2. Let L be a language for the intuitionistic predicative logic IL and let Ai(L) be the
corresponding Lindenbaum algebra. Then (Ai(L),≤) is a Heyting algebra.
Proof. (Ai(L),≤) is a lattice where for every ϕ,ψ ∈ FormL their join and meet are given by
[ϕ] ∨ [ψ] = [ϕ ∨ ψ] and [ϕ] ∧ [ψ] = [ϕ ∧ ψ].
Indeed, considering the join:
• [ϕ] ≤ [ϕ ∨ ψ] and [ψ] ≤ [ϕ ∨ ψ], since
ϕ ⊢ ϕ
ϕ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ and ψ ⊢ ψψ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ
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• if [ϕ] ≤ [χ] and [ψ] ≤ [χ] then [ϕ ∨ ψ] ≤ [χ], since
ϕ ⊢ χ ψ ⊢ χ
ϕ ∨ ψ ⊢ χ
and considering the meet:
• [ϕ ∧ ψ] ≤ [ϕ] and [ϕ ∧ ψ] ≤ [ψ], since
ϕ,ψ ⊢ ϕ
ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ϕ and ϕ,ψ ⊢ ψϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ
• if [χ] ≤ [ϕ] and [χ] ≤ [ψ] then [χ] ≤ [ϕ ∧ ψ], since
χ ⊢ ϕ χ ⊢ ψ
χ ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ
The lattice (Ai(L),≤) has least element 0 ≡ [] and greatest element 1 ≡ [taut], where taut is
any tautology. For any formula ϕ ∈ FormL:  ⊢ ϕ holds and so [] ≤ [ϕ], ϕ ⊢ taut holds and so[ϕ] ≤ [taut].
We define in (Ai(L),≤) an operation → by→∶ (Ai(L),≤) × (Ai(L),≤) Ð→ (Ai(L),≤)([ϕ], [ψ]) z→ [ϕ→ ψ]
It is well-defined and such that [ϕ] ≤ [ψ → χ]⇒ [ϕ] ∧ [ψ] = [ϕ ∧ ψ] ≤ [χ], indeed:
ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ χ
ϕ,ψ ⊢ χ
ϕ ⊢ ψ → χ and
ϕ ⊢ ψ → χ
ϕ,ψ ⊢ χ
ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ χ
Proceeding in the same way as before, but considering a language for the classical predicative
logic CL, we get to the same result for classical logic.
Theorem 4.3. Let L be a language for the classical predicative logic CL and let Ac(L) be the
corresponding Lindenbaum algebra. Then (Ac(L),≤) is a Boolean algebra.
Proof. Thanks to Theorem (4.2) and to Proposition (4.6), it suffices to show that [ϕ] ∨ ¬[ϕ] = 1
for every [ϕ] ∈ FormL. However we know from Theorem (4.2) that 1 = [taut] and that ¬[ϕ] =[ϕ]→ 0 = [ϕ]→ [] = [ϕ→ ] = [¬ϕ], and so [ϕ]∨¬[ϕ] = [ϕ]∨ [¬ϕ] = [ϕ∨¬ϕ]. Therefore we need
to show that [ϕ∨¬ϕ] = [taut], but this surely holds since ϕ∨¬ϕ is a classical tautology for every
ϕ ∈ FormL.
4.5 The Dedekind-MacNeille completion
Let X be a given preorder1. A completion of the preorder X is a complete lattice X̃ with an
order-embedding of X into X̃. Since X̃ is a complete lattice, every subset of elements of X̃ has
infimum and supremum, and since X Ð→ X̃ is an order-embedding, distinct elements of X must
be mapped to distinct elements of X̃ and each pair of elements in X has the same ordering in X̃
as they do in X.
1See Chapter Preorders for a rigorous definition.
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The posetX may have several different completions. Among all those, the Dedekind–MacNeille
completion (also called completion by cuts or normal completion) is the smallest complete
lattice that contains the poset X itself. It is named after Holbrook Mann MacNeille (1907-1973),
who first defined and formalized this completion, and after Richard Dedekind (1831-1916), because
this completion is a generalization of the Dedekind cuts used by Dedekind to construct the real
numbers from the rational numbers.
Definition 4.16. Let (P,≤) be a preorder. For every V ⊆ P , we indicate the upper bounds and
the lower bounds of V in P by:
V ↑ ∶= {z ∈ P ∣∀x ∈ V (x ≤ z)} V ↓ ∶= {z ∈ P ∣∀x ∈ V (z ≤ x)}
The Dedekind-MacNeille completion of the preorder (P,≤) is the algebra DM(P ) defined by:
DM(P ) ∶= {V ⊆ P ∣V = (V ↑)↓}
hence every V ∈DM(P ) has elements x such that ∀y ∈ P (∀z ∈ V (z ≤ y))→ x ≤ y. Let (P,≤) be a
preorder. The Dedekind-MacNeille operator is given by:
DM ∶ ℘(P ) Ð→ ℘(P )
V z→ DM(V ) = {x ∈ V ∣∀y ∈ P (∀z ∈ V (z ≤ y))→ x ≤ y}
The Dedekind-MacNeille operator is a particular kind of operator, namely a closure operator.
Definition 4.17. Let X be a set. The operator T ∶ ℘(X)Ð→ ℘(X) is a closure operator if for
every U,V ∈ ℘(X):
(i) T is reflexive: U ⊆ T (U);
(ii) T is idempotent: T (T (U)) ⊆ U ;
(iii) T is monotone: U ⊆ V → T (U) ⊆ T (V ).
Lemma 4.9. The Dedekind-MacNeille operator is a closure operator.
Proof. Let’s consider the Dedekind-MacNeille operator for a given preorder P :
DM ∶ V z→DM(V ) = {x ∈ V ∣∀y ∈ P (∀z ∈ V (z ≤ y))→ x ≤ y}
where V ∈ ℘(P ).
(i) DM is reflexive: Let V ∈ ℘(P ). Trivially for every x ∈ V the condition ∀y ∈ P (∀z ∈ V (z ≤
y))→ x ≤ y holds. Hence V ⊆DM(V ).
(ii) DM is idempotent: Let V ∈ ℘(P ) and x ∈ DM(DM(V )). Then ∀y ∈ P (∀z ∈ DM(V )(z ≤
y)) → x ≤ y holds, and since V ⊆ DM(V ) also ∀y ∈ P (∀z ∈ V (z ≤ y)) → x ≤ y holds, and so
x ∈DM(V ). Hence DM(DM(V )) ⊆ V .
(iii) DM is monotone: Let U,V ∈ ℘(P ) such that U ⊆ V . As it is easy to show, both ()↑ and ()↓
are antimonotone, thus U ⊆ V ⇒ V ↑ ⊆ U ↑ ⇒ (U ↑)↓ ⊆ (V ↑)↓, hence DM is monotone.
Theorem 4.4. Let P be a preorder. The Dedekind-MacNeille completion DM(P ) of P is still a
preorder, with respect to the set inclusion. If P is a Heyting (respectively Boolean) algebra, then
DM(P ) is a complete Heyting (respectively Boolean) algebra.
Proof. The first claim is trivially true. Let’s suppose P to be a Heyting algebra and let U,V ∈ ℘(P ).
• U ∧DM(P ) V ≡ U ∩ U . Indeed: DM(U ∪ V ) ⊆ DM(U) = U and DM(U ∩ V ) ⊆ DM(V ) = V
by monotonicity (Lemma (4.9)), thus DM(U ∩ V ) ⊆ U ∩ V . By reflexivity (Lemma (4.9))
U ∩ V ⊆DM(U ∩ V ). Concluding: U ∩ V =DM(U ∩ V ). (More generally ⋀i∈I Vi ≡ ⋂i∈I Vi.)
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• U ∨DM(P )V ≡DM(U ∪V ). Indeed: by monotonicity (Lemma (4.9)) U =DM(U) ⊆DM(U ∪
V ) and V = DM(V ) ⊆ DM(U ∪ V ). If W ∈ DM(P ) such that U ⊆ W and V ⊆ W then
U∪V ⊆W and by monotonicity (Lemma (4.9)) DM(U∪V ) ⊆DM(W ) =W . (More generally⋁i∈I Vi ≡DM(⋃i∈I Vi).)
• Trivially, 1DM(P ) ≡ P and 0DM(P ) ≡ {0P }.
• U →DM(P ) V ≡ {p ∈ P ∣∀u ∈ U(p ∧ u ∈ V )}. Indeed: for every W ∈ DM(P ), W ⊆ U → V ⇔
W ∩U ⊆ V . In order to show that, we previously notice that, given W ∈DM(P ):
W ⊆ U → V (∗)⇔W ∩U ⊆ V
since:
(⇒) Let z ∈W ∩U . In particular z ∈W and since W ⊆ U → V , then z ∈ U → V . Also z ∈ U ,
thus z ∧ z = z ∈ V .
(⇐) Let w ∈ W and u ∈ U . By definition of the Dedekind-MacNeille operator, w ∧ u ∈ W
and w ∧ u ∈ U . Hence w ∧ u ∈ W ∩ U , and since W ∩ U ⊆ V then w ∧ u ∈ V . By definition,
w ∈ U → V .
It remains to show that DM(U → V ) = U → V , and by reflexivity (Lemma (4.9)) it suffices
to show that DM(U → V ) ⊆ U → V . By the idempotence (Lemma (4.9)) DM(U → V ) ∈
DM(P ), and due to (∗): DM(U → V ) ⊆ U → V ⇔ DM(U → V ) ∩ U ⊆ V . Thus, we only
have to show that DM(U → V ) ∩U ⊆ V :
Let z ∈DM(U → V )∩U . If k ∈ V ↑, let’s take into consideration z → k: for every z′ ∈ U → V ,
z′ ∧ z ∈ V because z ∈ U , thus z′ ∧ z ≤ k because k ∈ V ↑, hence z′ ≤ z → k, and concluding
z → k ∈ (U → V )↑. Due to the fact that z ∈ DM(U → V ) we infer that z ≤ z → k, thus
z = z ∧ z ≤ k. Concluding: z ∈DM(V ) = V .
Let’s suppose P to be a Boolean algebra. By Proposition (4.6) and by the previous part of the
proof, it remains to show that DM(V ∪¬V ) = P for every V ∈DM(P ). Equivalently, let’s consider
z ∈ (V ∪ ¬V )↑ and let’s show that z = 1P :
Let v ∈ V . Then v ≤ z and so ¬z ≤ ¬v. It follows that
¬z ∈ {¬v∣v ∈ V }↑
We notice also that
¬V = V → ODM(P ) = {p ∈ P ∣∀v ∈ V (p ∧ v ≤ 0P )} = {p ∈ P ∣∀v ∈ V (p ≤ ¬v)} = {¬v∣v ∈ V }↑
We deduce that ¬z ∈ ¬V , and since z ∈ (¬V )↑ we have that ¬z ≤ z, thus 1P = z ∧ ¬z ≤ z, hence
z = 1P .
Lemma 4.10. Let P be a preorder and let z ∈ P . Let’s define
↓ z ∶= {x ∈ P ∣x ≤ z}
Then: ↓ z =DM({z})
where DM is the Dedekind-MacNeille operator.
Proof. Let z ∈ P and V ∶= {z}. By Definition (4.16): DM({z}) = DM(V ) = {x ∈ P ∣∀y ∈ P (∀w ∈
V (w ≤ y))→ x ≤ y} = {x ∈ P ∣∀y ∈ P (z ≤ y)→ x ≤ y}. We need to show that ↓ z =DM({z}):(⊆) Let x ∈↓ z, so x ≤ z, and let y ∈ P such that z ≤ y. From transitivity of the relation ≤
follows that x ≤ y, thus x ∈DM(V ).(⊇) Let x ∈DM(V ). Then for every y such that z ≤ y, we know that x ≤ y. In particular, let’s
take y ≡ z. Since trivially z ≤ z because of reflexivity of the relation ≤, we gather that x ≤ z, hence
x ∈↓ z.
4.5. THE DEDEKIND-MACNEILLE COMPLETION 51
Lemma 4.11. Let P be a preorder and V ∈ ℘(P ), z ∈ P . Then ↓ z = ⋁x∈V ↓ x if and only if⋁x∈V x exists in P and z = ⋁x∈V x.
Proof. We use the notation ⋁V ≡ ⋁x∈V x.(⇒) Let ↓ z = ⋁x∈V ↓ x. Then ↓ x ≤↓ z for every x ∈ V , so x ≤ z for every x ∈ V as well. Let y
be such that x ≤ y for every x ∈ V . Since z ∈ ⋁x∈V ↓ x =DM(V ), it follows that z ≤ y. Concluding:
z = ⋁V .(⇐) Let’s suppose that z = ⋁V . It follows that x ≤ z for every x ∈ V , hence V ≤↓ z. Being
DM monotone: DM(V ) ⊆ DM(↓ z). In addition: M(↓ z) =M(M(↓ z)) ⊆M({z}) =↓ z, thanks
to Lemma (4.10). Therefore: DM(V ) ⊆↓ z. Since DM(V ) is complete, we have that z = ⋁V ∈
DM(V ), and from monotonicity of DM we gather that ↓ z = DM({z}) ⊆ DM(DM(V )) =
DM(V ). Concluding: ↓ z =DM(V ).
Proposition 4.8. Let A be a Heyting algebra. Then the mapping
↓∶ A Ð→ DM(A)
z z→ ↓ z = {x ∈ A∣x ≤ z}
is a homomorphism of Heyting algebras preserving existing infinitary meets and joins.
Proof. We denote by 0 and 1 the infimun and the supremum of the Heyting algebra A. To begin
with, we notice that the mapping ↓ is monotone: given z ≤ z′ in A, we have that ↓ z = {x ∈ A∣x ≤
z} ⊆ {x ∈ A∣x ≤ z′} =↓ z′. We proceed to show that requirements in Definition (4.11) are met.
• ↓ 0 = 0DM(A). Indeed: ↓ 0 = {x ∈ A∣x ≤ 0} = {0} = 0DM(A)
• ↓ 1 = 1DM(A). Indeed: ↓ 1 = {x ∈ A∣x ≤ 1} = A = 1DM(A)
• ↓ (z ∧ z′) =↓ z∩ ↓ z′ for every z, z′ ∈ A.(⊆) Being ↓monotone and since z∧z′ ≤ z, we infer that ↓ (z∧z′) ⊆↓ z. Similarly ↓ (z∧z′) ⊆↓ z′.
Thus ↓ (z ∧ z′) ⊆↓ z∩ ↓ z′.(⊇) For every x ∈↓ z∩ ↓ z′, we have that x ∈↓ z and x ∈↓ z′, so x ≤ z and x ≤ z′. By definition
of meet: x ≤ z ∧ z′, thus x ∈↓ (z ∧ z′). Since this holds for every x ∈↓ z∩ ↓ z′, we conclude
that ↓ z∩ ↓ z′ ⊆↓ (z ∧ z′).
• ↓ (z ∨ z′) =↓ z∪ ↓ z′ for every z, z′ ∈ A.(⊆) For every x such that ↓ z∪ ↓ z′ ⊆↓ x, we have that ↓ z ⊆↓ x and ↓ z ⊆↓ x, so z ≤ x and
z′ ≤ x. By definition of join: z ∨ z′ ≤ x, thus ↓ (z ∨ z′) ⊆↓ x. Due to the generality of x, we
conclude that ↓ (z ∨ z′) ⊆↓ z∪ ↓ z′.(⊇) Being ↓monotone and since z ≤ z∨z′, we infer that ↓ z ⊆↓ (z∨z′). Similarly ↓ z′ ⊆↓ (z∨z′).
Thus ↓ z∪ ↓ z′ ⊆↓ (z ∨ z′).
• ↓ (z → z′) =↓ z →↓ z′ for every z, z′ ∈ A.(⊆) By definition of implication and since ↓ preserves meets, it suffices to show that ↓ (z →
z′)∩ ↓ z ⊆↓ z′, which holds if and only if ↓ ((z → z′) ∧ z) ⊆↓ z′, that is if and only if(z → z′) ∧ z ≤ z′. The last inequality trivially holds by reflexivity of the relation ≤, since by
definition of implication it is equivalent to z → z′ ≤ z → z′.(⊇) For every x ∈↓ z →↓ z′, we have that ↓ x ⊆↓ z →↓ z′, hence ↓ x∩ ↓ z ⊆↓ z′, that is↓ (x ∧ z) ⊆↓ z′. Then x ∧ z ≤ z′, and so by definition of implication: x ≤ z → z′. By
monotonicity of ↓: ↓ x ⊆↓ (z ∧ z′).
Furthermore, ↓ preserves all existing infinitary meets and joins.
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• ↓ (⋁x∈X x) = ⋁x∈X ↓ x for every X ⊆ A. Indeed, by applying Lemma (4.11) with z ≡ ⋁x∈X x,
we obtain what is needed.
• ↓ (⋀x∈X x) = ⋀x∈X ↓ x for every X ⊆ A. Indeed, by applying Lemma (4.10) with z ≡ ⋀x∈X x,
we obtain: ↓ ⋀x∈X x = DM(⋀x∈X x). Being DM a closure operator and due to Theorem
(4.4):
DM(⋀
x∈X x) = ⋂x∈XDM(x) = ⋂x∈X ↓ x
and since DM(A) is a Heyting algebra we conclude that ⋂x∈X ↓ x = ⋀x∈X ↓ x.
The Dedekind-MacNeille operator can be described in purely category-theoretic terms, via the
notion of adjunction. This fact does not come as a surprise: category theory was born as a general
language to deal with algebraic structures, and left and right adjoints retrace perfectly the core of
many algebraic constructions.
Definition 4.18. The category Sup is defined as follows: its objects are preorders with top element
and its morphisms are ordered maps preserving the top and the existing infinitary meets and joins.
We consider the following embedding functor:
Isup ∶ Ha Ð→ Sup
A z→ A(ϕ ∶ AÐ→ A′) z→ (ϕ ∶ AÐ→ A′)
and we call Isup(Ha) the full image category of Ha through Isup. Similarly we can consider the
category cHa2 of complete Heyting algebras and call Isup(cHa) the full image category of cHa
through Isup. There is an embedding functor
I ∶ Isup(cHa) Ð→ Isup(Ha)
Aˆ z→ Aˆ(ϕ ∶ AˆÐ→ Aˆ′) z→ (ϕ ∶ AˆÐ→ Aˆ′)
Theorem 4.5. Let’s consider the categories Isup(Ha) and Isup(cHa), the embedding functor I
and the Dedekind-MacNeille operator DM . The functor I has a left adjoint, which we call DM ,
being the Dedekind-MacNeille operator on the objects of Isup(Ha).
Proof. Let A ∈ Ob(Isup(Ha)). Then DM(A) ∈ Ob(Isup(cHa)) by Theorem (4.4). We define the
mapping
ηA ∶ A Ð→ DM(A)
a z→ ↓ a
and we need to show that for every f ∶ A Ð→ I(Bˆ) = Bˆ in Isup(Ha) there exists a unique
f ∶DM(A)Ð→ Bˆ in Isup(cHa) such that I(f) ○ ηA = f .
• Let f ∶ AÐ→ Bˆ in Isup(Ha) be given. We define:
f ∶ DM(A) Ð→ Bˆ
X z→ ⋁x∈X f(x)
This is well-defined since Bˆ is a complete Heyting algebra, and it is also monotone because
f is and trivially:
X ⊆X ′ in DM(A)⇒ f(X) = ⋁
x∈X f(x) ≤ ⋁x′∈X′ f(x′) =X ′
2For the sake of clarity we will indicate its objects by Aˆ with the purpose of discriminating complete and not
complete algebras.
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• f is a map in Isup(cHa): We only need to prove that it preserves the supremum and the
existing joins. First of all:
f(1DM(A)) = f(A) = ⋁
a∈A f(a) = ⋁ˆb∈Bˆ bˆ = 1Bˆ
Let’s now consider a collection Ai ⊆DM(A), i ∈ I. We notice that:
f(⋁
i∈IAi) = f(DM(⋃i∈IAi)) = ⋁z∈DM(⋃i∈I Ai) f(z)
and ⋁
i∈I f(Ai) =⋁i∈I ⋁x∈Ai f(x) = ⋁x∈⋃i∈I Ai f(x)
thus it suffices to show that
⋁
z∈DM(⋃i∈I Ai) f(z) = ⋁x∈⋃i∈I Ai f(x)
(≤) Let z ∈DM(⋃i∈I Ai). Then:↓ z ≤ ⋁
x∈⋃i∈I Ai ↓ x =DM( ⋃x∈⋃i∈I Ai ↓ x) =DM(⋃i∈IAi)
and so: (↓ z) ∧DM(⋃
i∈IAi) = (↓ z) ∧ ( ⋁x∈⋃i∈I Ai ↓ x) =↓ z
By the distributive property:
↓ z = (↓ z) ∧ ( ⋁
x∈⋃i∈I Ai ↓ x) = ⋁x∈⋃i∈I Ai(↓ z∧ ↓ x)
However ↓ is a homomorphism of Heyting algebras, hence:
⋁
x∈⋃i∈I Ai(↓ z∧ ↓ x) = ⋁x∈⋃i∈I Ai ↓ (z ∧ x)
Now we recall that f preserves the existing joins and is monotone, consequently from z∧x ≤ z
and z ∧ x ≤ x we gather f(z ∧ x) ≤ f(z) and f(z ∧ x) ≤ f(x), and so f(z ∧ x) ≤ f(z) ∧ f(x).
In addition, z = ⋁x∈⋃i∈I Ai z ∧ x by Proposition (4.8). Concluding:
f(z) = f( ⋁
x∈⋃i∈I Ai z ∧ x)) ⋁x∈⋃i∈I Ai f(z ∧ x) ≤ ⋁x∈⋃i∈I Ai f(z) ∧ f(x) ≤ ⋁x∈⋃i∈I Ai f(x)
and by the arbitrariness of z ∈DM(⋃i∈I Ai):⋁
z∈DM(⋃i∈I Ai) f(z) ≤ ⋁x∈⋃i∈I Ai f(x)
(≥) Let x ∈ ⋃i∈I Ai. Since f is monotone and ⋃i∈I Ai ⊆DM(⋃i∈I Ai), we infer:
f(x) ≤ ⋀
z∈DM(⋃i∈I Ai) f(z)
and by definition of join: ⋁
x∈⋃i∈I Ai f(x) ≤ ⋀z∈DM(⋃i∈I Ai) f(z)
• f is such that I(f) ○ ηA = f : Indeed, for every a ∈ A, we get:(I(f) ○ ηA)(a) = I(f)(ηA(a)) = f(↓ a) = ⋁
x∈(↓a) f(x) = f(⋁x≤ax) = f(a)
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• f is unique: Let’s consider a map h ∶DM(A)Ð→ Bˆ in Isup(cHa) such that h(ηA(a)) = f(a)
for every a ∈ A. Recalling that X = ⋁x∈X ↓ x for every X ⊆ A, we deduce:
h(X) = h(⋁
x∈X ↓ x) = ⋁x∈X h(↓ x) = ⋁x∈X h(ηA(x)) = ⋁x∈X f(x) = f(X)
In a way really similar to what has just been done, we can define the embedding functor
Isup ∶ Ba Ð→ Sup
A z→ A(ϕ ∶ AÐ→ A′) z→ (ϕ ∶ AÐ→ A′)
and the categories Isup(Ba) and Isup(cBa), and we can prove that the embedding functor
I ∶ Isup(cBa) Ð→ Isup(Ba)
Aˆ z→ Aˆ(ϕ ∶ AˆÐ→ Aˆ′) z→ (ϕ ∶ AˆÐ→ Aˆ′)
has a left adjoint DM which coincide with the Dedekind-MacNeille operator on the objects of
Isup(Ba).
However, in the case of Boolean algebras there is more to it than just that, as Banaschewski
and Bruns pointed out ([BB67]): the requirements that the supremum for every object in Sup
exists and that the maps in Sup respect it are redundant.
Definition 4.19. The category Ba∨ is the subcategory of Ba where maps are homomorphisms of
Boolean algebras respecting the existing infinitary joins. The category cBa∨ is the full subcategory
of Ba∨ where the objects are complete Boolean algebras.
As before, we can define the embedding functor
I ∶ cBa∨ Ð→ Ba∨
Aˆ z→ Aˆ(ϕ ∶ AˆÐ→ Aˆ′) z→ (ϕ ∶ AˆÐ→ Aˆ′)
Theorem 4.6. Let’s consider the categories Ba∨ and cBa∨, the embedding functor I and the
Dedekind-MacNeille operator DM . The functor I has a left adjoint, which we call DM , being the
Dedekind-MacNeille operator on the objects of Ba∨.
Proof. Let A ∈ Ob(Ba∨). Then DM(A) ∈ Ob(cBa∨) by Theorem (4.4). We define the mapping
ηA ∶ A Ð→ DM(A)
a z→ ↓ a
and we need to show that for every f ∶ AÐ→ I(Bˆ) = Bˆ in Ba∨ there exists a unique f ∶DM(A)Ð→
Bˆ in cBa∨ such that I(f) ○ ηA = f . We proceed in the same way of the proof of Theorem (4.5):
we define f ∶ DM(A) Ð→ Bˆ by setting f(X) ∶= ⋁x∈X f(x) for every X ∈ DM(A), and doing so
we get a well-defined monotone unique map such that f(ηA(a)) = f(a) for every a ∈ A and such
that it respects the existing infinitary joins (all these facts can be shown in the same way as in
the proof of Theorem (4.5)). In order to show that f is a map in cBa∨, it remains to show that
f is a homomorphism of Boolean algebras (it is no longer trivial in this case). By Lemma (4.6) it
suffices to show the following facts:
• f(0DM(A)) = 0Bˆ : Indeed, owing to the fact that f is a homomorphism of Boolean algebras,
we infer:
f(0DM(A)) = f({0}) = ⋁
x∈{0} f(x) = f(0A) = 0Bˆ
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• f(1DM(A)) = 1Bˆ : Indeed, as we pointed out in the proof of Theorem (4.5):
f(1DM(A)) = f(A) = ⋁
a∈A f(a) = ⋁ˆb∈Bˆ bˆ = 1Bˆ
• f(X ∪X ′) = f(X) ∨ f(X ′) for every X,X ′ ∈ Ob(cBa∨). Indeed:
f(X ∪X ′) = ⋁
z∈X∪X′ f(z) = ⋁x∈X f(x) ∨ ⋁x′∈X′ f(x′) = f(X) ∨ f(X ′)
• f(¬X) = ¬f(X) for every X ∈ Ob(cBa∨): We need to show that:
f(X) ∧ f(¬X) = 0Bˆ and f(X) ∨ f(¬X) = 1Bˆ
Using the distributive property we get:
f(X) ∧ f(¬X) = ⋁
x∈X f(x) ∧ ⋁z∈¬X f(z) = ⋁x∈X ⋁z∈¬X(f(x) ∧ f(z))
and after recalling that ¬X =X → 0 = {z ∈ A∣∀x ∈X.(z ≤ ¬x)} we deduce:
⋁
x∈X ⋁z∈¬X(f(x) ∧ f(z)) ≤ ⋁x∈X(f(x) ∧ f(¬x)) = ⋁x∈X(f(x ∧ ¬x)) = f(0A) = 0Bˆ
since f is a homomorphism of Boolean algebras. In a similar fashion:
f(X) ∨ f(¬X) = ⋁
x∈X ⋁z∈¬X(f(x) ∨ f(z)) ≤ ⋁x∈X(f(x) ∨ f(¬x)) = ⋁x∈X(f(x ∨ ¬x)) = f(1A) = 1Bˆ
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Chapter 5
Preorders
Let’s develop an example that is crucial in order to reach our goal. The structure of a preorder
turns out to be a really good instance for applying to some concrete structure the categorical
notions that have been introduced so far. Besides, preorders are the best place where to introduce
some primitive logical elements, such as bottom, top, implication and so on. In fact, the structure
of a preorder constitutes the primary shell of a Lindenbaum algebra over a given logical language.
Definition 5.1. A preordered set (or simply preorder) (A,≤) is a set A together with a reflexive
transitive binary relation ≤.
A preorder (A,≤) can be regarded as a category A whose objects correspond one-to-one to the
elements of A and in which for every couple of objects there is at most one map between them,
and informally we can think of the unique map A1 Ð→ A2 between the objects A1 and A2 in
the category as the assertion that a1 ≤ a2 for a1,a2 corresponding elements of A. Equivalently, it
is possible to define the so called preordered categories as the small categories in which there is
at most one map between any two objects. Nevertheless, we are not going to use this definition
in this chapter because we prefer to shed a clear light on the parallelism between preorders and
correspondent categories, which in fact are preordered categories in the sense just stated. In addi-
tion, we can consider the category Preord with preorder sets as objects and monotone functions
between them as maps.
Definition 5.2. A partially ordered set (poset) (A,≤) is a preorder with the property that if
x ≤ y and y ≤ x then x = y, for every x, y ∈ A.
As it happens with the preorders, any poset can be regarded as a category, in which the
following property holds: for every X,Y ∈ Ob(A) if X ≅ Y then X = Y . In addition, we can
consider the category Poset with objects the partially ordered sets and maps the monotone
functions between them.
Lemma 5.1. Let A, B be preorders and let A, B be the corresponding categories. Then a functor
F ∶ A Ð→ B amounts to a monotone function f ∶ A Ð→ B, which is increasing if F is covariant,
decreasing if F is contravariant. Conversely, a monotone function f ∶ A Ð→ B gives rise to a
functor F ∶ AÐ→ B, which is covariant if f is increasing, contravariant if f is decreasing.
Proof. Let F ∶ A Ð→ B be a covariant functor. A map A1 Ð→ A2 in A is sent into a map
F (A1) Ð→ F (A2) in B. We define a function f ∶ A Ð→ B, a z→ f(a) where f(a) is the element
of B corresponding to the object F (A) ∈ Ob(B), when a is the element of A corresponding to the
object A ∈ Ob(A). Since A1 Ð→ A2 in A if and only if a1 ≤ a2 in A and F (A1) Ð→ F (A2) in B if
and only if f(a1) ≤ f(a2) in B, we infer that a1 ≤ a2 Ô⇒ f(a1) ≤ f(a2). Thus f is an increasing
monotone function from A to B.
Let F ∶ A Ð→ B be a contravariant functor. A map A1 Ð→ A2 in A is sent into a map
F (A2) Ð→ F (A1) in B. We define a function f ∶ A Ð→ B, a z→ f(a) where f(a) is the element
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of B corresponding to the object F (A) ∈ Ob(B), when a is the element of A corresponding to the
object A ∈ Ob(A). Since A1 Ð→ A2 in A if and only if a1 ≤ a2 in A and F (A2) Ð→ F (A1) in B if
and only if f(a2) ≤ f(a1) in B, we infer that a1 ≤ a2 Ô⇒ f(a2) ≤ f(a1). Thus f is a decreasing
monotone function from A to B.
Let’s consider an increasing monotone function f ∶ A Ð→ B. We define a functor F ∶ A Ð→ B
in the following manner. If A1 ∈ Ob(A) and a1 is its corresponding element in the preorder A,
then F (A1) ∈ Ob(B) is the object of B corresponding to the element f(a1) in the preorder B. Let
A1 Ð→ A2 be a map in the category A, thus a1 ≤ a2 in the preorder A where a1, a2 in A correspond
to A1, A2 in Ob(A), therefore f(a1) ≤ f(a2) in B since f is increasing and so we can find a map
F (A1) Ð→ F (A2) in B, where f(a1), f(a2) correspond to F (A1), F (A2). By the monotonicity
of f , it can be easily proved that F respects composition and identities, so it is indeed a covariant
functor.
Let’s consider a decreasing monotone function f ∶ A Ð→ B. We define a functor F ∶ A Ð→ B
in the following manner. If A1 ∈ Ob(A) and a1 is its corresponding element in the preorder A,
then F (A1) ∈ Ob(B) is the object of B corresponding to the element f(a1) in the preorder B.
Let A1 Ð→ A2 be a map in the category A, thus a1 ≤ a2 in the preorder A where a1, a2 in A
correspond to A1, A2 in Ob(A), therefore f(a2) ≤ f(a1) in B since f is decreasing and so we
can find a map F (A2) Ð→ F (A1) in B, where f(a1), f(a2) correspond to F (A1), F (A2). By
the monotonicity of f , it can be easily proved that F respects composition and identities, so it is
indeed a contravariant functor.
This result makes the definition of the following functor legit:
I ∶ Preord Ð→ Cat(A,≤) ↦ A(AÐ→ B) ↤ (AÐ→ B)
where I(A) = A is the preordered categories corresponding to the preorder A. I is a full functor
since for every A, B preorders and f ∶ A Ð→ B increasing function between them there exists a
map F ∶ AÐ→ B in Cat, thanks to Lemma (5.1). Hence Preord is a full subcategory of Cat. We
can also consider the functor:
R ∶ Cat Ð→ PreordA ↦ (AA,≤A)(AÐ→ B) ↤ (AA Ð→ BB)
where if A is a small category then AA is a set containing an element for each object of A and for
a1,a2 ∈ A a1 ≤A a2 if and only if there exists a map A1 Ð→ A2 in A (where A1, A2 are the objects
corresponding to the elements a1, a2). For every map in Cat, Lemma (5.1) detects a monotone
function between preorders.
Theorem 5.1. The functor R ∶ CatÐ→ Preord is left adjoint to the functor I ∶ PreordÐ→Cat:
R ⊣ I
Proof. We define the natural transformation η ∶ 1Cat Ð→ I ○ R: for every small category A,
ηA ∶ A Ð→ IR(A) sends any object A ∈ Ob(A) in A and any map A1 Ð→ A2 in itself. It is easy
to check that ηA is well-defined for every small category A. Let A be a small category and B
a preorder and let F ∶ A Ð→ I(B) be a map in Cat, thus a functor between categories A and
I(B) = B. Let g ∶ R(A)Ð→ B be the monotone function corresponding to f , according to Lemma
(5.1). Then g is uniquely defined and owing to the definition of I it is such that I(g) ○ηA = f .
Let (A,≤) be a preorder. We define the relation ∼ on A by:
∀a, a′ ∈ A(a ∼ a′⇔ a ≤ a′ and a′ ≤ a)
It is an equivalence relation, thus we can consider the quotient set A/ ∼ whose elements are the
equivalent classes [a] = {a′ ∈ A∣a ∼ a′}. It is straightforward to check that (A/ ∼,≤) is a poset.
59
Theorem 5.2. The functor
I ∶ Ord Ð→ Preord(A,≤) ↦ (A,≤)(AÐ→ B) ↤ (AÐ→ B)
is left adjoint to the functor
R ∶ Preord Ð→ Ord
A ↦ A/ ∼(AÐ→ B) ↤ (A/ ∼Ð→ B ∼)
Proof. We need to show that I ⊣ R. We define η ∶ 1Ord Ð→ R ○ I: for every preorder A, ηA ∶ AÐ→
RI(A) = A/ ∼= A is defined by a z→ [a] = a. Let A be an order and B a preorder, let f ∶ A Ð→
R(B) = B/ ∼ be a monotone function between orders. Then there is a unique g ∶ I(A) = A Ð→ B
monotone function between preorders defined by az→ f(a) and such that f = R(g)○ηA. It is easy
to check that g is a well-defined monotone function, moreover R(g)(ηA(a)) = R(g)([a]) = g(a) =
f(a) for all a ∈ A and if h ∶ A Ð→ B is another such function, then g(a) = f(a) = R(h)(ηA(a)) =
R(h)([a]) = h(a).
Composing the two adjunctions of the previous results we can obtain an adjunction between the
categories Cat and Ord. Let’s investigate now the notion of natural transformation for preorders.
Lemma 5.2. Let A, B be preorders and let A, B be the corresponding categories. Let f, g ∶ AÐ→ B
be order preserving maps and let F,G ∶ A Ð→ B be the corresponding functors. Then there is at
most one natural transformation A BF
G
and there is exactly one if and only if f(a) ≤ g(a)
for all a ∈ A.
Proof. First of all, we notice that the condition (1.1) holds automatically in a preorder, because all
diagrams commute. Therefore the natural transformation A BF
G
is given by (αA ∶ F (A)Ð→
G(A))A∈Ob(A), provided the latter corresponds to an order preserving map, that is f(a) ≤ g(a)
for all a ∈ A.
It follows that BA is a preorder too: its elements are the order-preserving maps from A to
B and f ≤ g if and only if f(a) ≤ g(a) for all a ∈ A. Its corresponding category is the functor
category BA.
Definition 5.3. Let (A,≤) be a preorder. An element t ∈ A is called top of the preorder if a ≤ t
for all a ∈ A, an element i ∈ A is called bottom of the preorder if i ≤ a for all a ∈ A.
In a preorder, top and bottom need not be unique, but if the preorder is partially ordered they
are unique (if t, t′ are bottom of a poset, then t ≤ t′ and t′ ≤ t, hence t = t′).
Lemma 5.3. Let (A,≤) be a preorder and A the correspondent category. Then bottom and top of
A correspond respectively to the initial and the terminal object of A.
Proof. Let i ∈ A be the bottom of the preorder (A,≤), so i ≤ a for all a ∈ A. If I ∈ Ob(A) is the
object corresponding to i, then there exists exactly one map I Ð→ A for all A ∈ Ob(A). Therefore
I is initial in the category A. Similarly for the top of the preorder.
Whereas top and bottom of a preorders are given by special objects, such as the initial and
terminal ones, infimum and supremum are given by some constructions applied to the objects of
the category.
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Definition 5.4. Let (A,≤) be a preorder and let a, a′ ∈ A. The meet a ∧ a′ of a and a′ is an
element ξ ∈ A such that ξ ≤ a, z ≤ a′ and for all z ∈ A such that z ≤ a, z ≤ a′ one has that z ≤ ξ.
The join a ∨ a′ of a and a′ is an element ξ ∈ A such that a ≤ ξ, a′ ≤ ξ and for all z ∈ A such that
a ≤ z, a′ ≤ z one has that ξ ≤ z.
Lemma 5.4. Let (A,≤) be a preorder and A the correspondent category. Let also a, a′ ∈ A and
A,A′ ∈ Ob(A) be the corresponding objects. The meet a ∧ a′ and the join a ∨ a′ in the preorder A
correspond respectively to the product and the coproduct of A and A′ in the category A.
Proof. Let’s consider the product A×A′ of A and A′ objects in the category A and the correspond-
ing element a × a′ in the preorder A. Since there are projections A ×A′ Ð→ A and A ×A′ Ð→ A′,
we have that a×a′ ≤ a and a×a′ ≤ a′. Let c ∈ A be such that c ≤ a and c ≤ a′, let C ∈ Ob(A) be the
corresponding object in the category A. Then maps C Ð→ A and C Ð→ A′ exist in the category.
By definition of binary product, the map C Ð→ A ×A′ exists. Thus c ≤ a × a′ in the preorder A.
It follows that a × a′ = a ∧ a′.
Conversely, let a∧a′ ∈ A and let A∧A′ ∈ Ob(A) be the corresponding object. By definition a∧a′ ≤ a
and a∧a′ ≤ a′, hence maps A∧A′ Ð→ A and A∧A′ Ð→ A′ exist. Let’s suppose C ∈ Ob(A) such that
C Ð→ A and C Ð→ A′ in the categoryA. Therefore c ≤ a and c ≤ a′ in the preorder, and so c ≤ a∧a′.
As a consequence,the map C Ð→ A ∧A′ exists in A, and it is also unique. Besides, the equalities(A∧A′ Ð→ A) ○ (C Ð→ A∧A′) = (C Ð→ A) and (A∧A′ Ð→ A′) ○ (C Ð→ A∧A′) = (C Ð→ A′) are
clearly proved by correspondence in the preorder A. Finally A ×A′ = A ∧A′.
Let’s consider the coproduct A⊕A′ of A and A′ objects in the category A and the corresponding
element a⊕ a′ in the preorder A. Since there are maps A Ð→ A⊕A′ and A′ Ð→ A⊕A′, we have
that a ≤ a ⊕ a′ and a′ ≤ a ⊕ a′. Let c ∈ A be such that a ≤ c and a′ ≤ c, let C ∈ Ob(A) be the
corresponding object in the category A. Then maps A Ð→ C and A′ Ð→ C exist in the category.
By definition of binary coproduct, the map A ⊕A′ Ð→ C exists. Thus a ⊕ a′ ≤ c in the preorder
A. It follows that a⊕ a′ = a ∨ a′.
Conversely, let a∨a′ ∈ A and let A∨A′ ∈ Ob(A) be the corresponding object. By definition a ≤ a∨a′
and a′ ≤ a∨a′, hence maps AÐ→ A∨A′ and A′ Ð→ A∨A′ exist. Let’s suppose C ∈ Ob(A) such that
AÐ→ C and A′ Ð→ C in the categoryA. Therefore a ≤ c and a′ ≤ c in the preorder, and so a∨a′ ≤ c.
As a consequence, the map A∨A′ Ð→ C exists in A, and it is also unique. Besides, the equalities(A∨A′ Ð→ C) ○ (AÐ→ A∨A′) = (AÐ→ C) and (A∨A′ Ð→ C) ○ (A′ Ð→ A∨A′) = (A′ Ð→ C) are
clearly proved by correspondence in the preorder A. Finally A⊕A′ = A ∨A′.
Proposition 5.1. Let A, B be preorders and let A, B be the corresponding categories. An ad-
junction between A and B consists of order-preserving maps A Bf
g
such that
∀a ∈ A,∀b ∈ B(f(a) ≤ b⇐⇒ a ≤ g(b)). (5.1)
Proof. Let (F,G, .) be an adjunction between A and B, where A BF
G
are functors and
. ∶ B(F (A),B) ≅Ð→ A(A,G(B)) in an isomorphism, natural in A and B, for every A ∈ Ob(A)
and B ∈ Ob(B). Being A and B preorders, the sets B(F (A),B) and A(A,G(B)) contain both at
most one elements. Thus, by Lemma (5.1), there exist two order-preserving maps f ∶ AÐ→ B and
g ∶ B Ð→ A such that f(a) ≤ b⇐⇒ a ≤ g(b) for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B.
Corollary 5.1. Let A, B be preorders and let A, B be the corresponding categories. An adjunction
between A and B consists of order-preserving maps A Bf
g
such that
∀a ∈ A(a ≤ g(f(a))) and ∀b ∈ B(f(g(b)) ≤ b)
Proof. Let (F,G, η, ε) be an adjunction between A and B, where A BF
G
are functors and
η ∶ 1A Ð→ G ○ F and ε ∶ F ○G Ð→ 1B are the unit and the counit of the adjunction. This means
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that there exist two order-preserving maps f ∶ A Ð→ B and g ∶ B Ð→ A. Also, the unit of the
adjunction is the statement that a ≤ g(f(a)) for all a ∈ A and the counit is the statement that
f(g(b)) ≤ b for all b ∈ B. The triangle identities are equivalent to claim the equality of two maps
in an ordered set with the same domain and codomain, and this fact is always true.
The previuos results give evidence of an all-important link between adjunctions between two
preorders categories and Galois connections.
Definition 5.5. Let (A,≤) and (B,≤) be two partially ordered sets. A monotone Galois
connection between the posets A and B consists of two monotone functions f ∶ A Ð→ B and
g ∶ B Ð→ A, such that ∀a ∈ A,∀b ∈ B(f(a) ≤ b⇐⇒ a ≤ g(b))
Abusing language, if two functors satisfy the condition in the definition above, we say that
they are Galois connected, or that they form a Galois connection. However, the condition of the
definition is exactly the statement (5.1). We can consequently state the following crucial result
about adjunctions between preordered categories.
Theorem 5.3. Let A, B be posets and A, B be the corresponding categories. Let also F ∶ AÐ→ B,
G ∶ B Ð→ A be two order-preserving functors. Then F ⊣ G if and only if F and G are Galois
connected (more precisely, the corresponding order-preserving maps f and g satisfy the condition
(5.1), so they give rise to a Galois connection).
Having said that, the idea that adjunctions can be defined in many different ways also in the
case of preorders is now more evident. More precisely, we can list all of them in the following
theorem, which is exactly what Theorem (2.1) asserts in the specific case of preordered categories.
Theorem 5.4. Let (A,≤), (B,≤) be preorders and let A, B be the corresponding categories. LetA BF
G
be two functors, whose corresponding maps are A B
f
g
.
(i) F ⊣ G ⇔ f , g are monotone functions such that a ≤ g(f(a)) and (a ≤ g(b) Ô⇒ f(a) ≤ b)
for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B;
(ii) F ⊣ G ⇔ g is a monotone function and f g are such that a ≤ g(f(a)) and (a ≤ g(b) Ô⇒
f(a) ≤ b) for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B;
(iii) F ⊣ G ⇔ f , g are monotone functions such that f(g(b)) ≤ b and (f(a) ≤ bÔ⇒ a ≤ g(b)) for
all a ∈ A and b ∈ B;
(iv) F ⊣ G ⇔ f is a monotone function such that f(g(b)) ≤ b and (f(a) ≤ bÔ⇒ a ≤ g(b)) for all
a ∈ A and b ∈ B;
(v) F ⊣ G ⇔ f , g are monotone functions such that a ≤ g(f(a)) for all a ∈ A and f(g(b)) ≤ b
for all b ∈ B.
Proof. It follows directly from Theorem (2.1).
The notion of adjunction becomes crucial since it can be used to characterize top, bottom, the
meet and the join of two elements in a preorder, as the following results show.
• top
We define 1 to be the category with a unique object ● and a unique map ●Ð→ ●. Let (A,≤)
be a preorder and let t be its top, let T ∈ Ob(A) be the corresponding object in the category.
Let’s consider the functor top:
top ∶ 1 Ð→ A● ↦ T(●Ð→ ●) ↦ (1T ∶ T Ð→ T )
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and the trivial functor !:
! ∶ A Ð→ 1
A ↦ ●(A1 Ð→ A2) ↦ (●Ð→ ●)
Proposition 5.2. Let (A,≤) be a preorder with t its top, and let A be the corresponding
category with terminal object T . The trivial functor ! is left adjoint to the functor top
(! ⊣ top). Conversely, if ! ⊣ top then the category A has T as terminal object (equivalently,
the preorder (A,≤) has t as its top).
Proof. We need to show that there is a natural isomorphism
1(!(A), ●) ≅ A(A, top(●))
for every object A ∈ Ob(A). Being A the category corresponding to the preorder (A,≤), it
suffices to show that for every a ∈ A:
!(a) ≤ ●⇔ a ≤ top(●)
which is equivalent to ask that a ≤ t for every a ∈ A, which for sure holds by definition of t
top in the preorder (A,≤). Reversing the same reasoning, one gets the second part of the
Proposition.
As a consequence of the previous Proposition, in a category C the terminal object can be
described by an adjunction.
• bottom
We define 1 to be the category with a unique object ● and a unique map ●Ð→ ●. Let (A,≤)
be a preorder and let i be its bottom, let I ∈ Ob(A) be the corresponding object in the
category. Let’s consider the functor bottom:
bottom ∶ 1 Ð→ A● ↦ I(●Ð→ ●) ↦ (1I ∶ I Ð→ I)
and the trivial functor !.
Proposition 5.3. Let (A,≤) be a preorder with i its bottom, and let A be the corresponding
category with initial object I. The functor bottom is left adjoint to the trivial functor !
(bottom ⊣!). Conversely, if bottom ⊣! then the category A has I as initial object (equivalently,
the preorder (A,≤) has i as its bottom).
Proof. We need to show that there is a natural isomorphism
A(bottom(●),A) ≅ 1(●, !(A))
for every object A ∈ Ob(A). Being A the category corresponding to the preorder (A,≤), it
suffices to show that for every a ∈ A:
bottom(●) ≤ a⇔ ● ≤!(a)
which is equivalent to ask that i ≤ a for every a ∈ A, which for sure holds by definition of i
bottom in the preorder (A,≤). Reversing the same reasoning, one gets the second part of
the Proposition.
As a consequence of the previous Proposition, in a category C the initial object can be
described by an adjunction.
63
• meet
Let (A,≤) be a preorder where the meet of any two elements exists. The preorder (A×A,⪯)
has elements {(a, ã)∣a, ã ∈ A} and (a, ã) ⪯ (a′, ã′) ⇔ (a ≤ a′ and ã ≤ ã′). Let A be the
category corresponding to the preorder A and A × A the category corresponding to the
preorder A ×A. The diagonal functor diag is defined as:
diag ∶ A Ð→ A ×A
A ↦ (A,A)(A1 Ð→ A2) ↦ ((A1,A1)Ð→ (A2,A2))
and the product functor × is defined as:
× ∶ A ×A Ð→ A(A, Ã) ↦ A × Ã((A, Ã)Ð→ (A′, Ã′)) ↦ (A × ÃÐ→ A × Ã′))
Proposition 5.4. Let (A,≤) be a preorder where the meet of any two elements exists, and
let A be the corresponding category (where consequently binary products exist). The functor
diag is left adjoint to the functor × (diag ⊣ ×). Conversely, if diag ⊣ × then the category A
has binary products (equivalently, the preorder (A,≤) has meet for every couple of elements).
Proof. We need to show that there is a natural isomorphism
(A ×A)(diag(A′), (A, Ã)) ≅ A(A′,A × Ã)
for every A′,A, Ã ∈ Ob(A). Since the category A corresponds to the preorder (A,≤) and
products in the category correspond to meets in the preorder, it suffices to show that for
every a′, a, ã ∈ A: (a′, a′) ⪯ (a, ã)⇔ a′ ≤ a ∧ ã
which is true since:
(a′, a′) ⪯ (a, ã)⇔ (a′ ≤ a and a′ ≤ ã)⇔ a′ ≤ a ∧ ã
for every a′, a, ã ∈ A. Conversely, let’s suppose that diag ⊣ ×. It follows that in the language
of the preorders (A,≤) and (A × A,⪯): (a′, a′) ⪯ (a, ã) ⇔ a′ ≤ a ∧ ã and a ∧ ã ≤ a ∧ ã ⇔(a∧ ã, a∧ ã) ⪯ (a, ã). This means that for every a′, a, ã ∈ A: if a′ ≤ a and a′ ≤ ã then a′ ≤ a∧ ã,
also a ∧ ã ≤ a and a ∧ ã ≤ ã.
As a consequence of the previous Proposition, in a category C the product can be described
by an adjunction.
• join
Let (A,≤) be a preorder where the join of any two elements exists. Let A be the category
corresponding to the preorder A. The coproduct functor ⊕ is defined as:
⊕ ∶ A ×A Ð→ A(A, Ã) ↦ A⊕ Ã((A, Ã)Ð→ (A′, Ã′)) ↦ (A⊕ ÃÐ→ A⊕ Ã′))
Proposition 5.5. Let (A,≤) be a preorder where the join of any two elements exists, and letA be the corresponding category (where consequently binary coproducts exist). The functor ⊕
is left adjoint to the functor diag (⊕ ⊣ diag). Conversely, if ⊕ ⊣ diag then the category A has
binary coproducts (equivalently, the preorder (A,≤) has join for every couple of elements).
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Proof. We need to show that there is a natural isomorphism
A(A⊕ Ã,A′) ≅ (A ×A)((A, Ã), diag(A′))
for every A′,A, Ã ∈ Ob(A). Since the category A corresponds to the preorder (A,≤) and
coproducts in the category correspond to joins in the preorder, it suffices to show that for
every a′, a, ã ∈ A:
a ∨ ã ≤ a′⇔ (a, ã) ⪯ (a′, a′)
which is true since:
(a, ã) ⪯ (a′, a′)⇔ (a ≤ a′ and ã ≤ a′)⇔ a ∨ ã ≤ a′
for every a′, a, ã ∈ A. Conversely, let’s suppose that ⊕ ⊣ diag. It follows that in the language
of the preorders (A,≤) and (A×A,⪯): (a, ã) ⪯ (a′, a′)⇔ a∨ ã ≤ a′ and a∨ ã ≤ a∨ ã⇔ (a, ã) ⪯(a ∨ ã, a ∨ ã). This means that for every a′, a, ã ∈ A: if a ≤ a′ and ã ≤ a′ then a ∨ ã ≤ a′, also
a ≤ a ∨ ã and ã ≤ a ∨ ã.
As a consequence of the previous Proposition, in a category C the coproduct can be described
by an adjunction.
So far, we have shown that categorical language is powerful enough to deal with preorders
and posets and thus to describe categorically their structures. Essentially, this does suggest that
Heyting and Boolean algebras, hence (only propositional, for now) intuitionistic and classical logic,
can be treated within the setting of category theory, as we will see at the very end of the next
chapter.
Chapter 6
Logical connectives as adjoint
functors
The main goal of this chapter is to use the categorical language and the tools of category theory
for the treatment of propositional logic. In order to do so, we need to give a categorical charac-
terization (i.e. by means of adjoint functors) of the intuitionistic and classical connectives. Once
this is worked out, it will be possible to give the categorical definitions of Heyting and Boolean
algebras, as particular cases of ordered categories. This is the very starting point of categorical
logic, whose origins will be presented and whose developments will be sketched.
6.1 The adjoint-functorial nature of connectives: categori-
cal logic
As already mentioned, the turning point towards a categorical treatment of logic, which in fact
is categorical logic, consists in making explicit the hidden essentially adjoint-functorial nature
of logical connectives and quantifiers. We recall that category theory was invented in 1945 by
Eilenberg (September 30, 1913 – January 30, 1998) and Saunders Mac Lane (4 August 1909 – 14
April 2005), making its first official appearance in the paper [ME45]. Immediately it was seen by
other mathematicians as a powerful and useful tool to deal with algebraic aspects of mathematics,
and by the end of the 1950s its concepts and methods had become the full-fledged canonical way
to treat algebraic topology and algebraic geometry.
6.1.1 The birth of categorical logic
J. Lambek
At the beginning, logic and category theory had nothing in common,
and logicians of those days were most of the times totally unacquainted
with category theory. The first time these two subjects had a contact
was in the mind of an algebraist, Joachim ”Jim” Lambek (5 December
1922 – 23 June 2014). He first discerned analogies between the way a
category is defined and deductive systems in the style of those intro-
duced by Gerhard Karl Erich Gentzen (November 24, 1909 – August
4, 1945) in 1930s. This hint was taken in earnest by Francis William
Lawvere (February 9, 1937), who is rightly regarded as the founder
of categorical logic: in his pioneering work, which came to be known
as functorial semantics ([Law63]), he thoroughly reshape logical se-
mantics and syntax in categorical terms, identifying algebraic theories
as categories with certain properties, interpretations as functors be-
tween them and models as functors from them to the category Set of
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sets. Lawvere’s project was however far more complex. He actually began to extend this descrip-
tion of algebraic theories in category-theoretic terms to first-order theories (also called elementary
theories), after introducing quantification as a particular kind of adjunction. In fact, we was a
staunch supporter of the idea that category theory could serve as a foundation for mathematics:
on the one hand he had just discover a possible way for the development of logic through category-
theoretic language and tools, on the other he was convinced that category theory reflected the
real essence of mathematical (and not only algebraic) structures. Together with Myles Tierney
(1937), he started to look into the consequences of taking as an axiom the existence of an object
of truth value, which was necessary in order to express quantification. Together they ended up
with the foundation of a concept of terrific fertility: the elementary topos, i.e. a cartesian closed
category with an object of truth value ([Law70b], [Tie72], [Tie73]). Lawvere and Tierney’s ideas
were taken up and further developed by several mathematicians and logicians, and the belief that
logic can be done into a topos turned out soon to be well-founded: a topos’ internal logic is a form
of intuitionistic type theory and conversely each type theory generates a topos.
We can say that these two crucial steps, that is the foundation of functorial semantics by Lawvere
and the formulation of the concept of elementary topos by Lawvere and Tierney, officially establish
the birth of categorical logic, as we mean it today.
It is worth underlining that categorical logic did not develop as a stand-alone and self-supporting
branch of logic (or mathematics). Rather, as researching and studying of this subject went along,
connections and stimuli to many other fields of mathematics, theoretical computer science and
logic came to light more and more often. Among the others, fields such as intuitionistic Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory (IZF), philosophy of mathematics, recursion theory, formal topology, type
theory, and algebraic analysis of deductive systems, were deeply and profitably influenced by the
outcomes of categorical logic.
6.1.2 Lawvere’s pioneering work: the ”categorification” of logic
As we have already said, it is unquestionable that we can ascribe the merit of the foundation of
categorical logic to F. William Lawvere, and we can settle its birth in 1963 with the defence of his
PhD Thesis under the Eilenberg’s supervision ([Law63]).
All the ideas through which Lawvere has influenced the categorical community can be found
in this paper. In a nutshell they are:
1. the category of categories CAT should be the foundations of mathematics;
2. every aspect of mathematics should be expressed in category-theoretic terms;
3. mathematical constructions should be thought of as functors;
4. there is no such thing as a mathematical concept by itself (in particular there are no such
thing as sets by themselves, since they always appear in a category);
5. the category Set should play a key role in the category CAT of categories;
6. adjunction plays a pivotal role in the development of mathematics (one possible and fruitful
way of doing research is looking for adjoints to given functors);
7. the invariant character of any mathematical procedure or construction should be expressed
in terms of functoriality;
8. the real objective content of a mathematical theory is its invariant content, so functoriality
is the language through which a mathematical theory should be qualified;
9. logical aspects of the foundations of mathematics in particular should be treated categori-
cally, and thus they should be revealed by adjoint functors.
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F. W. Lawvere
The above list shows clearly a change of the status of the notion
of category among category theorists in 1960s and 1970s. In Lawvere’s
visions, categories constituted ”autonomous types and [were], as such,
independent of any underlying set-theoretical structures and structure
preserving functions” ([MR11], pg 11). In addition to that, Lawvere
started looking at categories also as algebraic descriptions of formal
systems, and so as formal systems themselves. The first striking new
idea of Lawvere came when he realized that certain categories could be
defined by asserting the existence of certain adjoint functors to given
elementary functors, therefore by asserting that certain basic conceptual
operations are representable in those categories. The point was that the
so-defined categories turned out to retrace logical concepts and theories:
the existence of specific adjoint functors to appropriate given functors
was equivalent to a specification of particular kinds of logical structures. The step that separated
these facts from the program of ”functorizing” the study of mathematical, and above all logical,
concepts appeared immediately in front of Lawvere’s eyes.
Although 1963 Lawvere’s thesis contained the seeds and ideas of what would be better formal-
ized in an out-and-out program for categorical logic a couple of years later, the concepts developed
in it are only a small part of those listed above. Actually, Lawvere treated in his PhD thesis only
algebraic categories, algebraic theories1 and algebraic functors. The main tool he used and
the key to connect these three notions together are adjoint functors. Thanks to them, he proved
that every algebraic functor2 has a left adjoint, that algebraic semantics3 has a left adjoint, which
can be called algebraic structure, and he succeeded in giving a categorical characterization of
algebraic categories.
A summary of Lawvere’s thesis was communicated to the Proceedings of the National Academy
of Science by MacLane already in 1963. The following year MacLane communicated to the same
Proceedings also Lawvere’s attempt at the axiomatization of the Elementary Theory of the Cate-
gory of Sets (ECTS), which had not appeared in the 1963 thesis. The role of ETCS was of crucial
importance: if on the one hand it gave suggestions to Lawvere and others about how logic could
be developed in a categorical setting, on the other it appeared as a counterpart of elementary
topos theory (ETT) for the common purpose of developing a categorical description of sets and
it highlighted many strengths of ETT that otherwise could have been underrated (among them,
the fact that ETT bridged the gap between a categorical description of sets and the method of
forcing). Indeed, at the time ETCS was viewed as a simple translation in category-theoretic terms
of the axioms of set theory and so it seemed that it could not provide any new insight into set
theory itself. Also, it is worth mentioning that sociological and historical factors should probably
have played a role: in those years Cohen’s proof on the independence of continuum hypothesis was
published and the brand new method of forcing attracted (deservedly) the interests of the bulk of
set theorists.
Be that as it may, it is important to recognize that the very first hint to develop such an
ambitious project, i.e. categorical logic, came to Lawvere by noticing exactly what we showed in
the previous chapter: posets can be presented as particular categories and maximum, minimum,
meets and joins can be introduced by means of adjoints to canonical given functors, such as the
trivial and the diagonal functors. That given, the step towards a category-theoretic treatment of
1An algebraic theory A is a small category, in which the objects of A form a countable set {A0,A1, ...,An, ...}
of distinct elements such that for all n An is the product of A1 with itself n times (hence the projection maps pi
(n)
i
exist for i = 1, ..., n−1 and for every n). Also, for each map θi ∶ Am Ð→ A1 (i = 1, ..., n−1) in A there exists one and
only one map ⟨θ0, ..., θn−1⟩ ∶ Am Ð→ An such that pi(n)i × ⟨θ0, ..., θn−1⟩ = θi (i = 1, ..., n − 1). The functor category
SetA of all product preserving functors A Ð→ Set can be thought of as the category of models of the theory A
and it is called an algebraic category.
2Given a morphism of algebraic theories f ∶ A Ð→ B, the corresponding algebraic functor is Setf ∶ SetA Ð→
SetB.
3Algebraic semantics is a construction assigning to each algebraic theory A the forgetful functor UA, and to
each map f ∶ AÐ→ B of algebraic theories the corresponding algebraic functor Setf ∶ SetA Ð→ SetB.
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connectives is really short: posets are the structures at the core of Lindenbaum algebras and the
canonical operations in a poset are the bones of logical connectives in Heyting or Boolean algebras.
The next section gives a formal setting to these intuitions.
6.2 Logical connectives via adjunctions
In the previuos chapter we looked into the properties of preordered categories. In particular we
proved that the notion of adjunction is powerful enough to characterize terminal objects, initial
objects, products and coproducts of categories, which correspond respectively to top, bottom,
meets and joins of elements in the preoder associated to a preordered category. This is summed
up in the following theorem. First of all we recall some all-important notations and definitions.
We define 1 to be the category with a unique object ● and a unique map ● Ð→ ●. If C is a
preordered category with initial object I ∈ Ob(C) and terminal object T ∈ Ob(C), we define the
functors top and bottom:
bottom ∶ 1 Ð→ C● ↦ I(●Ð→ ●) ↦ (1I ∶ I Ð→ I)
top ∶ 1 Ð→ C● ↦ T(●Ð→ ●) ↦ (1T ∶ T Ð→ T )
For any category C we can also define the trivial functor !:
! ∶ C Ð→ 1
C ↦ ●(C1 Ð→ C2) ↦ (●Ð→ ●)
the diagonal functor ∆:
∆ ∶ C Ð→ C × C
C ↦ (C,C)(C1 Ð→ C2) ↦ ((C1,C1)Ð→ (C2,C2))
If the category C admits products and coproducts, we can finally define the product and coproduct
functors × and ⊕:× ∶ C × C Ð→ C(C, C̃) ↦ C × C̃((C, C̃)Ð→ (C ′, C̃ ′)) ↦ (C × C̃ Ð→ C × C̃ ′))
⊕ ∶ C × C Ð→ C(C, C̃) ↦ C ⊕ C̃((C, C̃)Ð→ (C ′, C̃ ′)) ↦ (C ⊕ C̃ Ð→ C ⊕ C̃ ′))
Theorem 6.1. Let C be a preordered category. Then:
• C has terminal object T ⇔ ! ⊣ top;
• C has initial object I ⇔ bottom ⊣!;
• C admits meets ⇔ ∆ ⊣ ×;
• C admits joins ⇔ ⊕ ⊣∆;
Our purpose now is showing that the notion of adjunction permits furthermore to speak about
logical connectives for intuitionistic and classical propositional logic. More precisely, we will take
up the hints given by a category-theoretic treatment of preorders in order to follow in Lawvere’s
first footsteps and so to begin a categorical treatment of logic by the presentation of connectives
as adjoint functors.
Definition 6.1. Let L be a language for the intuitionistic propositional logic IL and let Ai(L) be
the ordered category corresponding to the poset (Ai(L),≤). We define the false functor  and
the true functor ⊺: 1 Ð→ Ai(L)● ↦ [](●Ð→ ●) ↦ (1[] ∶ []Ð→ [])
⊺ ∶ 1 Ð→ Ai(L)● ↦ [⊺](●Ð→ ●) ↦ (1[⊺] ∶ [⊺]Ð→ [⊺])
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the conjunction functor (−) ∧ (−):
(−) ∧ (−) ∶ Ai(L) ×Ai(L) Ð→ Ai(L)([ϕ], [ψ]) ↦ [ϕ ∧ ψ](([ϕ], [ψ])Ð→ ([ϕ′], [ψ′])) ↦ ([ϕ ∧ ψ]Ð→ [ϕ′ ∧ ψ′])
the disjunction functor (−) ∨ (−):
(−) ∨ (−) ∶ Ai(L) ×Ai(L) Ð→ Ai(L)([ϕ], [ψ]) ↦ [ϕ ∨ ψ](([ϕ], [ψ])Ð→ ([ϕ′], [ψ′])) ↦ ([ϕ ∨ ψ]Ð→ [ϕ′ ∨ ψ′])
the implication functor (−)(−):
(−)(−) ∶ Ai(L) ×Ai(L) Ð→ Ai(L)([ϕ], [ψ]) ↦ [ϕ→ ψ](([ϕ], [ψ])Ð→ ([ϕ′], [ψ′])) ↦ ([ϕ→ ψ]Ð→ [ϕ′ → ψ′])
and the negation functor ¬(−):
¬(−) ∶ Ai(L) Ð→ Ai(L)op[ϕ] ↦ [¬ϕ]([ϕ]Ð→ [ϕ′]) ↦ ([¬ϕ′]Ð→ [¬ϕ])
As we defined the Lindenbaum algebra over a language L for the intuitionistic predicative logic,
we noticed that the category Ai(L) is an ordered category, corresponding to the poset (Ai(L),≤)
where: [ϕ] ≤ [ψ]⇔ ϕ ⊢ ψ
Consequently, from now on we will denote a morphism [ϕ] Ð→ [ψ] in Ai(L) by: [ϕ] ≤ [ψ]. This
notation allows us to differentiate clearly the functorial arrow Ð→ between categories and the map≤ between objects.
Theorem 6.2. Let L be a language for the intuitionistic propositional logic IL and let pr be a
fixed proposition. Then:
1. the true functor ⊺ is right adjoint to the trivial functor !:
! ⊣ ⊺
2. the false functor  is left adjoint to the trivial functor !:
 ⊣!
3. the conjunction functor (−) ∧ (−) is right adjoint to the diagonal functor ∆:
∆ ⊣ (−) ∧ (−)
4. the disjunction functor (−) ∨ (−) is left adjoint to the diagonal functor ∆:
(−) ∨ (−) ⊣∆
5. the implication of pr functor (−)pr is right adjoint to the conjunction of pr functor (−)∧ pr:
(−) ∧ pr ⊣ (−)pr
6. the negation functor ¬(−) is left adjoint to the opposite negation functor ¬op(−):
¬(−) ⊣ ¬op(−)
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Proof. 1. By Proposition 5.2, we know that if [⊺] is the terminal object of the ordered category
Ai(L) then the trivial functor is left adjoint to the true functor ⊺. Hence, it suffices to show
that [ϕ] ≤ [⊺] for every [ϕ] ∈ Ob(Ai(L)), which is equivalent to show that ϕ ⊢ ⊺ for every
formula ϕ ∈ FormL, and this always holds.
2. By Proposition 5.3, we know that if [] is the initial object of the ordered category Ai(L)
then the trivial functor is right adjoint to the false functor . Hence, it suffices to show that[] ≤ [ϕ] for every [ϕ] ∈ Ob(Ai(L)), which is equivalent to show that  ⊢ ϕ for every formula
ϕ ∈ FormL, and this always holds.
3. Let ([ϕ], [ψ]) ∈ Ob(Ai(L) × Ai(L)). There is map ∆(([ϕ]) ∧ ([ψ])) = ([ϕ ∧ ψ], [ϕ ∧ ψ]) ≤([ϕ], [ψ]) in Ai(L) ×Ai(L), which means a couple of maps [ϕ ∧ ψ] ≤ [ϕ] and [ϕ ∧ ψ] ≤ [ψ]
in Ai(L). Indeed:
ϕ,ψ ⊢ ϕ ∧l
ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ϕ and ϕ,ψ ⊢ ψ ∧lϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ
Let [α] ∈ Ob(Ai(L)) and let’s suppose there is a map ∆([α]) = ([α], [α]) ≤ ([ϕ], [ψ]) in
Ai(L) ×Ai(L), therefore there are maps [α] ≤ [ϕ] and [α] ≤ [ψ] in Ai(L). We need to find
a map [α] ≤ [ϕ ∧ ψ] in Ai(L), then we need to show that α ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ:
α ⊢ ϕ α ⊣ ψ ∧r
α ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ
where α ⊢ ϕ and α ⊣ ψ are assured by our assumptions.
4. Let ([ϕ], [ψ]) ∈ Ob(Ai(L)×Ai(L)). There is a map ([ϕ], [ψ]) ≤ ∆([ϕ∨ψ]) = ([ϕ∨ψ], [ϕ∨ψ])
in Ai(L) ×Ai(L), which means a couple of maps [ϕ] ≤ [ϕ ∨ ψ] and [ψ] ≤ [ϕ ∨ ψ] in Ai(L).
Indeed:
ϕ ⊢ ϕ ∨r
ϕ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ and ψ ⊢ ψ ∨rψ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ
Let [α] ∈ Ob(Ai(L)) and let’s suppose there is a map ([ϕ], [ψ]) ≤ ∆([α]) = ([α], [α]) in
Ai(L) ×Ai(L), therefore there are maps [ϕ] ≤ [α] and [ψ] ≤ [α] in Ai(L). We need to find
a map [ϕ ∨ ψ] ≤ [α] in Ai(L), then we need to show that ϕ ∨ ψ ⊢ α:
ϕ,ψ ⊢ α ∨l
ϕ ∨ ψ ⊢ α
where ϕ,ψ ⊢ α follows from the existence of maps [ϕ] ≤ [α] and [ψ] ≤ [α] in Ai(L).
5. Let [ϕ] ∈ Ob(Ai(L)). There is a map [ϕ] ≤ (([ϕ]) ∧ (pr))pr = [pr → (ϕ ∧ pr)] in Ai(L),
indeed:
ϕ,pr ⊢ ϕ ϕ,pr ⊢ pr ∧r
ϕ,pr ⊢ ϕ ∧ pr → r
ϕ ⊢ pr→ (ϕ ∧ pr)
Let [α] ∈ Ob(Ai(L)) and let [ϕ] ≤ [pr → α] be a map in Ai(L). We need to find a map[ϕ ∧ pr] ≤ [α], thus it suffices to show that ϕ ∧ pr ⊢ α:
ϕ ⊢ pr→ α (→ r)−1
ϕ,pr ⊢ α ∧l
ϕ ∧ pr ⊢ α
where ϕ ⊢ pr→ α is assured by assumption.
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6. Let [ϕ] ∈ Ob(Ai(L)). There is a map [ϕ] ≤ ¬op(¬([ϕ])) = [¬¬ϕ] in Ai(L). Indeed:
ϕ ⊢ ϕ ϕ, ⊢  → l
ϕ,ϕ→  ⊢  → r
ϕ ⊢ ¬¬ϕ = ((ϕ→ )→ )
Let [α] ∈ Ob(Aopi (L) and let [ϕ] ≤ [¬α] be a map in Ai(L). We need to show that there is
a map [¬ϕ] ≤ [α] in Aopi (L). It suffices to show that α ⊢ ¬ϕ:
ϕ ⊢ (α → ) = ¬α (→ r)−1
ϕ,α ⊢  → r
α ⊢ (ϕ→ ) = ¬ϕ
where a derivation of ϕ ⊢ ¬α is given by assumption.
We can now look into the same situation as above in the case of classical logic. To achieve
this purpose, we proceed in the same way as above: we consider a language L for the classical
propositional logic CL and the ordered category Ac(L) corresponding to the poset (Ac(L),≤), as
defined in Chapter ?!?!. As we did before, we define the false functor , the true functor ⊺,
the conjuntion functor ∧, the disjunction functor ∨, the implication functor ⇢ and the
negation functor ¬. Also, we assume the same notations as before, so we will denote the maps
in the ordered category Ac(L) by ≤.
Theorem 6.3. Let L be a language for the classical propositional logic CL and let pr be a fixed
proposition. Then:
1. the true functor ⊺ is right adjoint to the trivial functor !:
! ⊣ ⊺
2. the false functor  is left adjoint to the trivial functor !:
 ⊣!
3. the conjunction functor (−) ∧ (−) is right adjoint to the diagonal functor ∆:
∆ ⊣ (−) ∧ (−)
4. the disjunction functor (−) ∨ (−) is left adjoint to the diagonal functor ∆:
(−) ∨ (−) ⊣∆
5. the implication of pr functor (−)pr is right adjoint to the conjunction of pr functor (−)∧ pr:
(−) ∧ pr ⊣ (−)pr
6. the negation functor ¬(−) is left adjoint to the opposite negation functor ¬op(−):
¬(−) ⊣ ¬op(−)
7. the negation functor ¬(−) is right adjoint to the opposite negation functor ¬op(−):
¬op(−) ⊣ ¬(−)
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Proof. By Theorem (6.2), it suffices to show only the last point, i.e. ¬op(−) ⊣ ¬(−).
Let [ϕ] ∈ Ob(Ac(L)). There is a map ¬op(¬([ϕ])) = [¬¬ϕ] ≤ [ϕ] in Ac(L). Indeed:
ϕ ⊢ ϕ, → r⊢ ϕ→ , ϕ  ⊢ ϕ → l(ϕ→ )→  = ¬¬ϕ ⊢ ϕ
Let [α] ∈ Ob(Aopc (L)) and let ¬op([α] = [¬α] ≤ [ϕ] be a map in Ac(L). Then we have a derivation
.... D⊢ α,ϕ  ⊢ ϕ → l(α → ) = ¬α ⊢ ϕ
where D is a derivation. We need to find a map [α] ≤ [¬ϕ] in Aopc (L), thus we have to show that¬ϕ ⊢ α:
.... D⊢ α,ϕ  ⊢ α → l(ϕ→ ) = ¬ϕ ⊢ α
where the derivation D is given by assumption.
6.3 Heyting and Boolean algebras via adjunctions
We defined a Heyting algebra as a lattice (X,≤,∧,∨) with least element 0 and greatest element 1,
where an operator →∶X×X Ð→X is defined and has the property: ∀z ∈X.(z ≤ x→ y⇔ z∧x ≤ y).
It follows that a Heyting algebra can as well be looked at as a poset X where the infimum ∧ and
the supremum ∨ of any two elements in X always exist, there are least and greatest elements and
an operator → can be defined. However, all this can be formalized through categorical language,
as a consequence of what has just been shown in the previous theorems.
However, the entire previous section was focused only on the Lindenbaum category A(L) of
the classical or intuitionistic logic. It is really easy, though, to extend the notion of ⊺, , infimum∧, supremum ∨ and implication → to a generic preordered category (the negation ¬ can be defined
using → and , as we already know). In fact, we already proved that  and ⊺ are the initial
and final object, as well as that ∧ and ∨ are the binary product and coproduct in A(L). We do
not know jet what the implication for an arbitrary preordered category stands for, but we can
make sure that it exists in that category by checking the existence of a right adjoint to the product
functor, as we proved in the previous section in the case of Lindenbaum categories for intuitionistic
and classical logic. For now we denote the ”general” implication functor for an object C as (−)C ,
and we will make this notion clearer soon.
Proposition 6.1. Let H be an ordered category. H is a Heyting algebra if and only if:
• the diagonal functor ∆ ∶H Ð→H ×H has right adjoint (−) ∧ (−) and left adjoint (−) ∨ (−)
∆ ⊣ (−) ∧ (−) and (−) ∨ (−) ⊣∆
• the trivial functor ! ∶H Ð→ 1 has right adjoint ⊺ and left adjoint 
! ⊣ ⊺ and  ⊣!
• for every A ∈ Ob(H) there exists an adjunction between the functors (−) ∧A ∶ H Ð→ H on
the left and (−)A ∶H Ð→H on the right
(−) ∧A ⊣ (−)A
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Proof. It follows directly from Theorem (6.2) and the remarks above.
In a Heyting algebra we defined the negation ¬ such that for any element x of the Heyting
algebra: ¬x ∶= x→ 0, where 0 is the least element of the algebra. Theorem (6.2) claims that, given
a category H that is a Heyting algebra, there is an adjunction between functors ¬(−) ∶H Ð→Hop
on the left and ¬op(−) ∶Hop Ð→H on the right:
¬(−) ⊣ ¬op(−)
Theorem (6.3) shows that in the case of classical logic, so when we are dealing with an underlying
Boolean algebra, there is also an adjunction
¬op(−) ⊣ ¬(−)
Proposition 6.2. Let B be a category and a Heyting algebra. Then B is a Boolean algebra if and
only if ¬op(−) ⊣ ¬(−), where ¬op(−) ∶ Bop Ð→ B is an equivalence.
Proof. We recall that a Heyting algebra in which ¬¬x = x for every element x is a Boolean algebra.
If B is a Boolean algebra, then there is an isomorphism ¬¬A ≅ A for every object A ∈ Ob(B). It
follows that ¬op(−) ∶ Bop Ð→ B is an equivalence and therefore there are η ∶ 1Bop Ð→ ¬ ○ ¬op and
ε ∶ ¬op ○ ¬ Ð→ 1B which are respectively the inverses of the counit and unit of the adjunction¬(−) ⊣ ¬op(−), and in particular they give also rise to an adjunction ¬op(−) ⊣ ¬(−). Conversely,
if ¬op(−) ∶ Bop Ð→ B is an equivalence and there is an adjunction ¬op(−) ⊣ ¬(−), then there is
an isomorphism ¬¬A ≅ A for every object A ∈ Ob(B), and so the Heyting algebra B is in fact a
Boolean algebra.
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Chapter 7
Logical quantifiers as adjoint
functors
We need to introduce now cartesian closed categories. Their importance is twofold: on the one
hand they permit to characterize in an easy elegant fashion Heyting (and thus Boolean) categories,
on the other they are at the basis of the definition of hyperdoctrines. A hyperdoctrine is a certain
category (together with an appropriate functor, to be precise) in which the process of logical
quantification makes sense. Therefore, not only propositional logic can be treated categorically
(i.e. by means of adjoint functors), but also predicate logic. And there is more to it than just
that: thanks to hyperdoctrines, even predicate logic with equality can be merged into category
theory.
7.1 Cartesian closed categories
Lawvere went on elaborating his program for the categorification of logic without respite all during
the 1960s. In 1965 and 1966 he presented two papers at the Meeting of the Association of Symbolic
Logic, which were published a year later ([Law66], [Law67]) and which contained the extension
of the results obtained for algebraic theories to first-order theories in general. The notion of
elementary theory was introduced and it was proved to correspond to some associated first-
order theory. A categorical proof of the completeness theorem was sketched and it was showed that
completeness amounts to the existence of specific adjoint functors. What is relevant, though, is that
quantification was presented for the first time via adjoint functors. In particular, Lawvere showed
how quantification arose naturally as an adjunction to the elementary operation of substitution,
which is the basic natural operation of first-order logic, whereas in the classical view this operation
is defined by recursion. On the top of that, Lawvere did not refer specifically to the category Set
of sets and was in fact able to provide a point of view that generalized to arbitrary categories.
These two facts convinced many logicians and mathematicians that this was the right analysis
of quantifiers, and categorical logic began to be regarded by many as a brand new branch of
mathematics, whose master-plan for further developments was clearly stated and accepted as
it was presented in three all-important publications in 1969 and 1970 ([Law69a], [Law69b] and
[Law70a]).
In [Law69b] in particular, Lawvere stressed with more emphasis the pivotal role of adjunction,
which became in his opinion the real primary concept. While in the previous paper he only used
adjoint functors to show that some category was equivalent to some other fixed one or to establish
specific properties of given functors in a context, on this occasion he even used them to define
certain categories, namely cartesian closed categories (CC categories).
Lemma 7.1. Let P and Q be two ordered categories whose associated orders are sup-completed
(i.e. there exists the supremum of every subset of the preorder), and let F ∶ P Ð→ Q be a functor
between them. Then: F has a right adjoint if and only if F preserves arbitrary suprema.
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Proof. (⇒) Let’s suppose that F has a right adjoint G, so F ⊣ G. Let’s take a subset {Ai ∈
Ob(P ∣i ∈ I} of objects of P, whose supremum is P . Of course, {F (Ai)∣i ∈ I} is a subset of objects
in Q, and its supremum does exist by hypothesis. Let it be Q. Since F ⊣ G, we have that
F (Ai) ≤ Q⇔ Ai ≤ G(Q) for all i ∈ I, hence P ≤ G(Q) since P in the supremum of all Ai, i ∈ I,
and by the condition of adjunction between F and G we get F (P ) ≤ Q. In addition, every map
Ai ≤ P in P is sent by F into maps F (Ai) ≤ F (P ) in Q, and we should have that Q ≤ F (P ) since
Q is the supremum of all F (Ai), i ∈ I. Concluding F (P ) = Q.(⇐) Let’s suppose that F preserves arbitrary suprema and let B ∈ Ob(Q). The set {A ∈
Ob(P)∣F (A) ≤ B} is a subset of Ob(P), hence there exists its supremum, which we take as G(B).
Thanks to the hypotheses, it is straightforward to show that this definition gives rise to a functorQ Ð→ P, B z→ sup{A ∈ Ob(P)∣F (A) ≤ B}. Also, it is easy to see that A ≤ G(B)⇔ F (A) ≤ B
for every A ∈ Ob(P) and B ∈ Ob(Q), thus F ⊣ G.
Let C be a category with binary products and let C ∈ Ob(C). We can define a functor from C
to itself as the product for a fixed object of the category, more precisely if C ∈ Ob(C) is a fixed
object of the category we call the product functor with the object C the following functor:(−) ×C ∶ C Ð→ C
X z→ X ×C(X Ð→ Y ) z→ (X ×C Ð→ Y ×C)
Definition 7.1. Let C be a category with binary products. It is said to be a cartesian closed
category when, for every object C ∈ Ob(C), the product functor (−)×C ∶ C Ð→ C has a right adjoint(−)C ∶ C Ð→ C, sending each object X ∈ Ob(C) into an object XC called space of the morphisms
from C to X.
Example 7.1. The category Set is cartesian closed. To begin with, let’s notice that for any two
sets A and B the collection BA of the maps from A to B is still a set. Let S ∈ Ob(Set) be fixed.
For any sets X,Y there is a natural isomorphism Set(X,Y S) ≅ Set(X ×S,Y ) defined in this way:
any map f ∶ X Ð→ Y S is sent into a map f ∶ X × S Ð→ Y , (x, s) z→ (f(x))(s), and any map
g ∶X × S Ð→ Y is sent into a map g ∶X Ð→ Y S , xz→ g(x,−). Consequently, (−) × S ⊣ (−)S .
The first investigations about the role of CC categories in categorical logic were conducted by
Lawvere and Lambek, who was bot in Zurich during the middle 1960s. No sooner had Lawvere
found out the close relation between CC categories and Church’s λ-calculus, than a lot of papers
and publications on the topic began to appear. Lambek was the first to explore the relationships
between categories and deductive systems. Together with Scott, he developed sistematically the
connection between CC categories and typed λ-calculi and showed the equivalence between the
category of typed λ-calculi and the category of CC categories ([LS86]).
Among the many scopes for which the class of CC categories is used for, we recall its role
in the treatment of well-known diagonal arguments, such as those of Cantor, Russell, Go¨del and
Tarski: Lawvere used CC categories to present these arguments, after noticing that they have the
same structure, which can take the form of a fixed point theorem based on the properties of CC
categories.
More importantly, the cartesian closure can be used to characterize categories that are Heyting
algebras. Let’s consider a preordered cartesian closed category. Up to now, we have shown that
preordered categories are extremely meaningful from a logical point of view, since inside them we
can build logical structures by using the language of adjunctions. But there is a little bit more to
say: cartesian closure can tell something about logical structures, too. Previously, we generalized
the notions of ⊺, , ∧ and ∨ for an arbitrary preordered category. The deep meaning of implication
in a generic preordered category was missing. We only knew that its existence was equivalent to
the existence of a right adjoint to the functor (−) ∧ C, which we can interpret more generally
as (−) × C, for every object C. Definition (7.1) clarifies now that the space of morphisms is the
generalization of the notion of implication.
Proposition 7.1. Let H be an ordered category, Then H is a Heyting category if and only if H
is cartesian closed and has finite coproducts.
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Proof. It follows trivially from what has just been asserted.
Requiring a category to be cartesian closed can be somehow really strict. Often, a sort of
weaker version of cartesian closure turns out to be far more handy. We recall a special case of
comma categories, which are useful in order to deal with local cartesian closure: if C is a category
and C ∈ Ob(C), an object (X,f) of the slice category C/C is a map f ∶X Ð→ C with X ∈ Ob(C)
and a map (X,f)Ð→ (X ′, f ′) in C/C is a map g ∶X Ð→X ′ such that f ′ ○ g = f .
Definition 7.2. A category C is a locally cartesian closed category if its slice categories C/C
are cartesian closed, for every C ∈ Ob(C).
It can be shown that a locally cartesian closed category with a terminal object is a cartesian
closed category itself.
7.2 Hyperdoctrines
All the three 1969-70 papers [Law69a], [Law69b] and [Law70a] sketched extensions of Lawvere’s
earlier work on algebraic theories to higher-order and especially first-order theory. He formalized
the proof of logical quantifiers as adjoint functors to substitution, proved that the comprehension
principle can be presented via adjunction and sketched how a category can be constructed from
a given higher-order logical theory. Besides that, most papers on categorical logic of the period
had a crucial common moral, namely the correspondence between propositions of a deductive
system with the objects of a corresponding category and the equivalent classes of proofs of a
deductive system with the maps of a corresponding category. This was summarized by the slogans
propositions-as-objects and proofs-as-morphisms. During the 1970s, by looking at the upshots of
the first decade of categorical logic, Lawvere realized that category theory was not a whatever
language for mathematics, but rather a formal language for mathematics.
The problem to formalize in categoric-theoretic terms quantification, equality and comprehen-
sion schema for a logical language was to Lawvere far more challenging than making explicit the
adjoint-functorial nature of connectives. The point was that quantification needed an organic
and specific structure in which to live and Lawvere himself began investigating into the nature
of such an entity with no starting points but his intuition. Specifically, Lawvere wanted to be
able to analyze quantification, equality and the comprehension schema as adjoints to elementary
functors, including them so in the algebraic approach. His plan was to organize the logical data
in a complicated but really powerful structure, which he called a hyperdoctrine.
analysis of the comprehension principle and Be´nabou’s work on fibred category.
As regards Lawvere’s contribution, he had been interested in the extensions of the connections
between CC categories and logic in the direction of higher-order logic and type theory since the
New York conference on applications of categorical algebra in 1968. Specifically, Lawvere wanted
to be able to analyze equality and the comprehension schema as adjoints to elementary functors,
including them so in the algebraic approach. His plan was to organize the logical data in a
complicated but really powerful structure, which he called a hyperdoctrine. This new concept
did its very first historical appearance in 1969 paper [Law69a], where adjunction was proved to
be sufficient to deal with quantification, and was later improved in 1970 paper [Law70a], where
Lawvere presented equality and comprehension shema in hyperdoctrines. Here is the very first
historical definition of hyperdoctrine.
Definition 7.3. A hyperdoctrine consists of
1. a cartesian closed category T. The objects of T are called types, its maps are called terms
and those ones of the form 1Ð→ C are called constant terms of type C. Terminal object,
product and exponentiation by C (with C a type in T) are respectively denoted by:
1, × , ()C
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2. for every type C, a corresponding cartesian closed category P(C) called the category of at-
tributes of type C. The maps between attributes of type C are called deductions over
C. Terminal object, product and exponentiation by ϕ (with ϕ an attribute of type C) are
respectively denoted by:
1C , ∧C , ϕC ⇒ ()
In particular, given ϕ and ψ attributes of type C, the evaluation over ψ along ϕ is given by
the map ϕ ∧C (ϕ⇒ ψ)Ð→ ψ in P(C), so it is called a modus ponens deduction.
3. for each term f ∶X Ð→ Y in T, a corresponding functor [f/−] called substitution, defined
by: [f/−] ∶ P (Y ) Ð→ P (X)
ψ z→ [f/ψ](ϕÐ→ ψ) z→ ([f/ϕ]Ð→ [f/ψ])
where [f/ψ] is the attribute of type X resulting from substituting f in ψ. If g ∶ Y Ð→ Z, we
assume that [f/−] ○ [g/−] = [(g ○ f)/−].
4. for each term f ∶X Ð→ Y , two functors Σf(−) and Πf()
Σf(−) ∶ P (Y )Ð→ P (X) and Πf(−) ∶ P (Y )Ð→ P (X)
such that they are respectively left and right adjoints to substitution f:
Σf(−) ⊣ [f/−] ⊣ Πf(−).
For any attribute ϕ of type X, we call Σf(ϕ) the existential quantification of ϕ along f
and we call Πf(ϕ) the universal quantification of ϕ along f . From Σf(−) ⊣ [f/−] the
existence of two natural isomorphisms follows, one between deductions Σf(ϕ)Ð→ ψ over X
and deductions ϕÐ→ [f/ψ] over Y , and the other one between deductions ψ Ð→ Πf(ϕ) over
Y and deductions [f/ψ] Ð→ ϕ over X, for every attribute ϕ of type X and every attribute
ψ of type Y . Finally, by the functoriality of the substitution: Σ(g ○ f)(ϕ) = Σg(Σf(ϕ)) and
Π(g ○ f)(ϕ) = Πg(Πf(ϕ)) for every term f ∶ X Ð→ Y , g ∶ Y Ð→ Z and every deduction ϕ
over X.
7.2.1 Hyperdoctrines for predicate logic and for predicate logic with
equality
The idea beyond the notion of a hyperdoctrine is the axiomatization of the collection of slices of a
locally cartesian closed category. More precisely, a hyperdoctrine is given by a category together
with a functor sending its objects into slice-like categories, satisfying some reasonable conditions.
As far as we are concerned, a hyperdoctrine will be thought of as a collection of contexts to-
gether with the operations of contexts extension/substitution and quantification on the category
of propositions in each contexts. So, putting things under a certain perspective, giving a hyper-
doctrine over some category amounts to equipping it with a specific kind of logic. Specifically, a
hyperdoctrine on a category C for a chosen logic L is a functor
D ∶ Cop Ð→ L
to some 2-category L, whose objects are categories whose internal logic corresponds to L. In this
way, every object of C is endowed with an L-logic. We will take L to be the propositional logic
and L a 2-category of posets, for instance Heyting or Boolean algebras.
A 2-category is a generalization of the notion of category, where on top of objects and maps,
there are further structures called 2-morphisms, which connect a map to another one. While maps
can be composed along the objects, the 2-morphisms can be composed both along objects (this is
usually called horizontal composition) and along maps (this is usually called vertical composition).
The most important example of 2-category is Cat, where objects are categories, maps are functors
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and 2-morphisms are natural trasformation. Quite easily, we can also think of Ha and Ba as 2-
categories.
A hyperdoctrine is then an incarnation of first-order predicate logic. With this idea borne
in mind, we will also require that for every map f in C the map D(f) in L has both left and
right adjoints, satisfying the so called Beck-Chevalley conditions and Frobenius reciprocity. These
adjunctions are regarded as the action of the existential and universal quantifiers along the map
f .
Concluding, a hyperdoctrine can also be viewed as a categorical way of adding quantifiers to a
given kind of logic, and so it becomes the necessary tool for our purpose to pass from propositional
to predicate logic.
We consider now the intuitionistic case. The classical case can be seen as a natural extension
of what we we are going to present in intuitionistic logic.
Definition 7.4. A hyperdoctrine for the predicative intuitionistic logic IL is a functor
D ∶ Cop Ð→Ha
such that:
(i) C is a category with finite products, called the base of the hyperdoctrine, and for every X ∈
Ob(C) the category D(X) is called a fiber on X (or a predicate over X), objects X ∈ Ob(C)
are often called a types and maps in C are often called terms;
(ii) for every projection pii ∶ X1 × X2 Ð→ Xi (i = 1,2) in C, the functor D(pii) ∶ D(Xi) Ð→
D(X1 ×X2) has a left adjoint ∃pii ∶D(X1 ×X2)Ð→D(Xi)
∃pii ⊣D(pii)
satisfying the Beck-Chevalley condition and the Frobenius reciprocity;
(iii) for every projection pii ∶ X1 × X2 Ð→ Xi (i = 1,2) in C, the functor D(pii) ∶ D(Xi) Ð→
D(X1 ×X2) has a right adjoint ∀pii ∶D(X1 ×X2)Ð→D(Xi)
D(pii) ⊣ ∀pii
satisfying the Beck-Chevalley condition.
The Beck-Chevalley condition for ∃ states the following: given any two projections pi ∶X Ð→ A
and pi′ ∶X ′ Ð→ A′, for every pullback diagram
X ′ A′
X A
pi′
f ′ f
pi
for every β ∈D(X) the canonical map
∃pi′D(f ′)(β) ≤D(f)∃pi(β)
in D(A′) is an isomorphism.
The Frobenius reciprocity states that for every projection pi ∶X Ð→ A and for all α ∈D(A),
β ∈D(X), the canonical map
∃pi(D(pi)(α) ∧X β) ≤ α ∧A ∃pi(β)
in D(A) is an isomorphism.
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The Beck-Chevalley condition for ∀ states the following: given any two projections pi ∶
X Ð→ A and pi′ ∶X ′ Ð→ A′, for every pullback diagram
X ′ A′
X A
pi′
f ′ f
pi
for every β ∈D(X) the canonical map
D(f)∀pi(β) ≤ ∀pi′D(f ′)(β)
in D(A′) is an isomorphism.
This structure is often called a first-order hyperdoctrine. One may wonder if for each term
X ∈ Ob(C) an equality predicate can be defined by
∃δX (⊺D(X)) ∈D(X ×X)
where ⊺D(X) is the top element of the Heyting algebra D(X) and δX ∶X×X Ð→X in C. However,
this is not enough to define a good notion of equality, and we need to assume a little more, in
order to ensure a sound interpretation of first order logic with equality in the hyperdoctrine. The
turning idea which allows a good definition of equality in hyperdoctrines can be suggested by
the notions of fibred category and fibration, which were the starting point of Benabou’s work
during the 1970s.
Before giving a definition of fibration, let’s introduce the notation
C
Dp for the functor p ∶ C Ð→D. Given X ∈ Ob(D), the fibre p−1(X) over X is the category whose objects are those A ∈ Ob(C)
such that p(A) = X and whose maps are those f ∶ A Ð→ B in C such that p(f) = 1X in D. C is
called the base category and D is called the total category. An object A ∈ Ob(C) such that
p(A) =X is said to be above X and a map f in C such that p(f) = u is said to be above u.
Definition 7.5. Let p ∶ C Ð→ D be a functor.
A map f ∶ C Ð→ B in C is said to be cartesian over u ∶X Ð→ Y in D if p(f) = u and if for every
g ∶ C Ð→ B such that p(g) = u○w for some w ∶ p(C)Ð→X in D then there is a unique h ∶ C Ð→ A
in C above w such that f ○ h = g.
C
A B
gh
f
p(C)
X Y
u○w=p(g)w
u
The functor p ∶ C Ð→ D is a fibration or a fibred category if for every B ∈ Ob(C) and u ∶X Ð→
p(B) in D, there is a cartesian map f ∶ AÐ→ B in C above u.
Be´nabou gave condition for a fibration to be small or locally small and showed that the concept
of fibration was what was needed to deal with foundational issues from a general point of view:
up to that day, category theorists had assumed that being small or locally small had a meaning
in the ambient universe in which they were working, so they had assumed a category of sets for
foundational purposes, in particular for issues of size.
In the 1980s, category logicians combined Lawvere’s notion of hyperdoctrine with Be´nabou’s
groundwork in order to provide a semantical framework for type theories and so completeness
theorems for them (e.g. [Jac99]). Lawvere himself found his inspiration for the definition of
equality and comprehension schema in a hyperdoctrine right in fibrations.
7.2. HYPERDOCTRINES 81
Definition 7.6. A hyperdoctrine for the predicative intuitionistic logic with equality
IL= is a hyperdoctrine for IL
D ∶ Cop Ð→Ha
satisfying in addition the following condition: for every A ∈ Ob(C) there exists δA ∈ Ob(D(A×A)),
called fibred equality on A such that, for every X ∈ Ob(C) and for every map
(pi1, pi2, pi2) ∶X ×AÐ→X ×A ×A
in C, the functor
∃pi1,pi2,pi2 ∶ D(X ×A) Ð→ D(X ×A ×A)
α z→ D(1X × pi1)(α) ∧D((pi2, pi2))(δA)
is left adjoint to the functor
D(pi1, pi2, pi2) ∶D(X ×A ×A)Ð→D(X ×A)
In symbols: ∃pi1,pi2,pi2 ⊣D(pi1, pi2, pi2)
We can define in a similar way the notions of hyperdoctrine for predicative classical logic and
of hyperdoctrine for predicative classical logic with equality, by substituting the category Ha for
the category Ba in the definitions above.
The notion of hyperdoctrine permits to interpret multi-sorted first-order (either intuitionistic
or classical) logic with equality: we intend the objects X ∈ Ob(C) to be sorts and the maps inC to be terms, and so the functor D assigns to each sort the Lindenbaum algebra of predicates
upon that sort and to each term the operation of substitution of that term into predicates, left
and right adjoints ∃− and ∀− to images of projections in C through D provide existential and
universal quantifications, the existence of further adjoints provides the possibility of interpreting
equality, Beck-Chevalley conditions and Frobenious identity ensure that quantification commutes
with substitution in the same appropriate way propositional quantifiers do.
The paper Adjointness in Foundations ([Law69a]) is, in addition to all the aspects reported so
far, of particular philosophical and foundational interest too. In this publication Lawvere identified
two aspects, namely the Formal and the Conceptual, which appeared to obey a general duality
inherent to mathematics and this framework of duality constitued the scaffolding of categorical
logic as it developed afterwords. The Formal was identified with the manipulation of symbols,
while the Conceptual is identified with their content. Though it might sound really similar to that
one between syntax and semantics, this distinction lay on a more general level: also foundations
actually partook of the duality, being itself part of mathematics. Of course the syntax of logical
systems belonged to the Formal and the semantics to the Conceptual. To the latter belonged
also categorical logic. The duality between these two aspects was established by Lawvere by means
of adjoint functors. He claimed indeed that there was an adjunction
Theoriesop Conceptual
semantics
structure
sending each theory into the category of its models1. Also Lawvere suggested that there should
be another adjunction
Formal Theories
describing ”the presentation of the invariant theories by means of the formalized language appro-
priate to the species” ([Law69a], pg 295). By composition Lawvere obtained a family of adjoint
functors
Formalop Conceptual
1Given a theory T, a model of T is a functor T Ð→ Set. The category of model of T is then a subcategory of
the functor category SetT.
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This totally programmatic project have had concrete outcomes2 since it lead to the development
of categorical doctrines ([KR79]).
Categorical logic was not the only attempt at developing an algebraic framework for logic
during those years and it is worth contrasting one with each other. During the 1970s, Joyal and
Reyes ([JR]) argued the advantages of a category-theoretic approach over the others: first of all,
the concept of category springs up in all branches of mathematics and seems really natural to a
mathematician; also, certain categories used in different fields of mathematics are actually theories
and consider them as such is fruitful; on top of that, many constructions used in model theory
are nothing but specializations of general categorical constructions. Therefore, towards the end of
1960s and early 1970s, the following ”dictionary” was elaborated and most logicians accepted it
fully:
Logic Category Theory
many-sorted theory category
sort object of a category
sorted formula subobject
sorted term map in a category
interpretation functor
set-theoretical model functor into Set
homomorphism natural transformation
7.2.2 An example: the syntactic hyperdoctrine
The structure of hyperdoctrine behaves well also at the syntactic level, and this is crucial in
our treatment of quantifiers. In order to define a syntactic hyperdoctrine, we need to define a
contravariant functor from a category that can express syntatic facts either to the category Ha of
Heyting algebras or the category Ba of Boolean algebras.
Definition 7.7. Let L be a language (either for IL= or CL=). We introduce a new category Cont
and we call it the category of contexts. Its objects are lists of distinct variables (xj1 , ..., xjn); a
map
⇀
t ∶= [t1/xk1 , ..., tn/xkm] ∶ (xj1 , ..., xjn)Ð→ (xk1 , ..., xkm) in Cont is a list of term substitutions
in L, where the free variables of ti are among xj1 , ..., xjn , for all i = 1, ...,m.
It can be easily seen that composition in Cont is well-defined and acts as a simultaneous sub-
stitution. Indeed, if
⇀
t ∶= [ti/xki]i=1,...,m ∶ (xj1 , ..., xjn) Ð→ (xk1 , ..., xkm) and ⇀s ∶= [si/xhi]i=1,...,l ∶(xk1 , ..., xkm)Ð→ (xh1 , ..., xhl) are two maps in Cont, then their composition is the map
⇀
s ○ ⇀t ∶= [si(t1/xk1 , ..., tm/xkm)/xhi]i=1,...,l ∶ (xj1 , ..., xjn)Ð→ (xh1 , ..., xhl)
which is still in Cont and each term si(⇀t /⇀xk)/xhi has free variables among xj1 , ..., xjn .
Given
⇀
t ∶= [ti/xki]i=1,...,m and ⇀s ∶= [si/xhi]i=1,...,m two maps in Cont, we define equality on
maps by: ⇀
t = ⇀s if and only if ti = si for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}
Composition in Cont is associative: given
⇀
t ∶= [ti/xki]i=1,...,m ∶ (xj1 , ..., xjn)Ð→ (xk1 , ..., xkm)
⇀
s ∶= [si/xhi]i=1,...,l ∶ (xk1 , ..., xkm)Ð→ (xh1 , ..., xhl)⇀
u ∶= [ui/xgi]i=1,...,p ∶ (xh1 , ..., xhl)Ð→ (xg1 , ..., xgp)
2It is worth mentioning that this is not an unanimous opinion. For instance, Corry asserted that ”this proposal
[...] remained at the programmatic level and no one seems to have developed it further” ([Cor96]).
7.2. HYPERDOCTRINES 83
maps in Cont,we have that ui[⇀s/⇀xh][⇀t /⇀xk] = ui[⇀s[⇀t /⇀xk]/⇀xh] for all i ∈ {1, ..., p} since xk1 , ..., xkm
don’t appear in ui.
For every list of variables (xj1 , ..., xjn) there is the identity map
⇀
xj[xji/xji]i=1,...,n ∶ (xj1 , ..., xjn)Ð→ (xj1 , ..., xjn)
as it is easy to verify.
Furthermore, C has the empty list (∅) as terminal object: a map in Cont from any list of
distinct variables to the empty list simply deletes all dependences on the variables of that list.
The category Cont has all binary products: given (xj1 , ..., xjn) and (xk1 , ..., xkm), their product
is the list (xj1 , ..., xjn , xJ+k1 , ..., xJ+km) with J =max{j1, ..., jn}
and the projections are given by
⇀
xj ∶= [⇀xj/⇀xj ,⇀xk/⇀∅] ∶ (xj1 , ..., xjn , xJ+k1 , ..., xJ+km)Ð→ (xj1 , ..., xjn)
⇀
xk ∶= [⇀xj/⇀∅,⇀xk/⇀xk] ∶ (xj1 , ..., xjn , xJ+k1 , ..., xJ+km)Ð→ (xj1 , ..., xjn)
Indeed, let (xh1 , ..., xhl) ∈ Ob(Cont) and let ⇀t ∶ (xh1 , ..., xhl)Ð→ (xj1 , ..., xjn) and ⇀s ∶ (xh1 , ..., xhl)Ð→(xk1 , ..., xkm) be maps in Cont; then the map
⟨⇀t ,⇀s⟩ ∶ (xh1 , ..., xhl)Ð→ (xj1 , ..., xjn , xJ+k1 , ..., xJ+km)
is such that ⇀
xj ○ ⟨⇀t ,⇀s⟩ = ⇀t and ⇀xk ○ ⟨⇀t ,⇀s⟩ = ⇀s
and it is also unique: if
⇀
u ∶ (xh1 , ..., xhl) Ð→ (xj1 , ..., xjn , xJ+k1 , ..., xJ+km) is such that ⇀xj ○ ⇀u = ⇀t
and
⇀
xk ○ ⇀u = ⇀s , then ui = xji for every i ∈ {1, ..., n} and uJ+ki = xJ+ki for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}, hence⟨⇀t ,⇀s⟩ = ⇀u.
Remark 7.1. Of course, we can generalize the just given definition of binary product to the defini-
tion of finite product. In particular, given a list of distinct variables (xj1 , ..., xjn), we can as well
define the object (xj1 , ..., xjn)n in Cont, as the product of (xj1 , ..., xjn) with itself n times, with
n a natural number. It can be noticed that the objects of the category of contexts Cont form a
finitely generated set: Ob(Cont) = {xn1 ∣n ∈ N}, proceeding by induction on the length of the list
of distinct variables which give an object of Cont.
From now on, we will give different names to variables, meaning implicitly that we can anyway
give them an order. We need to show now that the category Cont of ontects has the structure of
a hyperdoctrine. More properly: given a language L for intuitionistic logic IL=, there is a functor
HL ∶ Contop Ð→Ha
which satisfies the conditions of the definition of a hyperdoctrine and which we will call the
intuitionistic syntactic hyperdoctrine HL for the language L. Of course, this can be naturally
extended to the classical case. The natural way to define such a functor is exactly what does the
job, as we will see. Thus we introduce the following definition, and then we will prove that it is a
good one.
Definition 7.8. Let L be a language for intuitionistic logic IL=. The intuitionistic syntactic
hyperdoctrine HL for the language L is a functor
HL ∶ Contop Ð→Ha
where:
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• for each object
⇀
x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Ob(Cont), we define
HL = A(L)(⇀x) ∶= {[ϕ(x1, ..., xn)]∣ϕ ∈ FormL}
to be the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of the formulas with free variables in
⇀
x, called the fiber
on variables
⇀
x;
• for each map
⇀
t = [t1/y1, ..., tm/ym] ∶ (x1, ..., xn)Ð→ (y1, ..., ym) in Cont, we define
H(⇀t ) ∶ A(L)(y1, ..., ym)Ð→ A(L)(x1, ..., xn)
to be the map in Ha, that is a Heyting algebra morphism, sending any formula ϕ(y1, ..., ym)
with free variables among y1, ..., ym into the formula ϕ(y1, ..., ym)[y1/t1, ..., ym/tm] with free
variables among x1, ..., xn.
Let L be a language for classical logic CL=. The classical syntactic hyperdoctrine HL for
the language L is a functor
HL ∶ Contop Ð→ Ba
defined in the same way as above.
In particular, if
⇀
x and
⇀
x
′
are lists of variables and pi ∶ ⇀x Ð→ ⇀x′ is a projection, we call
HL(pi) ∶ A(L)(⇀x′)Ð→ A(L)(⇀x) a weakening functor. It sends formulas with free variables into
formulas with more extra free variables.
For reasons of clarity, we will consider objects in Ob(Cont) of the form (x, y), instead of a more
general case (x1, ..., xn), though it is obvious that the generalization is just a matter of formality.
Let’s consider
⇀
x1,
⇀
x2 lists of variables and pii ∶ ⇀x1 × ⇀x2 Ð→ ⇀xi a projection. By the definition
of hyperdoctrine, there must be a left adjoint ∃pii ∶ A(L)(⇀x1 × ⇀x2) Ð→ A(L)(⇀xi) to the weakening
functor HL(pii). The functor ∃pii sends every formula in A(L)(⇀x1× ⇀x2), thus every formula with free
variables in (⇀x1, ⇀x2), into the equivalent class of the existential quantification on the variables that
are not involved in the substitution given by pii. For instance, let’s reduce (as we preannounced
before) to the case of the projection pi ∶ (x, y) Ð→ (x) and a formula ψ = ψ(x, y) with free
variables among x, y, so [ψ] ∈ A(L)(x, y). For the sake of plainness, we will write the projection
pi as pi = [x/z] ∶ (x, y) Ð→ (z): indeed, we know that changing the name of free variables in a
formula does not change the formula itself (provided the new variables do not already appear in
the formula). We need an adjunction ∃pi(−) = ∃y.(−)[x/z] ⊣ HL(pi), so for any other formula[α] = [α(z)] ∈ A(L)(z) with free variable at most z we should have that:
[∃y.ψ[x/z]] ≤ [α]⇔ [ψ] ≤HL(pi)([α])
but α does not depend on y, hence HL(pi)([α]) = [α] and the adjunction is equivalent to the
following claim: [∃y.ψ[x/z]] ≤ [α]⇔ [ψ] ≤ [α]
and this is exactly how it should be. Hence generalizing:
∃pii ⊢HL(pii)
The Beck-Chevalley condition for the functor ∃ turns out to rule how to substitute a free
variable in an existential quantification. Let’s consider again a projection [x/x] ∶ (x, y)Ð→ (x) in
Cont and a formula [ψ] = [ψ(x, y)] ∈ A(L)(x, y) as before. For every map [⇀w/x] ∶ (w1, ...,wn)Ð→
x in Cont, the diagram (w1, ...,wn, y) (w1, ...,wn)
(x, y) (x)
[⇀w/⇀w]
[⇀w/x,y/y] [⇀w/x]
[x/x]
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is a pullback diagram: first of all [x/x] ○ [⇀w/x, y/y] = [⇀w/x] = [⇀w/x] ○ [⇀w/⇀w], so the diagram above
commutes; let (u1, ..., um) ∈ Ob(Cont) and let
(u1, ..., um) (w1, ...,wn)
(x, y) (x)
f
f ′ [⇀w/x]
[x/x]
be a commutative diagram, then the unique map that makes the diagram above a pullback is[f, y/y] ∶ (u1, ..., um)Ð→ (w1, ...,wn, y). We would like that the following holds:
[∃y.(ψ[x/⇀w,y/y])] = [(∃y.ψ)[x/⇀w]]
so in particular we need the map
∃⇀
w
HL([⇀w/x, y/y])([ψ]) ≤HL([⇀w/x])∃[x/x]([ψ])
to be an isomorphism, that is exactly what the Beck-Chevalley condition claims. As we noticed
some lines above, sometimes it turns out to be convenient or somehow clearer to write a projection(x, y) Ð→ (x) by using a change of variables (x, y) Ð→ (z), without affecting the meaning of
formulas. It is easy to see that the Beck-Chevalley condition for such a notation results in the
isomorphism: [∃y.(ψ[x/⇀w,y/y])] = [(∃y.ψ[x/z])[z/⇀w]]
We would also ask that if β is a formula that does not depend on y, then [∃y.(α(y) ∧ β)] ⇔[∃y.α(y) ∧ β]. This is nothing but the Frobenius reciprocity condition, which thus holds.
Let’s consider again
⇀
x1,
⇀
x2 lists of variables and pii ∶ ⇀x1 × ⇀x2 Ð→ ⇀xi a projection. There must
be a right adjoint ∀pii ∶ A(L)(⇀x1 × ⇀x2)Ð→ A(L)(⇀xi) to the weakening functor D(pii). The functor∀pii sends every formula in D(⇀x1 × ⇀x2), thus every formula with free variables in (⇀x1, ⇀x2), into
the equivalent class of the universal quantification on the variables that are not involved in the
substitution given by pii. Let’s take into account the projection pi ∶ (x, y) Ð→ (x), which we will
write as pi ∶ (x, y) Ð→ (z) in the spirit of what we said before, and a formula ψ = ψ(x, y) with
free variables among x, y, so [ψ] ∈ A(L)(x, y). There must be an adjunction HL(pi) ⊢ ∀pi(−) =∀y.(−)[x/z], so for any other formula [α] = [α(z)] ∈ A(L)(z) with free variable at most z we need
that: [α] ≤ [∀y.ψ[x/z]]⇔HL(pi)([α]) ≤ [ψ]
but α does not depend on y, hence HL(pi)([α]) = [α] and the adjunction is equivalent to the
following claim: [α] ≤ [∀y.ψ[x/z]]⇔ [α] ≤ [ψ]
and this is exactly how it should be. Hence generalizing:
HL(pii) ⊢ ∀pii
The Beck-Chevalley condition for the functor ∀ turns out to rule how to substitute a free
variable in an universal quantification. Let’s consider the projection [x/x] in Cont and a formula[ψ] = [ψ(x, y)] ∈ A(L)(x, y) as before. For every map [⇀w/x] ∶ (w1, ...,wn) Ð→ (x) in Cont, the
diagram
(w1, ...,wn, y) (w1, ...,wn)
(x, y) (x)
[⇀w/⇀w]
[⇀w/x,y/y] [⇀w/x]
[x/x]
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is a pullback diagram (this was shown some lines above) and we would like the following to hold:
[(∀y.ψ)[x/⇀w]] = [∀y.(ψ[x/⇀w,y/y])]
so in particular we need the map
HL([⇀w/x])∀[x/x]([ψ]) ≤ ∀[⇀w/⇀w]HL([⇀w/x, y/y])([ψ])
to be an isomorphism, which is exactly what the Beck-Chevalley condition claims. As we have
done many times so far, we write a projection (x, y) Ð→ (x) also as (x, y) Ð→ (z). It is easy to
see that the Beck-Chevalley condition for such a notation results in the isomorphism:
[(∀y.ψ[x/z])[z/⇀w]] = [∀y.(ψ[x/⇀w,y/y])]
In the end, for every (xj1 , ..., xjn) ∈ Ob(Cont) we define the fibred equality on this object by:
δ(xj1 ,...,xjn) ∶= xj1 = xJ+j1 ∧ ... ∧ xjn = xJ+jn
where J = max{j1, ..., jn}, and that is a formula in A(L)((xj1 , ..., xjn) × (xj1 , ..., xjn)), thus in
A(L)((xj1 , ..., xjn , xJ+j1 , ..., xJ+jn))). This actually does the trick! Let (xk1 , ..., xkm) ∈ Ob(Cont)
and let (pi1, pi2, pi2) ∶ ( ⇀xk, ⇀xj)Ð→ ( ⇀xk, ⇀xj , ⇀xJ+j)
be a map in Cont. We need to find an adjunction ∃(pi1,pi2,pi3) ⊣ HL(pi1, pi2, pi3), where the left
adjoint is:
∃(pi1,pi2,pi3) ∶ A(L)( ⇀xk, ⇀xj) Ð→ A(L)(L)( ⇀xk, ⇀xj , ⇀xJ+j)
α( ⇀xk, ⇀xj) z→ HL(1 ⇀xk × pi1)(α( ⇀xk, ⇀xj)) ∧HL(pi2, pi2)(α( ⇀xk, ⇀xj))
so more precisely HL(1 ⇀xk ×pi1)(α( ⇀xk, ⇀xj))∧HL(pi2, pi2)(α( ⇀xk, ⇀xj)) ≡ α( ⇀xk, ⇀xj)∧(xj1 = xJ+j1 ∧xj2 =
xJ+j2 ∧ ... ∧ xjn = xJ+jn), and the right adjoint is:
HL(pi1, pi2, pi3) ∶ A(L)( ⇀xk, ⇀xj , ⇀xJ+j) Ð→ A(L)(L)( ⇀xk, ⇀xj)
ψ( ⇀xk, ⇀xj , ⇀xJ+j) z→ ψ( ⇀xk, ⇀xj , ⇀xj)
As a consequence, for any α( ⇀xk, ⇀xj) ∈ A(L)( ⇀xk, ⇀xj) and any ψ( ⇀xk, ⇀xj , ⇀xJ+j) ∈ A(L)( ⇀xk, ⇀xj , ⇀xJ+j),
we need to have that:
[α( ⇀xk, ⇀xj)] ≤ [ψ( ⇀xk, ⇀xj , ⇀xj)]
[α( ⇀xk, ⇀xj) ∧ (xj1 = xJ+j1 ∧ xj2 = xJ+j2 ∧ ... ∧ xjn = xJ+jn)] ≤ [ψ( ⇀xk, ⇀xj , ⇀xJ+j)]
(where the double line is an equivalent notation for the logic equivalence ⇔). This actually holds
and a proof of that can be given by:
α( ⇀xk, ⇀xj) ⊢ ψ( ⇀xk, ⇀xj , ⇀xj)
....
=1
α( ⇀xk, ⇀xj), xj1 = xJ+j1 , xj2 = xJ+j2 , ..., xjn = xJ+jn ⊢ ψ( ⇀xk, ⇀xj , ⇀xJ+j) ∧l
α( ⇀xk, ⇀xj), (xj1 = xJ+j1 ∧ xj2 = xJ+j2 ∧ ... ∧ xjn = xJ+jn) ⊢ ψ( ⇀xk, ⇀xj , ⇀xJ+j) ∧l
α( ⇀xk, ⇀xj) ∧ (xj1 = xJ+j1 ∧ xj2 = xJ+j2 ∧ ... ∧ xjn = xJ+jn) ⊢ ψ( ⇀xk, ⇀xj , ⇀xJ+j)
where every rule used in the foregoing proof tree is invertible, so the above logic equivalence is
proved.
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7.3 Logical quantifiers via adjunctions
We introduced the notion of hyperdoctrine in order to be able to endow the categorical language
we have been using with the possibility of expressing quantifications on variables. So far, we
have simply introduced new functors, namely ∃ and ∀, asking some basic rules such as that
they respect Beck-Chevalley conditions and Frobenius reciprocity. Thereafter, we considered the
particular case of the syntactic hyperdoctrine and we showed that those rules tell something true
as regards existential and universal quantifications. However, the whole picture is not yet crystal
clear: the heart of the matter is showing that those new theoretical tools actually make possible
to speak about quantification as we know it, and it would also be desiderable that adjuntion
itself should allow to express quantification in categorical terms (in line with Theorem (6.2) and
Theorem (6.3)).
Although it is not clearly stated, the previous section makes conspicuous that this purpose has
already been achieved when we formulated the syntactic version of the notion of hyperdoctrine.
We would only like to make this all a little bit more evident. In order to do that, we will start
from what it is usually required to have in order to work with quantification and we will show
that syntactic hyperdoctrines are enough in this respect. Put it another way, we will tackle the
problem of a categorical (i.e. by means of adjoint functors) definition of logical quantifiers (we
will skip the categorical characterization of equality though), trying to resemble what we did with
logical connectives in the previous chapter and, as it is desiderable, we will get to the same exact
results of the previous section.
Let L be a language for the (either intuitionistic or classical) predicate logic and let ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y) ∈
FormL be a proposition with free variables among x1, ..., xn, y, namely [ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)] ∈ A(L)(x1, ..., xn, y).
We can consider the existential quantification of that formula [∃y.ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)], as well as the
universal one [∀y.ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)], obtaining formulas with free variables among x1, ..., xn, namely
formulas in A(L)(x1, ..., xn). In this way, maps
∃y ∶ A(L)(x1, ..., xn, y) Ð→ A(L)(x1, ..., xn)[ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)] z→ [∃y.ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)]
and ∀y ∶ A(L)(x1, ..., xn, y) Ð→ A(L)(x1, ..., xn)[ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)] z→ [∀y.ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)]
are given. We would also like that quantification behaves properly along substitution of variables.
Namely, for any substitution [⇀x/⇀z , y/y] ∶ (x1, ..., xn, y)Ð→ (z1, ..., zm, t) we should have that:
[(∃y.ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y))[⇀x/⇀z , y/y]] = [∃y.ϕ(z1, ..., zm, y)] = [∃y.(ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)[⇀x/⇀z , y/y])]
and
[(∀y.ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y))[⇀x/⇀z , y/y]] = [∀y.ϕ(z1, ..., zm, y)] = [∀y.(ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)[⇀x/⇀z , y/y])]
We find again the Beck-Chevalley conditions for ∃ and ∀.
Our goal now is mimicking what we did for the connectives of propositional logic: first of all we
define functors between Lindenbaum algebras (both in the intuitionistic and in the logical case)
that behave like quantifiers do, afterwards we characterize them as the adjoints of some particular
functorial structures between Lindenbaum algebras. To begin with, we extend the definition we
gave before of Lindenbaum algebra for propositional logic to the predicate case: it suffices to add
the possibility to quantify over variables, so we have simply to add variables to the algebra. This
is called a Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra.
Definition 7.9. Let L be a language for the (either intuitionistic or classical) predicative logic and
let
⇀
x = (x1, ..., xn) be a list of variables. The Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra A(L)(⇀x) is the Lin-
denbaum algebra A(L) where formulas have free variables among (x1, ..., xn), hence quantification
is admitted only over variables in (x1, ..., xn).
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It is straightforward to see that Ai(L)(⇀x) is still a Heyting algebra and Ac(L)(⇀x) is still a
Boolean algebra. We can define functors:
∃y ∶ Ai(L)(x1, ..., xn, y) Ð→ Ai(L)(x1, ..., xn)[ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)] z→ [∀y.ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)]([ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)] ≤ [ψ(x1, ..., xn, y)]) z→ ([∃y.ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)] ≤ [∃y.ψ(x1, ..., xn, y)])
∀y ∶ Ai(L)(x1, ..., xn, y) Ð→ Ai(L)(x1, ..., xn)[ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)] z→ [∃y.ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)]([ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)] ≤ [ψ(x1, ..., xn, y)]) z→ ([∀y.ϕ(x1, ..., xn, y)] ≤ [∀y.ψ(x1, ..., xn, y)])
These functors are well-defined: suppose there is a map [ϕ(⇀x, y)] ≤ [ψ(⇀x, y)] in Ai(L)(⇀x, y),
therefore there is a derivation D of ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊢ ψ(⇀x, y), hence we can find the following derivations
in intuitionistic sequent calculus (and thus they also hold classically)
ϕ(⇀x,w) ⊣ ψ(⇀x,w) ∃r
ϕ(⇀x,w) ⊣ ∃y.ψ(⇀x, y) ∃l(w ∉ FV (∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y),∃y.ψ(⇀x, y)))∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊣ ∃y.ψ(⇀x, y)
∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y), ϕ(⇀x,w) ⊣ ψ(⇀x,w) ∀l∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊣ ψ(⇀x,w) ∀r(w ∉ FV (∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y),∀y.ψ(⇀x, y)))∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊣ ∀y.ψ(⇀x, y)
We recall the definition of weakening functor, which we introduced immediately after the
definition of syntactic hyperdoctrine. Given a language L for the predicative logic, let’s consider
two lists of variables
⇀
x ∶= (x1, ..., xn) and (⇀x, y) = (x1, ..., xn, y) as objects of Cont, and let[⇀x/⇀x] ∶ (x1, ..., xn, y) Ð→ (x1, ..., xn) be a projection in Cont. The weakening functor of the
context of the variables
⇀
x with extra variable y
HL([⇀x/⇀x]) ∶ A(L)(⇀x)Ð→ A(L)(⇀x, y)
is the functor image through the syntactic hyperdoctrine HL, sending formulas with free variables
in x1, ..., xn into formulas where we add an extra free variable y.
Theorem 7.1. Let L be a language for either the intuitionistic predicative logic IL or the classical
predicative logic CL, and let HL be a functor defined as in Definition (7.8). Let ⇀x ∶= (x1, ..., xn),(⇀x, y) = (x1, ..., xn, y) ∈ Ob(Cont) and let [⇀x/⇀x] ∶ (x1, ..., xn, y) Ð→ (x1, ..., xn) be a projection in
Cont. Then:
1. the existential quantification ∃y is left adjoint to the weakening functor HL([⇀x/⇀x]) of the
context of the variables
⇀
x with extra variable y:
∃y ⊣HL([⇀x/⇀x])
2. the universal quantification ∀y is right adjoint to the weakening functor HL([⇀x/⇀x]) of the
context of the variables
⇀
x with extra variable y:
HL([⇀x/⇀x]) ⊣ ∀y
Proof. Let’s prove the result in the intuitionistic case, so it holds also in the classical one.
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Let [ϕ(⇀x, y)] ∈ Ob(Ai(L)(⇀x, y)). There is a map [ϕ(⇀x, y)] ≤ [∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y)] in Ai(L)(⇀x, y) since
there is a derivation of ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊢ ∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y) in intuitionistic sequent calculus:
id−ax
ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊢ ϕ(⇀x, y),∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y) ∃r
ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊢ ∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y)
Let now [α(⇀x)] ∈ Ob(Ai(L)(⇀x)) and let [ϕ(⇀x, y)] ≤ [α(⇀x)] be a map in Ai(L)(⇀x, y), hence
ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊢ α(⇀x). We need to show that there exists a unique map [∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y)] ≤ [α(⇀x)], so we
have to find a derivation of ∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊢ α(⇀x), which can be the following:
ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊢ α(⇀x) ∃l(y ∉ FV (∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y), α(⇀x)))∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊢ α(⇀x)
where a derivation of ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊢ α(⇀x) is given by assumption and the uniqueness of the map[∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y)] ≤ [α(⇀x)] comes from the definition of Lindenbaum algebra.
Let [ϕ(⇀x)] ∈ Ob(Ai(L)(⇀x)). There is a map [ϕ(⇀x)] ≤ [∀y.ϕ(⇀x)] in Ai(L)(⇀x) since ∀y.ϕ(⇀x) =
ϕ(⇀x) (ϕ(⇀x) does not depend on the variable y), hence there is a derivation of ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊢ ∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y)
in the intuitionistic sequent calculus by identity axiom. Let now [α(⇀x, y)] ∈ Ob(Ai(L)(⇀x, y) and let[ϕ(⇀x)] ≤ [∀y.α(⇀x, y)] be a map in Ai(L)(⇀x), hence there is derivation tree of ϕ(⇀x) ⊢ ∀y.α(⇀x, y) in
the intuitionistic sequent calculus. We need to show that there exists a unique map [∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y)] ≤[α(⇀x)], so we have to find a derivation of ∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊢ α(⇀x), which is the following3:
∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊢ ϕ(⇀x) ϕ(⇀x) ⊢ ∀y.α(⇀x, y)
comp∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊢ ∀y.α(⇀x, y) ∀y.α(⇀x, y) ⊢ α(⇀x)
comp∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊢ α(⇀x)
where a derivation of ϕ(⇀x) ⊢ ∀y.α(⇀x, y) is given by assumption, derivations of ∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y) ⊢ ϕ(⇀x)
and ∀y.α(⇀x, y) ⊢ α(⇀x) follow from the fact that both right-hand terms do not depend on y. As
a consequence, there is a map [∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y)] ≤ [α(⇀x)] in Ai(L)(⇀x), which is unique due to the
definition of Lindenbaum algebra.
7.4 The next step: categorical first order logic
Lawvere’s purpose was far more organic than just to express connectives and quantifiers as adjoint
functors, that is in a category-theoretic framework. As we already mentioned, his great intuition
was to treat categorically first order and higher order logics on their whole. Of course, to give
a detailed explanation of the matter is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it can
be interesting, as well as fair to Lawvere’s work, to depict an overall report of the consequent
researches and influences of categorical logic. With such a purpose in mind, we will present the
Elementary Topos Theory (ETT), which Lawvere formulated together with Tierney and which is
an attempt to introduce higher order theories in category-theoretic terms, and we will give a clue
of some results that came as an answer to Lawvere’s Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets
(ETCS).
3We make use of the composition rule here; it is obvious that Gentzen Theorem on the elimination of the cut
rule allows us to turn this proof tree into one which is cut free.
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7.4.1 Elementary Topos Theory
As we have already mentioned, elementary topos theory (ETT) was introduced by Lawvere and
Tierney at the beginning of the 1970s. Lawvere’s previous work had been an attempt to give to
logical concepts a categorical formulation, as well as to capture in category-theoretic terms purely
equational theories. The introduction of ETT corresponded to the occasion on which higher order
theories, or type theories, were introduced. It arose so an interest in clarifying the relationships
between ETT and type theories, as well as in characterizing categorically some intermediate cases,
the so called doctrines, especially the doctrine of first-order logic.
The concept of topos was first introduced by Grothendieck in the early 1960s in the context
of algebraic geometry. It was presented as a generalization of the concept of topological space,
though Grothendieck himself noticed that a topos inherited many properties of the category of sets
and thus could also be treated as a generalization of the notion of category of sets. Nevertheless,
Grothendieck and his students did not pay attention to the logical side of the issue. Though
social and especially political ideas are rarely though of as being related to mathematical theories,
the explanation of the lack of interest for logic during those years can be of this kind. While
geometry was considered progressive, logic was meant to be reactionary by many circles. Also,
using categorical techniques to solve a problem was sometimes considered off beat and even fascist4.
This could in part explain why the development of category theory, which was capable more than
other branches of mathematics of connecting logic with many different mathematical subjects such
as geometry, was so difficult in the initial stages.
However, the pioneering nature of Lawvere overcame these prejudices. When in 1969 his
interests in continuum mechanics and Tierney’s researches in sheaf theory intersected, the notion
of elementary topos arose naturally. In a nutshell, an elementary topos is a CC category with a
subobject classifier. More properly, here is the definition as it first appeared in 19695.
Definition 7.10. An elementary topos is a category ε such that:
1. it has pullbacks;
2. it has a terminal object 1;
3. the functor X × − ∶ εÐ→ ε has a right adjoint (−)X ∶ εÐ→ ε, for every X ∈ Ob(ε);
4. it has a subobject classifier Ω ∈ Ob(ε) and a monic map ⊺ ∶ 1Ð→ Ω such that for any monic
m ∶ A Ð→ X there is a unique map φ ∶ X Ð→ Ω in ε for which the following square is a
pullback:
A 1
X Ω
!
m ⊺
φ
for any A,X ∈ Ob(ε) (the map φ ∶ X Ð→ Ω is usually called characteristic morphism of A
and is usually denoted by φA).
Lawvere guessed the logical structure of a topos right from the start. It can actually be showed
that all propositional operations are definable in an alementary topos ε as maps of the subobject
4The political influence during those year was pervasive: it suffices to think that for instance set theory was said
to be bourgeois, since it was founded on the relationship of belonging.
5We underline the fact that the definition can be given entirely in terms of adjunction.
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classifier Ω:
⊺ ∶ 1Ð→ Ω¬ ∶ ΩÐ→ Ω ≡ ¬ ○ ⊺ ∶ 1Ð→ Ω∧ ∶ Ω ×ΩÐ→ Ω∨ ∶ Ω ×ΩÐ→ Ω→∶ Ω ×ΩÐ→ Ω
Furthermore, for any map f ∶ X Ð→ Y in ε there is are map ∃f ∶ ΩX Ð→ ΩY and ∀f ∶ ΩX Ð→ ΩY
which can be given as adjoints to given functors. Consequently, quantifiers are definable in any
elementary topos, too.
It turns out that the logic of an arbitrary topos ε is in general intuitionistic, though there exist
Boolean topoi too: for instance it is sufficient that the negation operator ¬ satisfies ¬ ○ ¬ = 1Ω, or
equivalently that ⊺ and  induce an isomorphism 1+1 ≃ Ω so the subobject classifier is two-valued.
In 1971 Diaconescu found out that a sufficient condition for a topos to be Boolean is that it satisfies
the axiom of choice (AC)6. Later it was also showed that any topos satisfying AC also satisfies
the internal axiom of choice (IAC)7 and that any topos satisfying IAC is necessarily Boolean.
A morphism of topoi is naturally defined as a functor preserving the structure. Lawvere and
Tierney called logical morphism such a functor, but they preferred to use instead geometric
morphisms in the development of their theory. These geometric morphisms had already been
defined and heavily used by Grothendieck and his students, also they guided Lawvere and Tierney
up to the definition of Grothendieck topology (also known as Lawvere-Tierney topology),
which made possible to put the geometry at the forefront of their theory.
What is relevant, though, is that ETT was at that point ready to let Lawvere and Tierney
formalize Cohen’s independence proof in categorical terms: in 1970 Lawvere translated Cohen’s
proof into the language of topos theory and two years later Tierney presented the full proof of this
translation ([Tie72]).
As it should be clear from what we have just reported, categorical logic raised, starting from
its early origins, a huge amount of foundational questions, presenting itself explicitly as a reversal
of the traditional presentation of mathematical concepts and theories. Whereas in most set-
theoretical accounts the approach to mathematics is clearly inherited by Russell’s philosophical
and logical visions and is atomistic (or bottom-up, according to Awodey in An answer to
Hellman’s question: ’Does category theory provide a framework for mathematical structuralism?’,
Philosophia Mathematica, 12, 2004), the approach to mathematics proposed by category theory
is on the contrary algebraic (or top-down according to Awodey in An answer to Hellman’s
question: ’Does category theory provide a framework for mathematical structuralism?’, Philosophia
Mathematica, 12, 2004). According to logical atomism, all truths are ultimately dependent upon
a layer of atomic facts, which consist either of a simple particular exhibiting a quality, or multiple
simple particulars standing in a relation. According to the algebraic vision of mathematics and
especially logic, the truth of the propositional atoms is subsequent to some algebraic structures
they belong to.
Having said that, the foundational opinions and beliefs inside the categorical community differ-
entiate one from each other for specific important aspects. There are some foundational elements,
though, on which all categorical logicians of the period agreed. First, all categorical logicians postu-
lated that, by adopting a top-down approach to the analysis of mathematical concepts, structures
shared by different mathematical systems should be described in terms of ”maps” (here not meant
explicitly as maps in a category) between them. In the case of Lawvere’s work, maps are meant as
adjoint functors between different categories that formalize some mathematical structures. Sec-
ond, it was a common belief in the categorical community that mathematics did not require a
6A topos satisfies AC if every epimorphism p ∶ X Ð→ Y hass a section s ∶ Y Ð→ X, that is p ○ s = 1Y .
7A topos ε satisfies IAC if for every epimorphism p ∶ X Ð→ Y and for any object Z ∈ Ob(ε), the map XZ Ð→ Y Z
is also epic.
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unique and absolute foundation, as for instance set theory had been meant up to those days; also,
they thought that certain frameworks even logically weaker than ZF could be as well satisfactory.
Of course, categorical logic was believed to provide the most handy tools for the analysis of the
logical structure of many mathematical disciplines. Third, and as consequence to what has just
been said, category theorists and categorical logicians agreed that it was not necessary to assume
that mathematics was about sets: sets are indeed not constitutive of the structure of categories
themselves, since there are many kinds of categories that do not have a set structure.
Starting from these elements as a common base, every categorical logician elaborated his own
foundational theory. Among the many, five positions in particular were the most important in the
development of the matter and were presented by: Lawvere, Lambek, MacLane, Bell and Makkai.
In reality, Lawvere’s opinion has changed through the years, even though a constant point is the
conviction that category theory provides the proper setting for the study of foundations. However,
what Lawvere meant for mathematical foundations should be made clear at the outset, since his
philosophical and mathematical considerations are manifold and different depending on the years
they are considered. Despite that, although Lawvere himself is aware of facing foundational
problems differently at different times, he cares about clarifying that his purpose has always been
steadfast: to produce a context in which mathematical domains may be characterized categorically
(and more precisely, by means of naturally arising adjoint functors to canonical given functors),
so that a top-down approach to mathematics may be undertaken. Actually, his position can be
said to be deeply historical and dialectical, far more than top-down. Using Lawvere’s words:
”[a] foundation makes explicit the essential features, ingredients, and operations of
a science as well as its origins and general laws of development. The purpose of making
these explicit is to provide a guide to the learning, use, and further development of
the science. A ’pure’ foundation that forgets this purpose and pursues a speculative
’foundation’ for its own sake is clearly a nonfoundation.” ([LR03], pg 235)
This, together with the idea that there is no such thing as the foundation for mathematics,
implies that, in Lawvere’s opinion, foundations should not be perscriptive about what consitutes
mathematics, but rather descriptive about its origins and essential features.
Lambek’s position is totally different from Lawvere’s. He too is clearly concerned with the
history of mathematics, but he keeps this interest separated from a his deeply elaborated philo-
sophical work ([LS80]), in which he focused on the analysis of how the standard philosophical
positions in the foundations (logicism, intuitionism, formalism, platonism) might be inserted in a
topos-theoretical approach to mathematics.
A different view held MacLane, who at first, after founding category theory, did not see it as
more than a handy and useful language. Under the influence of Lawvere’s ideas, he reconsidered
foundational issues and raised many questions as to set-theoretical foundations for category theory.
Basically, he recalled Lawvere’s ETCS in a topos-theoretical setting, asserting that a well-pointed
topos with choice and a natural-number object could offer an alternative to ZFC, and so that
a different foundation for mathematics was possible. Nevertheless, MacLane’s complete picture
of his foundational ideas can be found in his book Mathematics Form and Function ([Mac86]):
in a nutshell, mathematics is presented as arising from a formal network based on ideas and
concepts that evolve through time according to their function and consequently there cannot be
any preference for a set-theoretic or category-theoretic perspective as regards the foundations of
mathematics, which is seen as form and function.
Bell, like Lambek, had a profound interest on the historical influence on foundational issues
and, like Lawvere, adopted a distinctly dialectical attitude towards the subject. Even though in the
early 1980s he had totally denied the possibility for category theory to be taken as a foundational
framework, some years later he began to acknowledge category theory to play a foundational role
in mathematics. More precisely, he advanced the idea that toposes and the associated higher-order
intuitionistic type theories provided a network in which one could analyze mathematical concepts.
Differently from Lambek, though, his approach is pluralist and top-down, since Bell did not argue
in favor of a specific kind of toposes. In his words:
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”the topos-theoretical viewpoint suggests that the absolute universe of sets be re-
placed by a plurality of ’toposes of discourse’, each of which may be regarded as a
possible ’world’ in which mathematical activity may (figuratively) take place. The
mathematical activity that takes place within such ’worlds’ is codified within local set
theories; it seems appropriately, therefore, to call this codification local mathematics,
to constrast it with the absolute universe of sets. Constructive probability of a mathe-
matical assertion now means that it is invariant, i.e. valid in every local mathematics.”
([Bel88], pg 245)
Makkai’s contributions were not only technical, but also of philosophical relevance. From
a technical point of view, he agreed that a topos-theoretical perspective could not provide an
adequate foundation for category theory, therefore he searched for an appropriate metatheory for
category theory trying, following in Lawvere’s footsteps, to provide a metatheoretic description
of the category of categories. Philosophically, he looked into the connections between these issues
and mathematical structuralism, which was, according to him, the belief that conceptual world
consisted on structures. His crucial idea was that the identity relation in formal languages was
not given a priori by first-order axioms, but was derived from within a certain context. Practically
speaking, only when the context for talking about share structures has been fixed, can a criterion
of identity for objects of that structure be given directly by the context itself (this is in fact a
structurally interpreted context principle).
7.4.2 First order logic in a new mindset: Joyal and Reyes’ strategy
As we have already mentioned, Lawvere’s first attempt at categorizing set theory was the Elemen-
tary Theory of the Category of Sets (ETCS). However, this did not give brilliant results: strictly
speaking, it was nothing but a categorical transcription of the axioms of set theory and did not
give any new insight into the subject. Lawvere’s interests flared up again after the discovery of the
importance of the concept of topos in logic. His great idea was to replace the category of sets by
an arbitrary topos, in order to develop mathematics, in particular analysis. The axiom of topos
theory seemed to be very much set-like, thus the biggest initial efforts were concerned with the
clarification of the relationships between topos and set theory.
As regards first-order logic, its development is difficult to report accurately. The most author-
itative references are for sure [Law75a], [Law75b] and [Law76], though there were many others
all-important contributions by Reyes, Lambek, Makkai, Joyal and Be´nabou. In case they were
published, these contributions were surprisingly difficult to find and examine, but Be´nabou and
Joyal never even wanted to publish their results. In Marquis and Reyes’ opinion ([MR11]), histor-
ical events might have had an influence: both in France and in Montreal, which where the places
at the core of the development of the subject, social, political and cultural situation was very tense
(recall for instance the October Crisis in Que´bec in 1970 or May 68 in France). Be´nabou and
Joyal gave only talks in conferences, colloquia and seminars, but no specific details about their
work were available. Two important events in the development of categorical logic and first-order
logic theories were two meetings in April 1973 in Montreal, where Dana Schlomiuk had invited
many category theorists to a series of conferences and seminars, and in the summer of 1974, when
Shuichi Takahashi had organized the Se´minaire de mathe´matiques supe´rieures. There were no
official records of these meetings, though.
The first published record of all those researches came out only in 1973, when Hugo Volger, one
of Lawvere’s students, presented a categorical version of a first-order logic and of the completeness
theorem by following the guidelines of his supervisor. Nevertheless, Volger’s proposal was not
received favourably and the community did not adopt his results: many notions he presented
could not be extended to the non-Boolean cases and the whole proposal seemed to most category
theorists too contrived and ad hoc. More appreciated answers came from another front, namely
from the researches of Joyal and Reyes, who were working in Montreal school and were looking at
categorical logic from another point of view. Their idea was to start from a logical theory and then
construct a corresponding category: in this way a hierarchy of logical theories is introduced hand-
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in-hand with a hierarchy of categories. Thanks to this approach, Joyal and Reyes succeeded in
finding connections with elementary topoi and Joyal was capable of giving a uniform categorical
treatment of the various completeness theorems. The whole work of the two mathematicians
can be found in a publication by Reyes in 1974 ([Rey74]), even though there can be also found
eight thesis, Master’s and PhD’s, touching this subject and written at the University of Montreal
between 1973 and 1977.
Let’s look at Joyal and Reyes’ strategy attentively: given a first-order theory T, they wanted
to construct a corresponding small category CT and then characterize in an abstract manner the
type of the category thus obtained. Except for its successful results, as we are going to see, there
were also philosophical reasons indicating that this approach was the ”right” one: Joyal and Reyes
retraced the canonical Lindenbaum-Tarski construction in categorical terms in such a way that it
yielded a category. This gave evidence of the fact that categorical logic provided a natural setting
for the algebraic treatment of logic. Besides, as Jean Dionne suggested in the introduction of his
thesis, categorical logicians believed that substituting the theory T with the category CT would
make simpler and more complete the object of study, since categories allowed for more relations
between concepts than the canonical set-theoretic inclusion. Thus in the early 1970s, categorical
methods were believed to be more objective and invariant than logical methods.
”Our method is therefore general enough to apply to a large variety of languages
and we can conclude that it constitutes the true link between logic in the traditional
sense and categorical logic: with the advantage that we can now work without using
axioms, rules of inference, formal demonstrations and the rest. We can even forget
about variables, which were always inconvenient. Moving to categories, we can do
logic in an ”abstract” fashion in terms of objects, arrows, functors and diagrams,
which is, among all advantages mentioned in this work, not the least, since the logician
is naturally more interested by concepts than by indices to give to variables.” ([Dio73],
translation by Marquis and Reyes)
The first step in Joyal and Reyes’ construction is the definition of a first-order primitive languageL0 (which contains only variables, functional and relational symbols, and the true formula ⊺),
followed by the presentation of its axioms and rules, which in fact are those of equational logic.
The first extension of L0, namely L1 or Lreg, is called regular logic and contains the conjunction
connective ∧ and the existential quantifier ∃. The following step is considering also the disjunction
connective ∨ and the false formula , thus obtaining the next extension of the language, namely L2
or Lcoh, known as coherent logic. The last two levels are the intuitionistic and the classical ones.
In order to obtain intuitionistic logic L3 or Lint, it suffices to extend Lcoh with the implication
connective →, the universal quantifier ∀ and their intuitionistic rules. Finally, by adding the
negative connective ¬ and the disjuntion rule ⊺ ⊢ φ ∨ ¬φ, classical logic L4 or Lbool is obtained.
Lint
L0 Lreg Lcoh
Lbool
Let T be a given theory. Then we can construct the corresponding category CT in the following
manner. First of all, we define the equivalence relation ∼:
ϕ(⇀x) ∼ ψ(⇀x)⇔ (ϕ(x) ⊢T ψ(⇀x) and ψ(⇀x) ⊢T ϕ(⇀x))
The equivalence class of a formula ϕ(⇀x) is denoted by [ϕ(⇀x)], is called a formal set and constitutes
an object of the category CT. Maps between formal sets in CT are called formal functions and
are defined as equivalent classes of formulas that are provably equivalent functional relations of T.
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Specifically, given [ϕ(⇀x)], [ψ(⇀y)] ∈ Ob(CT) such that the contexts ⇀x and ⇀y are disjoint, a formula
ρ(⇀x,⇀y) defines a formal function from [ϕ(⇀x)] to [ψ(⇀y)], denoted ⟨⇀x z→ ⇀y ∶ ρ⟩ ∶ [ϕ(⇀x)]Ð→ [ψ(⇀y)],
if:
1. ρ(⇀x,⇀y) ⊢T ϕ(⇀x) ∧ ψ(⇀y);
2. ρ(⇀x,⇀y) ∧ ρ(⇀x,⇀z) ⊢T ⇀y = ⇀z ;
3. ϕ(⇀x) ⊢T ∃⇀y.ρ(⇀x,⇀y);
and two formal functions from [ϕ(⇀x)] to [ψ(⇀y)] are identified whenever:
ρ(⇀x,⇀y) ⊢T σ(⇀x,⇀y) and σ(⇀x,⇀y) ⊢T ρ(⇀x,⇀y)
The moral is that for each theory T there is a corresponding small category CT, as the following
table shows.
If T is in then CT is aLreg regular categoryLcoh coherent categoryLint Heyting categoryLreg Boolean category
At this point, as we have already said, the plan was to describe the properties of the categoriesCT corresponding to theories T, since it was assumed that replacing T with CT was not only
mathematically fruitful but also philosophically motivated.
Definition 7.11. A category C is said to be a regular category if it satisfies the following
properties:
1. it has all finite limits;
2. coequalizers of kernel pairs exist8;
3. regular epimorphisms are stable under pullback9.
For example, the category Set of sets is regular and in reality so is any elementary topos. It is
possible to define regular functors between regular categories as functors preserving finite limits
and coequalizers of kernel pairs. Then we say Reg to be the category where objects are (small)
regular categories and maps are regular functors between them.
Definition 7.12. A category C is said to be a coherent category if it satisfies the following
properties:
1. it is a regular category;
2. for each object X ∈ Ob(C), Sub(X) has finite joins;
3. finite joins are stable under pullbacks (equivalently, for every f ∶ X Ð→ X in C, the inverse
image map f∗ ∶ Sub(Y )Ð→ Sub(X) preserves finite joins).
A functor between regular categories is said to be a coherent functor if it is regular and it
preserves finite joins. Again, we can consider the category Coh whose objects are (small) coherent
categories and whose maps are coherent functors between them.
8A kernel pair of a map f ∶ X ←→ Y in the category C is the pullback of a pair of equal maps Y fÐ→ Y f←Ð X.
9This means that if f ∶ X Ð→ Y is a regular epimorphism and g ∶ Z Ð→ Y is a map in C, then the map
g′ ∶ X ×Y Z Ð→ X obtained by pulling back f along g is a regular epimorphism.
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Definition 7.13. A category C is said to be a Heyting category if it satisfies the following
properties:
1. it is a regular category;
2. for every map f ∶ X Ð→ Y , the inverse image map f∗ ∶ Sub(Y ) Ð→ Sub(X) has a right
adjoint ∀f ∶ Sub(X)Ð→ Sub(Y );
3. for every object X ∈ Ob(C), Sub(X) is a lattice with smallest element.
A Heyting functor between Heyting categories is a regular functor preserving ∀f and the
lattice operations. Similarly as before, it is possible to define the category Heyt of Heyting
categories and Heyting functors between them.
Definition 7.14. A category C is said to be a Boolean category if it satisfies the following
properties:
1. it is a Heyting category;
2. for every object X ∈ Ob(C), Sub(X) is a Boolean algebra.
A Boolean functor is a functor between Boolean categories preserving all the lattice oper-
ations and the category Bool has Boolean categories as objects and Boolean functors between
them. Quite apparently, there are forgetful functors (actually 2-functors):
BoolÐ→HeytÐ→CohÐ→Reg
Some questions arose immediately. First of all, it could be interesting to look into possible adjoints
to the foregoing functors. Besides, there should be some relationship between these categories and
topoi, which could be useful to understand fully the whole matter. Reyes and Joyal answered
to those questions in their publication of 1974. The connections with topoi made it possible to
formalize a dictionary between algebraic geometry and logic, which was ready to be used to find
out new and useful mathematical insights.
Nevertheless, something was still missing, namely a way to construct a theory TC given a
category C in such a way that there is a canonical interpretation of TC in C, once that the notion
of interpretation of a theory in a category has been clarified. Now, we do not think that getting
bogged down into too specific detail can be somehow useful for our target, which is simply an
overall view of the historic events of the development of categorical logic. It suffices to say that,
given a category C and a first-order language Li (i = 0, ...,4), a proper definition of C-interpretation
makes it possible the formalization of the notion of model of a sequent and of a theory T. Also,
we can define the internal language LC of the category C, which in fact is nothing less that C itself,
and the canonical interpretation of LC in C, which is nothing less that the identity interpretation.
The theory TC corresponding to the category C is then the collection of all sequents of the internal
language that are verified in C by the canonical interpretation. The point of this kind of tautologous
game is that one can prove properties of the category C using the appropriate deductive system
related to the theory TC . More properly, we should say that the internal language LC of the
category C is a special case of the primitive language L0, and we better indicate the theory TC
by T0(C). If C is a regular category, then we obtain a theory T1(C) by adding suitable axioms
to T0(C). Similarly, we can associate a specific theory Ti(C) to coherent, Heyting and Boolean
categories.
If C is a then LC is and TC is
category L0(C) T0(C)
regular category L1(C) T1(C)
coherent category L2(C) T2(C)
Heyting category L3(C) T3(C)
Boolean category L4(C) T4(C)
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It is straightforward to prove a soundness theorem for the various logical systems in the table.
Much more intricate turns out to be the proof of the completeness theorems, and for this reason
we do not dwell on the subject, though we should underline that the researches in that respect
brought new tools and brilliant results in categorical logic and some other mathematical areas.
What counts now is the fact that, in a sense, the border between logical theories as categories
and categories as logical theories seems to vanish. This is indeed the real terrific strength of
categorical logic, or more generally of topos theory, as Reyes noticed:
”The goal of topos theory is to develop a language and an efficient method for the
study of concepts of local character (as well as constructions on such concepts) that are
found in different branches of mathematics: topology, geometry, analytic geometry,...
To the geometric aspect (or topological), which is the dominant aspect, another is
dialectically opposed: the logical aspect.” ([Rey78], translation by Reyes and Marquis)
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Chapter 8
Soundness and completeness
The Theorem of soundness and completeness for some kind of logic is a well-known result of
standard mathematical logic. It states that a logical inference is provable if and only if it is true1,
so it establishes a close connection between logical provability and semantical truth.
In this chapter we will focus only on the intuitionistic case, as the classical case arises as a natural
generalization. Our aim now is to give a proof of the Theorem of soundness and completeness
for predicate logic. Previously, the notion of interpretation needs to be presented: in fact hy-
perdoctrines themselves will serve as interpretations and so also as models for logical systems.
Afterwards, we will extend the result to predicate logic with equality. In order to be able to
produce models and countermodels for formulas in a clear and easy way, we will previously give
a particular categorical-theoretic version of the notion of interpretation and we will exemplify its
use in the last section of the chapter.
On the top of all that, we have to underline that the proof of the Theorem of soundness and
completeness via categorical logic and hyperdoctrines, both in the intuitionistic and in the classical
case, turns out to be totally constructive, instead it is known that the proof of the completeness
Theorem via Boolean algebraic models requires Zorn’s Lemma, hence not being constructive.
8.1 Term and formula interpretation under context
With the notation t(x1,..,xn) or ϕ(x1,...,xn) we mean that either the term t or the formula ϕ has
free variables among x1, ..., xn.
Definition 8.1. Let L be a language for the (intuitionistic or classical) predicative logic with(ci)i∈I in it, (fi)i∈I be terms and (Pj)j∈J be atomic predicates. Let D be a hyperdoctrine for the
classical or the intuitionistic logic from a category C, which has all the finite products. Given
C ∈ Ob(C), let be given an assignation:
• (ci)I ∶ 1Ð→ C;
• (fi)I ∶ Cni Ð→ C where ni is the arity of fi;
• (Pj)I ∈D(Cnj) where nj is the arity of Pj.
We define the interpretation of terms and formulas based on the hyperdoctrine D by
induction on the construction of terms and formulas.
The term interpretation of a term t(x1,...,xn), with free variables among x1, ..., xn, is a map
tI ∶ Cn Ð→ C
in C, defined by induction as follows:
• I(xi(x1,...,xn)) ∶= pii ∶ Cn Ð→ C with pii projection
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• I(fi(t1, ..., tm)(x1,...,xn)) ∶= (fi)I(I(t1), ...,I(tm))
The formula interpretation of a formula ϕ(x1,...,xn), with free variables among x1, ..., xn, is
the assignation I(ϕ(x1,...,xn)) ∈D(Cn)
defined by induction on the complexity of the formula ϕ(x1, ..., xn) as follows:
• I(Pj(t1, ..., tmj)(x1,...,xn)) ∶=D(tI1 × ... × tImj)(P Ij )
• I(¬ψ)(x1,...,xn) ∶= ¬I(ψ)(x1,...,xn) ∈D(Cn)
• I(ψ ∧ χ)(x1,...,xn) ∶= I(ψ(x1,...,xn)) ∧ I(χ(x1,...,xn)) ∈D(Cn)
• I(ψ ∨ χ)(x1,...,xn) ∶= I(ψ(x1,...,xn)) ∨ I(χ(x1,...,xn)) ∈D(Cn)
• I(ψ → χ)(x1,...,xn) ∶= I(ψ(x1,...,xn))→ I(χ(x1,...,xn)) ∈D(Cn)
• I(∀xn+1.ψ(xn+1))(x1,...,xn) ∶= ∀pin+1I(ψ(x1,...,xn)) ∈D(Cn)
• I(∃xn+1.ψ(xn+1))(x1,...,xn) ∶= ∃pin+1I(ψ(x1,...,xn)) ∈D(Cn)
Before proceeding with the proofs of soundness and completeness, we need to verify the validity
of some crucial lemmas, such as the weakening and the substitution lemma, as well as checking that
the identical assignation gives rise to the identical interpretation (so our definition of interpretation
works exactly as it is supposed to).
In the interest of brevity, we consider only the intuitionistic case, as the classical case is a
simple generalization of it.
Lemma 8.1 (weakening). Let L be a language for the intuitionistic predicative logic and let D
be a hyperdoctrine for the intuitionistic logic from a category C. Let t(x1,...,xn) be a term and
ϕ(x1,...,xn) ∈ FormL a formula, with free variables among x1, ...xn and y ≠ xi (i = 1, ..., n). Then:
(i) I(t)(x1,...xj ,y,xj+1,...,xn) = tI(x1,...xj ,xj+1,...,xn) ○ (pi1 × ... × pij × pij+1 × ... × pin)
(ii) I(ϕ)(x1,...xj ,y,xj+1,...,xn) =D(pi1 × ... × pij × pij+1 × ... × pin)(I(ϕ)(x1,...xj ,xj+1,...,xn))
Proof. In the interests of brevity, we will write (⇀x) ≡ (x1, ..., xj , xj+1, ..., xn), (−, y,−) ≡ (x1, ..., xj , y, xj+1, ..., xn)
and (⇀pi) ≡ (pi1 × ... × pin).
(i) Let’s proceed by induction on the complexity of the term t.
• If t ≡ xi, then tI(⇀x) = I(xi)(⇀x) = pini ∶ Cn Ð→ C and tI(−,y−) = I(xi)(−,y,−) = pin+1i ∶ Cn+1 Ð→
C. Thus:
tI(−,y−) = pin+1i = pini ○ (⇀pi) = tI(⇀x) ○ (⇀pi)
• If t ≡ fi(t1, ..., tm)(⇀x)), then I(fi(t1, ..., tm)(⇀x)) = (fi)I(I(t1)(⇀x), ...,I(tm)(⇀x)) and sim-
ilarly I(fi(t1, ..., tm)(−,y,−)) = (fi)I(I(t1)(−,y,−), ...,I(tm)(−,y,−)). Thus:I(fi(t1, ..., tm)(−,y,−)) == (fi)I(I(t1)(−,y,−), ...,I(tm)(−,y,−)) == (fi)I(I(t1)(⇀x) ○ (⇀pi), ...,I(tm)(⇀x) ○ (⇀pi)) == (fi)I((I(t1)(⇀x), ...,I(tm)(⇀x)) ○ (⇀pi)) == (fi)I ○ (I(t1)(⇀x), ...,I(tm)(⇀x)) ○ (⇀pi) == I(fi(t1, ..., tm))(⇀x) ○ (⇀pi) == fiI(⇀x) ○ (⇀pi)
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(ii) Let’s proceed by induction of the complexity of the formula ϕ ∈ FormL.
• If ϕ ≡ Pj(t1, ..., tmj), then I(Pj(t1, ..., tmj)(⇀x)) =D(tI1 (⇀x)×...×tmjI(⇀x))(P Ij ) and I(Pj(t1, ..., tmj)(−,y,−)) =
D(tI1 (−,y,−) × ... × tImj (−,y,−))(P Ij ). Thus:
I(Pj(t1, ..., tmj)(−,y,−)) ==D(tI1 (−,y,−) × ... × tImj (−,y,−))(P Ij ) ==D((tI1 (⇀x) ○ (⇀pi)) × ... × (tImj (⇀x) ○ (⇀pi)))(P Ij ) ==D((tI1 (⇀x) × ... × tImj (⇀x)) ○ (⇀pi))(P Ij ) ==D(tI1 (⇀x) × ... × tImj (⇀x)) ○D(⇀pi)(P Ij ) ==D(⇀pi) ○D(tI1 (⇀x) × ... × tImj (⇀x))(P Ij ) ==D(⇀pi) ○ (I(Pj(t1, ..., tmj)(⇀x)))
• If ϕ ≡ ψ ∧ χ, then by induction hypothesis and as D(⇀pi) respects ∧:
I(ψ ∧ χ)(−,y,−) == I(ψ)(−,y,−) ∧ I(χ)(−,y,−) ==D(⇀pi)(I(ψ)(⇀x)) ∧D(⇀pi)(I(χ)(⇀x)) ==D(⇀pi)(I(ψ)(⇀x) ∧ I(χ)(⇀x)) ==D(⇀pi)(I(ψ ∧ χ)(⇀x))
• If ϕ ≡ ψ ∨ χ, then by induction hypothesis and as D(⇀pi) respects ∨:
I(ψ ∨ χ)(−,y,−) == I(ψ)(−,y,−) ∨ I(χ)(−,y,−) ==D(⇀pi)(I(ψ)(⇀x)) ∨D(⇀pi)(I(χ)(⇀x)) ==D(⇀pi)(I(ψ)(⇀x) ∨ I(χ)(⇀x)) ==D(⇀pi)(I(ψ ∨ χ)(⇀x))
• If ϕ ≡ ¬ψ, then by induction hypothesis and as D(⇀pi) respects ¬:
I(¬ψ)(−,y,−) == ¬I(ψ)(−,y,−) == ¬D(⇀pi)(I(ψ)(⇀x)) ==D(⇀pi)(¬I(ψ)(⇀x) ==D(⇀pi)(I(¬ψ)(⇀x))
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• If ϕ ≡ ψ → χ, then by induction hypothesis and as D(⇀pi) respects →:
I(ψ → χ)(−,y,−) == I(ψ)(−,y,−) → I(χ)(−,y,−) ==D(⇀pi)(I(ψ)(⇀x))→D(⇀pi)(I(χ)(⇀x)) ==D(⇀pi)(I(ψ)(⇀x) → I(χ)(⇀x)) ==D(⇀pi)(I(ψ → χ)(⇀x))
• If ϕ ≡ ∀xn+1.ψ(⇀x,xn+1), then by induction hypothesis and by the Beck-Chevalley con-
ditions:
I(∀xn+1.ψ(⇀x,xn+1))(−,y,−,) == ∀pin+1I(ψ(⇀x,xn+1))(−,y,−,xn+1)) == ∀pin+1(D(⇀pi,pin+1)(I(ψ(⇀x,xn+1))(⇀x,xn+1))) ==D(⇀pi)(∀pin+1(I(ψ(⇀x,xn+1))(⇀x))) ==D(⇀pi)(I(∀xn+1.ψ(⇀x,xn+1))(⇀x)) =
• If ϕ ≡ ∃xn+1.ψ(⇀x,xn+1), then by induction hypothesis and by the Beck-Chevalley con-
ditions:
I(∃xn+1.ψ(⇀x,xn+1))(−,y,−,) == ∃pin+1I(ψ(⇀x,xn+1))(−,y,−,xn+1)) == ∃pin+1(D(⇀pi,pin+1)(I(ψ(⇀x,xn+1))(⇀x,xn+1))) ==D(⇀pi)(∃pin+1(I(ψ(⇀x,xn+1))(⇀x))) ==D(⇀pi)(I(∃xn+1.ψ(⇀x,xn+1))(⇀x)) =
Lemma 8.2 (substitution). Let L be a language for the intuitionistic predicative logic and let
D be a hyperdoctrine for the intuitionistic logic from a category C. Let t(x1,...,xn) be a term and
ϕ(x1,...,xn) ∈ FormL a formula, with free variables among x1, ...xn. Then:
(i) I(t(x1,...,xn)[s/xi]) = tI ○ (pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)
(ii) I(ϕ(x1,...,xn)[s/xi]) =D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(I(ϕ)(x1,...,xn))
Proof. In the interests of brevity, we will write (⇀x) ≡ (x1, ..., xn) and (−, s/xi,−) ≡ (x1/x1, ..., s/xi, ..., xn/xn),
though we will refrain from writing the dependence of the formulas on free variables.
(i) Let’s proceed by induction on the complexity of the term t.
• If t ≡ xi, then: I(t(⇀x)[s/xi]) = I(xi[s/xi]) = sI
and
tI ○ (pi1 × ...× sI × ...×pin) = xiI ○ (pi1 × ...× sI × ...×pin) = pii ○ (pi1 × ...× sI × ...×pin) = sI
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If t ≡ xj with j ≠ i, then:
I(t(⇀x)[s/xi]) = I(xj[s/xi]) = pij
and
tI ○ (pi1 × ...× sI × ...×pin) = xjI ○ (pi1 × ...× sI × ...×pin) = pij ○ (pi1 × ...× sI × ...×pin) = pij
• If t ≡ fj(t1, ..., tmj), then: I(t(⇀x)[s/xi]) == I(fj(t1, ..., tmj)[s/xi]) == (fj)I ○ (t1[s/xi]I , ..., tmj [s/xi]I) == (fj)I ○ (tI1 (pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin), ..., tImj(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)) == (fj)I ○ ((tI1 , ..., tImj) ○ (pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)) == (fj)I ○ (tI1 , ..., tImj) ○ (pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin) == (fj(t1, ..., tmj))I ○ (pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)
(ii) Let’s proceed by induction of the complexity of the formula ϕ ∈ FormL.
• If ϕ ≡ Pj(t1, ..., tmj), then by definition and by the previous point of the proof:I(Pj(t1, ..., tmj)[s/xi]) ==D(t1[s/xi]I × ... × tmj [s/xi]I)(P Ij ) ==D(tI1 ○ (pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin) × ... × tImj ○ (pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin))(P Ij ) ==D((tI1 × ... × tImj) ○ (pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin))(P Ij ) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin) ○D(tI1 × ... × tImj)(P Ij ) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(I(Pj(t1, ..., tmj)))
• If ϕ ≡ ψ∧χ, then by definition and by induction hypothesis and as D(pi1×...×sI×...×pin)
respects ∧:
I((ψ ∧ χ)[s/xi]) == I(ψ[s/xi]) ∧ I(χ[s/xi]) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(I(ψ)) ∧D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(I(χ)) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(I(ψ) ∧ I(χ)) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(I(ψ ∧ χ))
• If ϕ ≡ ψ∨χ, then by definition and by induction hypothesis and as D(pi1×...×sI×...×pin)
respects ∨:
I((ψ ∨ χ)[s/xi]) == I(ψ[s/xi]) ∨ I(χ[s/xi]) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(I(ψ)) ∨D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(I(χ)) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(I(ψ) ∨ I(χ)) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(I(ψ ∨ χ))
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• If ϕ ≡ ¬ψ, then by definition and by induction hypothesis and as D(pi1× ...×sI × ...×pin)
respects ¬:
I((¬ψ)[s/xi]) == ¬I(ψ[s/xi]) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(¬I(ψ)) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(I(¬ψ))
• If ϕ ≡ ψ → χ, then by definition and by induction hypothesis and as D(pi1×...×sI×...×pin)
respects →:
I((ψ → χ)[s/xi]) == I(ψ[s/xi])→ I(χ[s/xi]) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(I(ψ))→D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(I(χ)) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(I(ψ)→ I(χ)) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(I(ψ → χ))
• If ϕ ≡ ∀xn+1.ψ(⇀x,xn+1), then by definition and by induction hypothesis and by Beck-
Chevalley conditions:
I(∀xn+1.ψ(⇀x,xn+1)[s/xi]) == ∀pin+1(I(ψ(⇀x,xn+1)[s/xi])) == ∀pin+1(D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin × pin+1)(I(ψ(⇀x,xn+1)))) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin × pin+1)(∀pin+1I(ψ(⇀x,xn+1))) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin × pin+1)(I(∀xn+1.ψ(⇀x,xn+1)))
• If ϕ ≡ ∃xn+1.ψ(⇀x,xn+1), then by definition and by induction hypothesis and by Beck-
Chevalley conditions:
I(∃xn+1.ψ(⇀x,xn+1)[s/xi]) == ∃pin+1(I(ψ(⇀x,xn+1)[s/xi])) == ∃pin+1(D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin × pin+1)(I(ψ(⇀x,xn+1)))) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin × pin+1)(∃pin+1I(ψ(⇀x,xn+1))) ==D(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin × pin+1)(I(∃xn+1.ψ(⇀x,xn+1)))
Lemma 8.3. Let L be a language for the intuitionistic predicative logic and let D be a hyperdoctrine
for the intuitionistic logic from a category C. Let’s consider the assignation cIi = ci, fIi = fi and
Pj(t1, ..., tmj)I = [Pj(t1, ..., tmj)]. Then for every ϕ(x1,...,xn) ∈ FormL with free variables among(x1, ..., xn): I(ϕ)(x1,...,xn) = [ϕ(x1,...,xn)]
where [ϕ(x1,...,xn)] is the equivalent class of the proposition ϕ in the Lindenbaum algebra A(L)
based on the language L.
Proof. Let’s proceed by induction on the complexity of the formula ϕ ∈ FormL.
• If ϕ ≡ Pj(t1, ..., tmj), then Pj(t1, ..., tmj)I = [Pj(t1, ..., tmj)] by hypothesis.
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• If ϕ ≡ ψ ∧ χ, then: I(ϕ)(x1,...,xn) == I(ψ ∧ χ)(x1,...,xn) == I(ψ)(x1,...,xn) ∧ I(χ)(x1,...,xn) ind.hyp.== [ψ(x1,...,xn)] ∧ [χ(x1,...,xn)] == [(ψ ∧ χ)(x1,...,xn)]
• If ϕ ≡ ψ ∨ χ, then: I(ϕ)(x1,...,xn) == I(ψ ∨ χ)(x1,...,xn) == I(ψ)(x1,...,xn) ∨ I(χ)(x1,...,xn) ind.hyp.== [ψ(x1,...,xn)] ∨ [χ(x1,...,xn)] == [(ψ ∨ χ)(x1,...,xn)]
• If ϕ ≡ ¬ψ, then: I(ϕ)(x1,...,xn) == I(¬ψ)(x1,...,xn) == ¬I(ψ)(x1,...,xn) ind.hyp.== ¬[ψ(x1,...,xn)] == [(¬ψ)(x1,...,xn)]
• If ϕ ≡ ψ → χ, then: I(ϕ)(x1,...,xn) == I(ψ → χ)(x1,...,xn) == I(ψ)(x1,...,xn) → I(χ)(x1,...,xn) ind.hyp.== [ψ(x1,...,xn)]→ [χ(x1,...,xn)] == [(ψ → χ)(x1,...,xn)]
• If ϕ ≡ ∀xn+1.ψ(xn+1)(x1,...,xn), then: I(ϕ)(x1,...,xn) == I(∀xn+1.ψ(xn+1))(x1,...,xn) == ∀pin+1I(ψ(xn+1))(x1,...,xn) ind.hyp.== ∀pin+1[ψ((xn+1)(x1,...,xn)] == [(∀xn+1.ψ(xn+1))(x1,...,xn)]
• If ϕ ≡ ∃xn+1.ψ(xn+1)(x1,...,xn), then: I(ϕ)(x1,...,xn) == I(∃xn+1.ψ(xn+1))(x1,...,xn) == ∃pin+1I(ψ(xn+1))(x1,...,xn) ind.hyp.== ∃pin+1[ψ((xn+1)(x1,...,xn)] == [(∃xn+1.ψ(xn+1))(x1,...,xn)]
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8.2 Theorem of Soundness and Completeness for predicate
logic
Theorem 8.1 (Soundness). Let L be a language for the (either intuitionistic or classical) pred-
icative logic and let FormL be the set of its formulas. Let Γ(x1,...,xn), ϕ(x1,...,xn) ∈ FormL. If
Γ(x1,...,xn) ⊢ ϕ(x1,...,xn), then for every hyperdoctrine D and assignation cIi , fIi , P Ij : ID(Γ) ≤ID(ϕ) in D(Cn).
Proof. We restrict to the case of the intuitionistic predicative logic, and we make use of the
intuitionistic sequent calculus. Also, we omit the dependence of a formula on the free variables
x1, ..., xn in the notation. Let’s suppose that pi is a sequent calculus derivation tree for the sequent
Γ ⊢ ϕ and let’s proceed by induction on the complexity of the derivation tree pi. Let D be a
hyperdoctrine.
Let’s consider the base cases:
• The sequent Γ ⊢ ϕ is the axiom id − ax, thus Γ ≡ γ1, ..., γm, ϕ. It follows that:ID(Γ) = ID(γ1 ∧ ... ∧ γm ∧ ϕ) = ID(γ1) ∧ ... ∧ ID(γm) ∧ ID(ϕ) ≤ ID(ϕ)
• The sequent Γ ⊢ ϕ is the axiom  − ax, thus Γ ≡ γ1, ..., γm,. It follows that:ID(Γ) = ID(γ1 ∧ ... ∧ γm ∧ ) = ID(γ1) ∧ ... ∧ ID(γm) ∧ ID() = ID() ≤ ID(ϕ)
• The sequent Γ ⊢ ϕ is the axiom ⊺ − ax, thus ϕ ≡ ⊺. As a trivial consequence:
ID(Γ) ≤ ID(⊺) = ID(ϕ)
Let’s consider the inductive steps:
• Let’s suppose that the last step of pi is the application of the ∧l rule, in case Γ ≡ Γ′, α ∧ β:
..... pi
′
Γ′, α, β ⊢ ϕ ∧l
Γ′, α ∧ β ⊢ ϕ
By induction hypothesis we have that ID(Γ′ ∧ α ∧ β) ≤ ID(ϕ), so by definition of interpre-
tation: ID(Γ′ ∧ α ∧ β) = ID(Γ′) ∧ ID(α ∧ β) ≤ ID(ϕ)
• Let’s suppose that the last step of pi is the application of the ∧r rule, in case ϕ ≡ ψ ∧ χ:
..... pi
′
Γ ⊢ ψ
..... pi
′′
Γ ⊢ χ ∧r
Γ ⊢ ψ ∧ χ
By induction hypothesis we have that ID(Γ) (∗)≤ ID(ψ) and ID(Γ) (∗∗)≤ ID(χ), hence:
ID(Γ) (∗∗)= ID(Γ) ∧ ID(χ) ∗∗≤ ID(ψ) ∧ ID(χ) = ID(ψ ∧ χ) = ID(ϕ)
• Let’s suppose that the last step of pi is the application of the ∨l rule, in case Γ ≡ Γ′, α ∨ β:
..... pi
′
Γ′, α ⊢ ϕ
..... pi
′′
Γ′, β ⊢ ϕ ∨l
Γ′, α ∨ β ⊢ ϕ
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By induction hypothesis we have that ID(Γ′ ∧ α) ≤ ID(ϕ) and ID(Γ′ ∧ β) ≤ ID(ϕ). By
definition of interpretation this means that ID(Γ′) ∧ ID(α) ≤ ID(ϕ) and ID(Γ′) ∧ ID(β) ≤ID(ϕ), which together can be written as(ID(Γ′) ∧ ID(α)) ∨ (ID(Γ′) ∧ ID(β)) ≤ ID(ϕ) ∨ ID(ϕ) = ID(ϕ)
By distributivity and definition of interpretation the following follows:ID(Γ′ ∧ (α ∨ β)) = ID(Γ′) ∧ ID(α ∨ β) = ID(Γ′) ∧ (ID(α) ∨ ID(β)) ≤ ID(ϕ)
• Let’s suppose that the last step of pi is the application of the ∨r1 rule (the rule ∨r2 is similar),
in case ϕ ≡ ψ ∨ χ:
..... pi
′
Γ ⊢ ψ ∨r1
Γ ⊢ ψ ∨ χ
By induction hypothesis we have that ID(Γ) ≤ ID(ψ), hence:ID(Γ) ≤ ID(ψ) ≤ ID(ψ) ∨ ID(χ) = ID(ψ ∨ χ)
• Let’s suppose that the last step of pi is the application of the ¬l rule, in case Γ ≡ Γ′,¬α:
..... pi
′
Γ′,¬α ⊢ α ¬l
Γ′,¬α ⊢ ϕ
By induction hypothesis we have that ID(Γ′) ∧ ID(¬α) = ID(Γ′ ∧ ¬α) ≤ ID(α), hence:ID(Γ′)∧ID(¬α) = ID(Γ′)∧ID(¬α)∧ID(¬α) ≤ ID(α)∧ID(¬α) = ID(α∧¬α) ≤ ID() ≤ ID(ϕ)
• Let’s suppose that the last step of pi is the application of the ¬r rule, in case ϕ ≡ ¬ψ:
..... pi
′
Γ, ψ ⊢ ¬r
Γ ⊢ ¬ψ
By induction hypothesis we have that ID(Γ) ∧ ID(ψ) = ID(Γ′ ∧ ψ) ≤ ID(), hence by
definition of implication:ID(Γ) ≤ ID(ψ)→ ID() = ID(ψ → ) ≤ ID(¬ψ)
• Let’s suppose that the last step of pi is the application of the → l rule, in case Γ ≡ Γ′, α → β:
..... pi
′
Γ′ ⊢ α
..... pi
′′
Γ′, β ⊢ ϕ → l
Γ′, α → β ⊢ ϕ
By induction hypothesis we have that ID(Γ′) (1)≤ ID(α) and ID(Γ′ ∧ β) = ID(Γ′) ∧ ID(β) ≤ID(ϕ). By definition of implication, the last disequality can be expressed as ID(β) (2)≤ID(Γ′)→ ID(ϕ). Since in every Heyting algebra x ∧ (x→ y) ≤ y holds, we gather that:
ID(Γ′) ∧ (ID(α)→ ID(β)) (1)≤ ID(α) ∧ (ID(α)→ ID(β)) ≤ ID(β) (2)≤ ID(Γ) ∧ ID(ϕ)
and again by definition of implication:ID(Γ′ ∧α → β) = ID(Γ′)∧ (ID(α)→ ID(β)) = ID(Γ′)∧ (ID(α)→ ID(β))∧ID(Γ′) ≤ ID(ϕ)
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• Let’s suppose that the last step of pi is the application of the → r rule, in case ϕ ≡ ψ → χ:
..... pi
′
Γ, ψ ⊢ χ → r
Γ ⊢ ψ → χ
By induction hypothesis we have that ID(Γ) ∧ ID(ψ) = ID(Γ ∧ ψ) ≤ ID(χ), hence by
definition of implication: ID(Γ) ≤ ID(ψ)→ ID(χ) = ID(ψ → χ)
• Let’s suppose that the last step of pi is the application of the ∀l rule, in case Γ ≡ Γ′,∀xn.α(x1, ..., xn):
..... pi
′
Γ′,∀xn.α(x1, ..., xn), α[t/xn] ⊢ ϕ ∀l
Γ′,∀xn.α(x1, ..., xn) ⊢ ϕ
By induction hypothesis we have that ID(Γ′ ∧∀xn.α(x1, ..., xn)∧α[t/xn]) ≤ ID(ϕ) and the
following equivalences hold (due to the substitution Lemma (8.2) and the weakening Lemma
(8.1)): ID(Γ′ ∧ ∀xn.α(x1, ..., xn) ∧ α[t/xn]) ≤ ID(ϕ)⇕ID(Γ′) ∧ ID(∀xn.α(x1, ..., xn)) ∧ ID(α[t/xn]) ≤ ID(ϕ)⇕ID(Γ′) ∧ ID(∀xn.α(x1, ..., xn)) ∧D(pi1 × ... × pin+1 × tI)(ID(α(x1, ..., xn))) ≤ ID(ϕ)⇕ID(Γ′) ∧D(pi1 × ... × pin+1 × tI)(ID(∀xn.α(x1, ..., xn)) ∧ ID(α(x1, ..., xn))) ≤ ID(ϕ)⇕ID(Γ′) ∧D(pi1 × ... × pin+1 × tI)(ID(∀xn.α(x1, ..., xn) ∧ α(x1, ..., xn))) ≤ ID(ϕ)⇕ID(Γ′) ∧D(pi1 × ... × pin+1 × tI)(ID(∀xn.α(x1, ..., xn))) ≤ ID(ϕ)⇕ID(Γ′) ∧ ID(∀xn.α(x1, ..., xn)) ≤ ID(ϕ)⇕ID(Γ′ ∧ ∀xn.α(x1, ..., xn)) ≤ ID(ϕ)
• Let’s suppose that the last step of pi is the application of the ∀r rule, in case ϕ ≡ ∀xn.ψ(x1, ..., xn):
..... pi
′
Γ ⊢ ψ[w/xn] ∀r(w ∉ FV (Γ,∀xn.ψ(x1, ..., xn)))
Γ ⊢ ∀xn.ψ(x1, ..., xn)
By induction hypothesis we have that ID(Γ) ≤ ID(ψ[w/xn]), hence by substitution Lemma
(8.2): ID(Γ) ≤D(pi1 × ... × pin−1 ×wI)(ID(ψ)). In addition, since w ∉ FV (Γ), by weakening
Lemma (8.1) we have that D(pi1 × ... × pin−1)(ID(Γ)(x1,...,xn−1)) = ID(Γ)(x1,...,xn−1). Finally,
by the definition of hyperdoctrine there is an adjunction D(pin) ⊣ ∀pin such that:ID(Γ)(x1,...,xn−1) =D(pi1 × ... × pin−1)(ID(Γ)(x1,...,xn−1)) ≤ ID(ψ[w/xn])⇕ID(Γ) ≤ ∀pinID(ψ(x1, ..., xn)) = ID(∀xn.ψ(x1, ..., xn))
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• Let’s suppose that the last step of pi is the application of the ∃l rule, in case Γ ≡ Γ′,∃xn.α(x1, ..., xn):
..... pi
′
Γ′, α[w/xn] ⊢ ϕ ∃l(w ∉ FV (Γ′,∃xn.α(x1, ..., xn), ϕ))
Γ′,∃xn.α(x1, ..., xn) ⊢ ϕ
By induction hypothesis we have that ID(Γ′ ∧ α[w/xn]) = ID(Γ′) ∧ ID(α[w/xn]) ≤ ID(ϕ),
so by substitution Lemma (8.2): ID(Γ′)∧D(pi1 × ...×pin−1 ×wI)(ID(α)) ≤ ID(ϕ). Since w ∉
FV (Γ′, ϕ), by applying weakening Lemma (8.1) we gather that ID(Γ′)(x1,...,xn−1) =D(pi1×...×
pin−1)(ID(Γ′)(x1,...,xn−1)) and ID(ϕ)(x1,...,xn−1) =D(pi1 × ...×pin−1)(ID(ϕ)(x1,...,xn−1)). Using
the properties of a Heyting algebra and the adjunction in the definition of hyperdoctrine,
we deduce:
D(pi1 × ... × pin−1)(ID(Γ′)) ∧ ID(α[w/xn]) ≤D(pi1 × ... × pin−1)(ID(ϕ))⇕ID(α[w/xn]) ≤D(pi1 × ... × pin−1)(ID(Γ′))→D(pi1 × ... × pin−1)(ID(ϕ))⇕ID(α[w/xn]) ≤D(pi1 × ... × pin−1)(ID(Γ′)→ ID(ϕ))⇕∃pinID(α(x1, ..., xn)) ≤ ID(Γ′)→ ID(ϕ)⇕ID(Γ′) ∧ ∃pinID(α(x1, ..., xn)) ≤ ID(ϕ)⇕ID(Γ′) ∧ ID(∃xn.α(x1, ..., xn)) ≤ ID(ϕ)⇕ID(Γ′ ∧ ∃xn.α(x1, ..., xn)) ≤ ID(ϕ)
• Let’s suppose that the last step of pi is the application of the ∃r rule, in case ϕ ≡ ∃xn.ψ(x1, ..., xn):
..... pi
′
Γ ⊢ ψ[t/xn] ∃r
Γ ⊢ ∃xn.ψ(x1, ..., xn)
Trivially, ∃pin(ID(ψ(x1, ..., xn)) ≤ ∃pin(ID(ψ(x1, ..., xn)), and due to the adjunction in the
definition of hyperdoctrine, this is equivalent to:ID(ψ(x1, ..., xn)) ≤D(pi1 × ...pin−1)(∃pinID(ψ(x1, ..., xn)))
By applying D(pi1 × ... × pin−1 × tI) to both sides, the following equivalences hold (owing to
the substitution Lemma (8.2)):
D(pi1 × ... × pin−1 × tI)(ID(ψ(x1, ..., xn))) ≤D(pi1 × ... × pin−1 × tI)D(pi1 × ...pin−1)(∃pinID(ψ(x1, ..., xn)))⇕ID(ψ[t/xn]) ≤D((pi1 × ... × pin−1 × tI) ○ (pi1 × ...pin−1))(∃pinID(ψ(x1, ..., xn)))⇕ID(ψ[t/xn]) ≤ ∃pinID(ψ(x1, ..., xn))⇕ID(ψ[t/xn]) ≤ ID(∃xn.ψ(x1, ..., xn))
By induction hypothesis we have that ID(Γ) ≤ ID(ψ[t/xn]) =D(pi1×...×pin×tI)(I(ψ(x1, ..., xn)).
Concluding: ID(Γ) ≤ ID(ψ[t/xn]) ≤ ID(∃xn.ψ(x1, ..., xn)), hence: ID(Γ) ≤ ID(∃xn.ψ(x1, ..., xn)).
110 CHAPTER 8. SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS
Theorem 8.2 (Completeness). Let L be a language for the (either intuitionistic or classical)
predicative logic and let FormL be the set of its formulas. Let Γ(x1,...,xn), ϕ(x1,...,xn) ∈ FormL. IfID(Γ) ≤ ID(ϕ) in D(Cn) for every hyperdoctrine D and assignation cIi , fIi , P Ij , then: Γ(x1,...,xn) ⊢
ϕ(x1,...,xn).
Proof. Similarly to the previous proof, we consider the case of the intuitionistic predicative logic.
Let’s suppose that for every hyperdoctrine D and assignation cIi , fIi , P Ij ID(Γ) ≤ ID(ϕ) holds.
In particular, let’s consider the identical assignation cIi = ci, fIi = fi and Pj(t1, ..., tmj)I =
Pj(t1, ..., tmj). By Lemma (8.3), I is the identical interpretation, hence ID(Γ) ≤ ID(ϕ) is equiv-
alent to [Γ] ≤ [ϕ], which means that Γ(x1,...,xn) ⊢ ϕ(x1,...,xn).
8.3 Adding the equality to the language: a new kind of
interpretation
Let’s consider a language L for the intuitionistic predicate logic with equality (we could as well
naturally extend what is going to follow to the case of classical logic). We need to modify the
interpretation of Definition (8.1), in order to be able to interpret statements with equality in a
given Heyting algebra.
The most general idea is foreseeable. Let’s consider a language L for the intuitionistic predica-
tive logic with equality IL=, where (ci)i∈I are constants, (fi)i∈I are terms and (Pj)j∈J are atomic
predicates. Let C be a category with all finite products and let D= be a hyperdoctrine for IL=.
Given C ∈ Ob(C), let be given an assignation:
• (ci)I ∶ 1Ð→ C;
• (fi)I ∶ Cni Ð→ C where ni is the arity of fi;
• (Pj)I ∈D=(Cnj) where nj is the arity of Pj , and in particular =I≡ δC ∈D=(C2) where δC is
the fibred equality on the object C.
We define then the interpretation of terms and formulas based on the hyperdoctrine D= by in-
duction on the construction of terms and formulas as in Definition (8.1), with the addition of the
interpretation for formulas with the equality predicates:
ID=((t = t′)(x1,...,xn)) ∶=D=(tI × t′I)(δC)
The proof of the Theorem of Soundness and Completeness retraces exactly the same ideas of the
previous sections of this chapter.
Having said that, we would like to tackle the proof of the Theorem of Soundness and Complete-
ness for predicative logic with equality in a more specific way, enunciating it for some particular
kinds of hyperdoctrines, namely the H-valued sets (with H a given Heyting algebra). Indeed,
those hyperdoctrines are really useful and handy when trying to construct counterexamples.
First of all, we recall that the equality is a binary equivalent relation, thus being reflexive,
simmetric and transitive, which has to be evaluated in a given complete Heyting algebra (in the
case of intuitionistic logic, which we decided to take under examination). For the sake of semplicity,
let’s suppose that the ”objects”2 over which we can express equality predicates are in a set A and
let’s also fix a complete Heyting algebra H in which we decide to evaluate the equality predicates.
Then the most naive way to formalize equality is the following:=∶ A ×A Ð→ H
(x, y) z→ ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩⊺ if x = y if x ≠ y (8.1)
2There is no categorical meaning here.
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It is easy to convince ourselves that the foregoing construction captures the essence of equality,
in some sense. Also, it can be quite easily expressed in a categorical-theoretic fashion, specifically
by means of a hyperdoctrine:
D= ∶ Cop Ð→ Ha
C z→ HC(f ∶ C Ð→D) z→ (− ○ f ∶HD Ð→HC)
where HC indicates the collection of all maps from the object C ∈ Ob(C) to the Heyting algebraH, and − ○ f ∶ HD Ð→ HC(D ϕÐ→H) z→ (C fÐ→D ϕÐ→H)
It is possible now to extend Lemma (8.1), Lemma (8.2), Lemma (8.3), Theorem (8.1) and
Theorem (8.2) to the case of predicative logic with equality, provided that the interpretation of
Definition (8.1) is properly adjusted.
Nevertheless, we do not follow this strategy, opting for a more subtle one, since construction
(8.1) has a little drawback: it is somehow ”too classical”. Indeed, according to it, the truth value
of an equality predicate could only be either ⊺ or : this is fine in the case of classical logic, but
does not go hand-in-hand with the more complex intuitionistic expressive power. Finding a way
to espress the typical intuitionistic expressive power is possible, but it requires a more ingenious
procedure, namely the use of H-valued equivalence relations and H-valued predicates.
Let’s fix a complete Heyting algebra H.
Definition 8.2. Let H be a Heyting algebra and A be a non-empty set. A function
ρ ∶ A ×AÐ→H
is said to be a H-valued equivalence relation if the following conditions are satified:
• (reflexivity) for every a, a′ ∈ A
ρ(a, a′) = 1⇔ a = a′ ∈ A
• (symmetricity) for every A,a′ ∈ A
ρ(a, a′) ≤ 3ρ(a′, a)
• (transitivity) for every a, a′, a′′ ∈ A
ρ(a, a′) ∧ ρ(a′, a′′) ≤ 4ρ(a, a′′)
Definition 8.3. Let H be a Heyting algebra, A be a non-empty set and ρ ∶ A × A Ð→ H be aH-valued equivalence relation. A function
P ∶ AÐ→H
is said to be a H-valued predicate with respect to ρ on A if the following holds:
• (substitutivity) for every a, a′ ∈ A
ρ(a, a′) ∧ P (a) ≤ P (a′)
3The condition ρ(a, a′) = ρ(a′, a) is trivially equivalent.
4One may wonder why not to ask ρ(a, a′)∧ρ(a′, a′′) = ρ(a, a′′). We do not impose this condition otherwise every
element is in the relation ρ with any other element since: ρ(a, a′) ∧ ρ(a′, a) = ρ(a, a)
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Definition 8.4. Let H be a Heyting algebra, A,A′ be non-empty sets endowed with H-valued
equivalence relations ρ ∶ A ×AÐ→H and ρ′ ∶ A′ ×A′ Ð→H. A function
f ∶ AÐ→ A′
is said to be a H-valued function with respect to ρ, ρ′ on A,A′ if the following holds:
• (substitutivity) for every a, a′ ∈ A
ρ(a, a′) ≤ ρ′(f(a), f(a′))
It can be shown that, given a H-valued equivalence relation on a set, the natural extension
of the definition to the cartesian product gives rise to a H-valued equivalence relation on the
cartesian product, where projections and pairing are H-valued functions. Also, the set of all n-aryH-valued predicates, with the punctual order, is a Heyting algebra; it is complete if H is; it is a
Boolean algebra if H is.
Usually, the foregoing notions are used in the algebraic-theoretic proof of the Theorem of
Soundness of predicate logic with equality, interpreting predicates as H-valued predicates, func-
tions as H-valued functions and equality as a H-valued equivalence relation ρ, after a complete
Heyting (Boolean, in the classical case) H is fixed.
The idea now is to stick to the same plan, though proceeding in a more general categorical-
theoretic fashion. Let’s fix a complete Heyting algebra H. We define the following new category:
Definition 8.5. The category H − Set is defined as follows:
objects an object is a couple (C,ρ) where C ∈ Ob(Set) and ρ ∶ C ×C Ð→H is such that for every
c, c′, c′′ ∈ C:
• (reflexivity) ρ(c, c) = ⊺;
• (simmetricity) ρ(c, c′) ≤ ρ(c′, c);
• (transitivity) ρ(c, c′) ∧ ρ(c′, c′′) ≤ ρ(c, c′′).
maps a map [f] ∶ (C,ρ) Ð→ (D,σ) is an equivalent class of functions f ∶ C Ð→ D such that for
every c, c′ ∈ C:
• (substitutivity) ρ(c, c′) ≤ σ(f(c), f(c′))
At this point, we can define a new hyperdoctrine that will be used to define a new kind of
interpretation as follows:
D= ∶ (H − Set)op Ð→ Ha(C,ρ) z→ {ϕ ∈HC ∣∀c, c′ ∈ C.(ϕ(c) ∧ ρ(c, c′) ≤ ϕ(c′))}([f] ∶ (C,ρ)Ð→ (D,σ)) z→ (− ○ [f] ∶D=(D,σ)Ð→D=(C,ρ))
Before introducing the Definition (8.6) of interpretation for predicative logic with equality in
the particular case we are studying, we need to verify that the functor D= is indeed a hyperdoctrine,
thus we need to show that the category (H − Set)op has all finite products (it suffices to show it
has all binary products), that for every projection pii ∶ (C1, ρ1)×(C2, ρ2)Ð→ (Ci, ρi) in (H−Set)op
there are a left adjoint ∃pii and a right adjoint ∀pii to D=(pii) respecting the Beck-Chevalley and
Frobenius conditions as requested by Definition (7.4), that for every object (C,ρ) ∈ Ob((H−Set)op)
there exists the fibred equality δ(C,ρ) on the object (C,ρ) as requested by Definition (7.6). For
the sake of semplicity, we will write objects (C,ρ) of (H−Set)op without specifying the H-valued
equivalence relation ρ associated to the set C, unless it is necessary.
First of all, let’s consider two objects (C1, ρ1) and (C2, ρ2) in (H−Set)op. Their binary product
is the object (C1 ×C2, ρ1 × ρ2), where C1 ×C2 is the cartesian product of the sets C1 and C2 and
ρ1 × ρ2 ∶ (C1 ×C2) × (C1 ×C2) Ð→ H((c1, c2), (c′1, c′2)) z→ ρ1(c1, c′1) ∧ ρ2(c2, c′2)
Trivially, ρ1 × ρ2 respects reflexivity, simmetricity, transitivity and substitutivity, as Definition
(8.5) requires, since ρ1 and ρ2 do:
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• ρ1(c1, c1) ∧ ρ2(c2, c2) = ⊺ ∧ ⊺ = ⊺ for every c1 ∈ C1 and c2 ∈ C2;
• ρ1(c1, c′1) ∧ ρ2(c2, c′2) ≤ ρ1(c′1, c1) ∧ ρ2(c2, c′2) for every c1, c′1 ∈ C1 and c2, c′2 ∈ C2;
• (ρ1(c1, c′1) ∧ ρ2(c2, c′2)) ∧ (ρ1(c′1, c′′1) ∧ ρ2(c′2, c′′2)) ≤ (ρ1(c1, c′1) ∧ ρ1(c′1, c′′1)) ∧ (ρ2(c2, c′2) ∧
ρ2(c′2, c′′2)) ≤ ρ1(c1, c′′1) ∧ ρ2(c2, c′′2)) for every c1, c′1, c′′1 ∈ C1 and c2, c′2.c′′2 ∈ C2;
• for any map [f] ∶ (C1×C2, ρ1×ρ2)Ð→ (D,σ) in H−Set and for every c1, c′1 ∈ C1 and c2, c′2 ∈
C2: ρ1(c1, c′1)∧ρ2(c2, c′2) ≤ σ(⋀c2∈C2 f(c1, c2),⋀c2∈C2 f(c′1, c2))∧σ(⋀c1∈C1 f(c1, c2),⋀c1∈C1 f(c1, c′2))∧ ≤
σ(f(c1, c2), f(c′1, c′2))
The projections pii ∶ C1 × C2 Ð→ Ci are the canonical ones, and they really are maps in H − Set
since the condition of substitutivity in Definition (8.5) is respected, as we can see by replacing f
with pii in the last entry of the foregoing bulleted list. Also, for every object X in H − Set and
diagram of the type
X
C1 ×C2
C1 C2
f1 f2
pi1 pi2
there is a unique map f ∶ X Ð→ C1 × C2, namely f ≡ (f1, f2), such that the preceding diagram
commutes.
Let pi1 ∶ C1 ×C2 Ð→ C1 be a projection (the proof for pi2 ∶ C1 ×C2 Ð→ Ci is similar). We recall
that the image of the map pi1 through the functor D= gives rise to the map
D= ∶ D=(C1) =HC1 Ð→ D=(C1 ×C2) =HC1×C2(ϕ ∶ C1 Ð→H) (ϕ ○ pi1 ∶ C1 ×C2 Ð→H)
We define its left and right adjoints as follows:
∃pi1 ∶ D=(C1 ×C2) =HC1×C2 Ð→ D=(C1) =HC1(ψ ∶ C1 ×C2 Ð→H) Ð→ (∃x2.ψ ∶ C1 Ð→H)
where in particular (∃x2.ψ)(c1) ∶= ⋁x∈C2 ψ(c1, x) for every c1 ∈ C1, and
∀pi1 ∶ D=(C1 ×C2) Ð→ D=(C1)HC1×C2 Ð→ HC1(ψ ∶ C1 ×C2 Ð→H) z→ (∀x2.ψ ∶ C1 Ð→H)
where in particular (∃x2.ψ)(c1) ∶= ⋀x∈C2 ψ(c1, x) for every c1 ∈ C1. They indeed are left and right
adjoints to D=(pi1), since for every ϕ ∈HC1 , ψ ∈HC1×C2 :
(∃x2.ψ)(c1) ≤ ϕ(c1)⇔ ψ(c1, c2) ≤ ϕ(pi1(c1, c2)) for every c1 ∈ C1, c2 ∈ C2
that is ⋁
x∈C2 ψ(c1, x) ≤ ϕ(c1)⇔ ψ(c1, c2) ≤ ϕ(c1) for every c1 ∈ C1, c2 ∈ C2
and
ϕ(pi1(c1, c2)) ≤ ψ(c1, c2)⇔ ϕ(c1) ≤ (∀x2.ψ)(c1) for every c1 ∈ C1, c2 ∈ C2
that is
ϕ(c1) ≤ ψ(c1, c2)⇔ ϕ(c1) ≤ ⋀
x∈C2 ψ(c1, x) for every c1 ∈ C1, c2 ∈ C2
114 CHAPTER 8. SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS
The left adjoint ∃pi1 respects the Beck-Chevalley condition: given two projections pi ∶X ×C Ð→
C, pi′ ∶X ′ ×C ′ Ð→ C ′ (without loss of generality we can reduce to projections of this form) and a
pullback diagram
X ′ ×C ′ C ′
X ×C C
pi′
f ′ f
pi
the map ∃pi′D=(f ′)(β) ≤D=(f)∃pi(β) is an isomorphism for every β ∈D=(X×C) =HX×C , because
β ∈HX×C z→
D=(f ′) β ○ f ′ ∈HX′×C′ z→∃pi′ ⋁x′∈X′ β(f ′(x′,−)) = ⋁x∈X,x′∈X′ β(x, (pi ○ f ′)(x′,−)) ∈HC′
β ∈HX×C z→∃pi ⋁x∈X β(x, c) ∈HC z→D=(f) ⋁x∈X β(x, f(−)) = ⋁x∈X,x′∈X′ β(x, (f ○ pi′)(x′,−)) ∈HC′
and recalling that f ○ pi′ = pi ○ f ′ owing to the Definition (3.8) of pullback, we conclude that∃pi′D=(f ′)(β) =D=(f)∃pi(β).
It respects also the Frobenius condition: given a projection pi ∶ X × C Ð→ C, then the map∃pi(D=(pi)(α) ∧ β) ≤ α ∧ ∃pi(β) is an isomorphism for every α ∈ HC and β ∈ HX×C , because the
following holds for every x ∈X, c ∈ C:∃pi(D=(pi)(α) ∧ β)(x, c) = (α × pi)(x, c) ∧ β(x, c) = ⋁
x∈X(α ○ pi)(x, c) ∧ β(x, c) =
α(c) ∧ ⋁
x∈X β(x, c) = α(c) ∧ (∃x.β)(c) = α(c) ∧ ∃pi(β)(c)
The right adjoint ∀pi1 respects the Beck-Chevalley condition: given two projections pi ∶X×C Ð→
C, pi′ ∶X ′ ×C ′ Ð→ C ′ and a pullback diagram
X ′ ×C ′ C ′
X ×C C
pi′
f ′ f
pi
the map D=(f)∀pi(β) ≤ ∀pi′D=(f ′)(β) is an isomorphism for every β ∈D=(X×C) =HX×C , because
β ∈HX×C z→∀pi ⋀x∈X β(x, c) ∈HC z→D=(f) ⋀x∈X β(x, f(−)) = ⋀x∈X,x′∈X′ β(x, (f ○ pi′)(x′,−)) ∈HC′
β ∈HX×C z→
D=(f ′) β ○ f ′ ∈HX′×C′ z→∀pi′ ⋀x′∈X′ β(f ′(x′,−)) = ⋀x∈X,x′∈X′ β(x, (pi ○ f ′)(x′,−)) ∈HC′
and recalling that f ○ pi′ = pi ○ f ′ owing to the Definition (3.8) of pullback, we conclude that
D=(f)∀pi(β) = ∀pi′D=(f ′)(β).
Finally, let (C,ρ) be an object in (H − Set)op. We define the fibred equality on (C,ρ) by:
δ(C,ρ) ∶= ρ ∈ Ob(D=((C,ρ) × (C,ρ)))
where ρ is indeed an object of D=((C,ρ) × (C,ρ)) because ρ ∈ HC×C and ρ(c, c′) ∧ ρ(c, d) ∧
ρ(c′, d′) ≤ ρ(d, d′) thanks to simmetricity and transitivity of ρ in Definition (8.5). Let’s consider
any X ∈ Ob((H − Set)op) and the map (pi1, pi2pi2) ∶ X × C Ð→ X × C × C in (H − Set)op. The
following functors give rise to an adjunction with left adjoint:∃(pi1,pi2,pi2) ∶ D=(X ×C) =HX×C Ð→ D=(X ×C ×C) =HX×C×C
ϕ z→ D=(1X × pi2)(ϕ) ∧D=(pi2, pi2)(δC)
where D=(1X × pi2)(ϕ) ∧D=(pi2, pi2)(δC) = ϕ ○ (1X × pi2) ∧ δC ○ (pi2, pi2) = ϕ(x, c) ∧ ρ(c, c′) for all(x, c, c′) ∈X ×C ×C, and with right adjoint:
D=(pi1, pi2, pi2) ∶ D=(X ×C ×C) =HX×C×C Ð→ D=(X ×C) =HX×C
ψ z→ ψ ○ (pi1, pi2, pi2)
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This actually is an adjunction because for every ϕ ∈ HX×C , ψ ∈ HX×C×C the following holds for
every x ∈X and c, c′ ∈ C:
ϕ(x, c) ∧ ρ(c, c′) ≤ ψ(x, c, c′)⇔ ϕ(x, c) ≤ (ψ ○ (pi1, pi2, pi2))(x, c) = ψ(x, c, c)
as it can be easily shown:(⇒) If ϕ(x, c) ≤ ψ(x, c, c), then we gather:
ϕ(x, c) ∧ ρ(c, c′) ≤ ψ(x, c, c) ∧ ρ(c, c′)
and due the way D= is defined:
ϕ(x, c) ∧ ρ(c, c′) ≤ ψ(x, c, c) ∧ ρ(c, c′) ≤ ψ(x, c, c′)
(⇐) Let’s suppose that ϕ(x, c) ∧ ρ(c, c′) ≤ ψ(x, c, c′) holds. It follows that:
ϕ(x, c) ∧ ρ(c, c′) ∧ ρ(c′, c) ≤ ψ(x, c, c′) ∧ ρ(c′, c)
and by the definition of implication in a Heyting algebra:
ϕ(x, c) ≤ ρ(c, c′) ∧ ρ(c′, c)→ ψ(x, c, c′) ∧ ρ(c′, c)
However, by transitivity and reflexivity of ρ (Definition (8.5)) ρ(c, c′) ∧ ρ(c′, c) ≤ ρ(c, c) = ⊺, so:
ϕ(x, c) ≤ ρ(c, c)→ ψ(x, c, c′) ∧ ρ(c′, c)
and again due to the fact that we are working in a Heyting algebra:
ϕ(x, c) ∧ ρ(c, c) ≤ ψ(x, c, c′) ∧ ρ(c′, c)
hence, using again the definition of D=, we can conclude:
ϕ(x, c) = ϕ(x, c) ∧ ⊺ = ϕ(x, c) ∧ ρ(c, c) ≤ ψ(x, c, c′) ∧ ρ(c′, c) ≤ ψ(x, c, c)
In the end, we have proved that D= is in fact a hyperdoctrine for the intuitionistic predicative
logic with equality IL=, and we can now stick to the plan we announced some lines above.
Definition 8.6. Let L be a language for the (intuitionistic or classical) predicative logic with
equality =, let (ci)i∈I be symbols for constants, (fi)i∈I be symbols for terms, (Pj)j∈J be symbols for
predicates. Let H be a complete Heyting algebra and let D= be the hyperdoctrine as we defined it
above. Given (C,ρ) ∈ Ob(H − Set), let be given an assignation:
• (ci)I ∶ (1, δ)Ð→ (C,ρ), where
δ ∶ 1 × 1 Ð→ H(⋅, ⋅) z→ ⊺
• (fi)I ∶ (C,ρ)ni Ð→ (C,ρ), where ni is the arity of fi and (C,ρ)ni ∶= (Cni , ρni) with
ρni ∶ Cni ×Cni Ð→ H(c1, ...cni , c̃1, ..., c̃ni) z→ ρ(c1, c̃1) ∧ ... ∧ ρ(cni , c̃ni)
• (Pj)I ∈ D=((C,ρ)nj) = {ϕ ∈ HCnj ∣ϕ(c1, ..., cnj) ∧ ρ(c1, c′1) ∧ ... ∧ ρ(cnj , c′nj) ≤ ϕ(c′1, ..., c′nj)},
where nj is the arity of Pj.
We define the interpretation of terms and formulas based on the hyperdoctrine D= by
induction on the construction of terms and formulas.
The term interpretation of a term t(x1,...,xn), with free variables among x1, ..., xn, is a map
tI ∶ (C,ρ)n Ð→ (C,ρ)
in C, defined by induction as follows:
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• I(xi(x1,...,xn)) ∶= pii ∶ (C,ρ)n Ð→ (C,ρ) with pii projection
• I(fi(t1, ..., tm)(x1,...,xn)) ∶= (fi)I(I(t1), ...,I(tm))
The formula interpretation of a formula ϕ(x1,...,xn), with free variables among x1, ..., xn, is
the assignation I(ϕ(x1,...,xn)) ∈D=((C,ρ)n)
defined by induction on the complexity of the formula ϕ(x1, ..., xn) as follows:
• I(Pj(t1, ..., tmj)(x1,...,xn)) ∶=D=(tI1 × ... × tImj)(P Ij )
• I((t = t′)(x1,...,xn)) ∶=D=(tI × t′I)(ρ) with t, t′ terms and ρ ∈D=((C,ρ)2)5
• I(¬ψ)(x1,...,xn) ∶= ¬I(ψ)(x1,...,xn) ∈D=((C,ρ)n)
• I(ψ ∧ χ)(x1,...,xn) ∶= I(ψ(x1,...,xn)) ∧ I(χ(x1,...,xn)) ∈D=((C,ρ)n)
• I(ψ ∨ χ)(x1,...,xn) ∶= I(ψ(x1,...,xn)) ∨ I(χ(x1,...,xn)) ∈D=((C,ρ)n)
• I(ψ → χ)(x1,...,xn) ∶= I(ψ(x1,...,xn))→ I(χ(x1,...,xn)) ∈D=((C,ρ)n)
• I(∀xn+1.ψ(xn+1))(x1,...,xn) ∶= ∀pin+1I(ψ(x1,...,xn)) ∈D=((C,ρ)n)
• I(∃xn+1.ψ(xn+1))(x1,...,xn) ∶= ∃pin+1I(ψ(x1,...,xn)) ∈D=((C,ρ)n)
As we did before, we need to verify the validity of weakening and substitution Lemma and to
check that the identical assignation gives rise to the identical interpretation (so our definition of
interpretation works exactly as it is supposed to).
In the interest of brevity, we consider only the intuitionistic case, as the classical case is a
simple generalization of it.
Lemma 8.4 (weakening). Let L be a language for the intuitionistic predicative logic with equality
and let D= be the hyperdoctrine as in Definition (8.5). Let t(x1,...,xn) be a term and ϕ(x1,...,xn) ∈
FormL a formula, with free variables among x1, ...xn and y ≠ xi (i = 1, ..., n). Then:
(i) I(t)(x1,...xj ,y,xj+1,...,xn) = tI(x1,...xj ,xj+1,...,xn) ○ (pi1 × ... × pij × pij+1 × ... × pin)
(ii) I(ϕ)(x1,...xj ,y,xj+1,...,xn) =D(pi1 × ... × pij × pij+1 × ... × pin)(I(ϕ)(x1,...xj ,xj+1,...,xn))
Proof. It follows straightforwardly from Lemma (8.1) with C ≡ H − Set and from the fact that
(using the same notation of Lemma (8.1)) if also t′(x1,...,xn) is a term then:I((t = t′)(−,y,−)) ==D=(tI(−,y,−) × t′I(−,y,−))(ρ) ==D=((tI(⇀x) ○ (⇀pi)) × (t′I(⇀x) ○ (⇀pi)))(ρ) ==D=((tI(⇀x) × t′I(⇀x)) ○ (⇀pi))(ρ) ==D=(tI(⇀x) × t′I(⇀x)) ○D=(⇀pi)(ρ) ==D=(⇀pi) ○D=(tI(⇀x) × t′I(⇀x))(ρ) ==D=(⇀pi) ○ (I(t = t′)(⇀x))
5Indeed, by transitivity and simmetricity in Definition (8.5):
ρ(t, t′) ∧ ρ(s, s) ∧ ρ(s′, s′) ≤ ρ(t, s) ∧ ρ(t, s′) ≤ ρ(s, t) ∧ ρ(t, s′) ≤ ρ(s, s′)
8.4. THEOREMOF SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS FOR PREDICATE LOGICWITH EQUALITY117
Lemma 8.5 (substitution). Let L be a language for the intuitionistic predicative logic with equality
and let D= be the hyperdoctrine as in Definition (8.5). Let t(x1,...,xn) be a term and ϕ(x1,...,xn) ∈
FormL a formula, with free variables among x1, ...xn. Then:
(i) I(t(x1,...,xn)[s/xi]) = tI ○ (pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)
(ii) I(ϕ(x1,...,xn)[s/xi]) =D=(pi1 × ... × sI × ... × pin)(I(ϕ)(x1,...,xn))
Proof. It follows straightforwardly from Lemma (8.2) with C ≡ H − Set and from the fact that
(using the same notation of Lemma (8.2)) if also t′(x1,...,xn) is a term then:I((t = t′)[s/xi]) ==D=(t[s/xi]I , t′[s/xi]I)(ρ) ==D=(tI ○ (pi1 × sI × pi2) × t′I ○ (pi1 × sI × pi2))(ρ) ==D=((tI × t′I) ○ (pi1 × sI × pi2))(ρ) ==D=(pi1 × sI × pi2) ○D=(tI × t′I)(ρ) ==D=(pi1 × sI × pi2)(I(t = t′))
Lemma 8.6. Let L be a language for the intuitionistic predicative logic with equality and let
D= be the hyperdoctrine as in Definition (8.5). Let’s consider the assignation cIi = ci, fIi =
fi, Pj(t1, ..., tmj)I = [Pj(t1, ..., tmj)] and let ρ be the equivalent class of th equality of the given
language. Then for every ϕ(x1,...,xn) ∈ FormL with free variables among (x1, ..., xn):I(ϕ)(x1,...,xn) = [ϕ(x1,...,xn)]
where [ϕ(x1,...,xn)] is the equivalent class of the proposition ϕ in the Lindenbaum algebra A(L)
based on the language L.
Proof. The proof follows exactly the same steps of the proof of Theorem (8.3).
8.4 Theorem of Soundness and Completeness for predicate
logic with equality
Theorem 8.3 (Soundness). Let L be a language for the (either intuitionistic or classical) pred-
icative logic and let FormL be the set of its formulas. Let Γ(x1,...,xn), ϕ(x1,...,xn) ∈ FormL. LetH be a complete (either intuitionistic or classical) algebra and (C,ρ) ∈ Ob(H − Set) be fixed.
If Γ(x1,...,xn) ⊢ ϕ(x1,...,xn), then for every hyperdoctrine D= of the form of Definition (8.5) and
assignation cIi , fIi , P Ij : ID=(Γ) ≤ ID=(ϕ) in D=((C,ρ)n).
Proof. The proof follows exactly the same strategy of the proof of Theorem (8.1), hence it is by
induction on the complexity of the derivation tree pi of the sequent Γ ⊢ ϕ (we will use the same
abbreviations used on that occasion). Most cases were already proved in the proof of Theorem
(8.1), there are only three cases left:
• The sequent Γ ⊢ ϕ is the axiom = −ax, thus ϕ ≡ t = t for some term t. Then:
ID=(Γ) ≤ ID=(t = t) = ID=(ϕ)
since by Definition (8.6) and by reflexivity in Definition (8.5):
ID=(t = t) =D=(tI × tI)(ρ) = ⊺
and trivially ID=(Γ) ≤ ⊺ for any Γ.
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• Let’s suppose that the last step of pi is the application of the =1 rule, in case Γ ≡ Σ,Γ′(s), t = s
and ϕ ≡ ϕ(s):
..... pi
′
Σ, t = s,Γ′(t) ⊢ ϕ(t) =1
Σ,Γ′(s), t = s ⊢ ϕ(s)
By induction hypothesis we have that:
ID=(Σ ∧ t = s ∧ Γ′(s)) ≤ ID=(ϕ(s))
However, owing to substitutivity in Definition (8.3), one infers that:
ID=(Σ ∧ Γ′(s) ∧ t = s) ≤ ID=(Σ ∧ Γ′(t))
and ID=(ϕ(t) ∧ t = s) ≤ ID=(ϕ(s))
hence: ID=(Σ ∧ Γ′(s) ∧ t = s) ≤ ID=(ϕ(s)).
• Let’s suppose that the last step of pi is the application of the =2 rule, in case Γ ≡ Σ,Γ′(s), s = t
and ϕ ≡ ϕ(s):
..... pi
′
Σ, s = t,Γ′(t) ⊢ ϕ(t) =2
Σ,Γ′(s), s = t ⊢ ϕ(s)
We proceed in the same way as we did for the foregoing case.
Theorem 8.4 (Completeness). Let L be a language for the (either intuitionistic or classical)
predicative logic and let FormL be the set of its formulas. Let Γ(x1,...,xn), ϕ(x1,...,xn) ∈ FormL.
If ID=(Γ) ≤ ID=(ϕ) in D=(Cn) for every hyperdoctrine D= and assignation cIi , fIi , P Ij , then:
Γ(x1,...,xn) ⊢ ϕ(x1,...,xn).
Proof. The proof follows exactly the same strategy of the proof of Theorem (8.2), although using
Lemma (8.6) instead of Lemma (8.3).
8.5 An example
We want to give an example of the use of the notion of interpretation in Definition (8.6) in order
to produce a countermodel for the formula ∀x1∀x2.(x1 = x2 ∨ x1 ≠ x2), which we know not to be
intuitionistically valid. In other words, we want to show that
⊬HA ∀x1∀x2.(x1 = x2 ∨ ¬x1 = x2)
by exhibiting an interpretation that falsifies this sentence.
First of all, we notice that an interpretation as presented in Definition (8.6) is given by the
choice of a Heyting algebra H, the choice of an object (C,ρ) ∈ Ob(H−Setop) (which means fixing
a set C and an H-valued equivalence relation ρ) and the choice of a hyperdoctrine D= of the form
D= ∶ (H − Set)op Ð→Ha
As far as our initial purpose is concerned, we make the following choices. We consider the
Heyting algebra H ≡ τR
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given by the real numbers with the canonical topology, i.e. a subset X ⊆ R is open if and only if
it is union of open intervals (we recall that topological spaces are examples of complete Heyting
algebras). Let C ∈ Ob(Set) be a set with two elements
C ≡ {c, c′}
and let’s define a τR-valued equivalence relation ρ on C by:
ρ ∶ C ×C Ð→ τR(c1, c1) z→ {1}(c2, c2) z→ {1}(c1, c2) z→ ]0,1[(c2, c1) z→ ]0,1[
We consider the hyperdoctrine for predicative intuitionistic logic with equality IL=:
D= ∶ (τR − Set)op Ð→Ha
where for every object (C,ρ) ∈ Ob((τR −Set)op): δC ≡ ρ and if pii ∶ (C,ρ)× (C,ρ)Ð→ (C,ρ) and z
is the variable such that I(z) = pii then ∃pii ≡ ⋃[c/z],c∈C ∀pii ≡ ⋂[c/z],c∈C .
By definition of interpretation of terms we gather:
xI1 = pi1 ∶ (C,ρ)2 Ð→ (C,ρ) and xI2 = pi2 ∶ (C,ρ)2 Ð→ (C,ρ)
and by definition of interpretation of formulas we can deduce:I((x1 = x2)(x1,x2)) =D=(xI1 × xI2 )(ρ) = ρ ○ (pi1, pi2)
and I((¬x1 = x2)(x1,x2)) = ¬τRI((x1 = x2)(x1,x2)) = ¬τR(ρ ○ (pi1, pi2)) = (ρ ○ (pi1, pi2))c
in particular: I((x1 = x2)(x1,x2))(c1, c2) = (ρ ○ (pi1, pi2))(c2, c1) =]0,1[I((x1 = x2)(x1,x2))(c1, c1) = (ρ ○ (pi1, pi2))(c2, c2) = {1}
and I((¬x1 = x2)(x1,x2))(c1, c2) = I((¬x1 = x2)(x1,x2))(c2, c1) = R∖]0,1[I((¬x1 = x2)(x1,x2))(c1, c1) = I((¬x1 = x2)(x1,x2))(c2, c2) = R ∖ {1}
By the inductive Definition (8.6) of interpretation we conclude that:I((x1 = x2 ∨ ¬x1 = x2)(x1,x2)) = I((x1 = x2)(x1,x2)) ∨τR I((¬x1 = x2)(x1,x2)) =I((x1 = x2)(x1,x2)) ∪ I((¬x1 = x2)(x1,x2))
in particular:I((x1 = x2 ∨ ¬x1 = x2)(x1,x2))(c1, c2) = I((x1 = x2 ∨ ¬x1 = x2)(x1,x2))(c2, c1)]0,1[∪(R∖]0,1[) = R ∖ {0,1}I((x1 = x2 ∨ ¬x1 = x2)(x1,x2))(c1, c1) = I((x1 = x2 ∨ ¬x1 = x2)(x1,x2))(c2, c2){1} ∪ (R ∖ {1}) = R
And finally, by Definition (8.6) of interpretation we find:I(∀x1∀x2.(x1 = x2 ∨ ¬x1 = x2)) == ∀pi1I((∀x2.(x1 = x2 ∨ ¬x1 = x2))(x1)) == ∀pi2∀pi1I(x1 = x2 ∨ ¬x1 = x2) == ⋂[c/x2],c∈C ⋂[c′/x1],c′∈C I(x1 = x2 ∨ ¬x1 = x2) == I(x1 = x2 ∨ ¬x1 = x2)(c1, c1) ∩ I(x1 = x2 ∨ ¬x1 = x2)(c1, c2)∩∩I(x1 = x2 ∨ ¬x1 = x2)(c2, c1) ∩ I(x1 = x2 ∨ ¬x1 = x2)(c2, c2) =
R ∩R ∩R ∖ {0,1} ∩R ∖ {0,1} = R ∖ {0,1}
thus the formula ∀x1∀x2.(x1 = x2 ∨x1 ≠ x2) is not intuitionistically valid since there is a model in
which it is not satisfied.
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8.6 A global view
Looking at the mathematical and historical development the first period of the evolution of cat-
egorical logic, which we have tried so far to depict in its most important implications, makes us
understand at least two crucial reasons why categorical logic gained broad approval among math-
ematicians. Firstly, a translation in category-theoretic terms of the key concepts of logic and set
theory is fruitful, provided they fall under the central notions of category theory, namely adjoint
functors. Secondly, the proper translation revealed how many notions of algebraic geometry and
algebraic topology were mathematically equivalent to logical notions. This latter aspect is cru-
cial: the categorical analysis of logical notions was at first associated with a distinctive ideological
component, on some occasions strongly political, according to which in 1960s and 1970s logic
and geometry were opposites, however soon the purely algebraic fabric weaving together all these
aspects was revealed and all parties agreed on the fact that this opened new avenues of research
and offered new ways of thinking.
Of course, we need to underline how these observations regard mainly the mathematical world.
What is curious about categorical logic is that complaints and objections to the use of this new
toolbox came from the logicians’ world itself. The doubts raised by mathematical logicians towards
categorical logicians can be summarized by the following words of Marquis and Reyes:
”[...] can you prove something by these [i.e. categorical] means that cannot be
proved by other, meaning more traditional, means? If what one does in categorical
logic is simply the same but in a different, more complicated, and ultimately irrelevant
guise, why bother learning this general abstract nonsense in the first place? If one
does not care about a grand unifying picture of mathematics and its foundations, of
unsuspected links between domains resulting in a complex and rich network of abstract
structures, then is there any genuine value in the categorical toolbox?”([MR11], pg 105)
Many categorical logicians spent a hard time trying to convince mathematical logicians that
their analyses were indeed foundational. The point is deeply ideological or, better to say, philo-
sophical: the algebraic approach to foundations has been seen since Frege misguided because it
implies viewing logic as a part of mathematics, while Frege and his successors assumed exactly
the opposite. Nevertheless, we should recognize that categorical logic does in fact offer a genuine
foundational analysis of many mathematical concepts, and in addition to that it offers the great
advantage of being a bridge between constructive and classical approaches, geometry and logic,
topology and logic, theoretical computer science and logic, just to name a few of them.
Besides these observations, it should be unanimously clear why categorical logic had also philo-
sophical consequences. The main field of the philosophy of mathematics that categorical logic
affected was the so called mathematical (or logical) structuralism. According to it, mathe-
matics studies structures and mathematical objects are nothing but positions in those structures,
so mathematical theories consist in the description of structures of mathematical objects. As a
consequence, mathematical objects do not own any intrinsic property, but rather they are in ex-
ternal relations one to each other within a given system. On the logical side, structuralists believe
that mathematical statements have an objective truth value, thus their epistemological views are
totally realistic. Ontologically speaking, though, they are not interested in the type of existence
that mathematical objects and structures have: their focus is on what kind of entity a mathe-
matical object can be ascribed to (of course, this does depend on the kind of structure which a
particular object belongs to). The main contributions as regards structuralism in the philosophy
of mathematics came from Paul Benacerraf (1931), Michael Resnik (March 20, 1938) and Stewart
Shapiro (1951).
Although the main definition of structuralism is well-accepted, it can be elaborated in various
different manners and, perhaps also for this reason, not all categorical theorists have declared
themselves structuralists. Indeed, we can interpret structuralism in two different ways and we can
distinct two possible levels at which it can be developed. First of all, claiming that mathematics is
the study of structures can mean either that mathematics is about structures or that mathematics
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is about structured systems, i.e. systems that possess a structure. Different investigations will of
course lead to different outcomes. In addition to that, we can find both a concrete and an abstract
level inside the development of structuralism.
At the concrete level mathematical structuralism is also called model-structuralism and
is the philosophical claim that the subject matter of a particular mathematical theory is concrete
kinds of structured systems (models) and their morphology. Hence, a given mathematical object
turns out to be a position in a concrete system, which has a specific structure. The role of a
mathematical theory is characterizing such kinds of objects in terms of the common structure of the
concrete systems in which they are positions (this means characterizing them up to isomorphism).
Let’s take for example the theory of natural numbers PA given by Peano axioms. This provides
a framework to present the models that have the same natural-number structure and that are
isomorphic one to each other. In this respect, natural numbers are positions in any interpretation
that satisfies Peano axioms.
At the abstract level, mathematical structuralism is the philosophical claim that the subject
matter of mathematics itself is abstract kinds of structured systems and their morphology. In
this case, a mathematical object is nothing but a position in an abstract system, which itself has
an abstract structure. Such types of abstract systems are described in terms of their common
structures by mathematical theories. Whereas in the case of concrete structure it is clear that
we are dealing with models, it not unanimously clear what an abstract structure is. In order to
respond to such a question, we have to distinguish between two possible interpretations and three
varieties of philosophically positioned structuralism. The abstract structuralism can be interpreted
as:
• realist structuralism (or ante rem structuralism): structures exist as objects of study
in their own right, so any structure exists regardless of any system exemplifying it.
• nominalist structuralism (or ante rem structuralism): mathematical objects and
structures do not exist by themselves, rather structures are systems of objects behaving
in a certain manner and speaking about a particular structure is allowed after having pro-
vided a generalization over all systems of a certain type.
This distinction recalls that one between Frege and Hilbert’s approach at the concrete level. An
ante re structuralist sees abstract structures as anything that satisfies the axioms that are taken to
characterize the abstract type of structure under consideration. An in re structuralist eschews the
Frege demand that before talking about abstract structured systems as object, that is positions
in a type of structured system, there must be a background theory that allows dealing with typed
of structures as independently existing things. Depending on the way according to which pre-
conditions for the independent existence of abstract structures, required by Frege demand, are
settled, we single out three varieties of abstract structuralism. These suggest set theory, structure
theory or modal logic as tools to give conditions to assert whether a given abstract system have
or does not have a structure of a specific type.
Categorical logic fits in among all these interpretations and varieties of mathematical struc-
turalism in many, sometimes complicated, ways. The standard assertion is that categories are
types of structured sets and in this respect category theory can be taken as a framework to de-
velop a particular variety of abstract structuralism. Nevertheless, it seems that this claim may
not ”do justice to the actual practise of category theory and [...] fails to recognize the fact that
category theory is both a foundational and philosophical alternative” (Landry, E. and Marquis, J.
P., Categories in context: Historical, Foundational, and Philosophical, Philosophia Mathematica,
1, 13, 2005 , pg 29). Unfortunately, such an argumentation, interesting and worthy though it
might be, would require a great command in the subject and is beyond the scope of the thesis.
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Chapter 9
Kleene’s intuitionistic realizability
interpretation as hyperdoctrine
This chapter offers another example in which categorical language can be used to formalize logical
notions.
In the first part of the Chapter we introduce some basic notions of recursion theory, which are
essential to deal with BHK-interpretation and Kleene’s realizers. After introducing Kleene’s re-
alizability theory in the canonical way, we will show a way to treat it categorically, namely we
will present the hyperdoctrine of realizability. Furthermore, we will use adjunctions in order to
show the well-known result claiming that the rules of intuitionistic predicate logic IL are valid in
Kleene’s realizability whilst those of classical predicate logic CL are not.
9.1 Classical and intuitionistic Peano arithmetics PA and
HA
Let’s consider the classical and intuitionistic calculus with equality CL= and IL= defined as follows.
Definition 9.1. Let CL= be the calculus of the classical logic with identity, containing the following
rules1, where ϕ, ψ are arbitrary propositions:
id−ax
Γ, ϕ,Γ′ ⊢∆, ϕ,∆′ −axΓ,,Γ′ ⊢∆ ⊺−axΓ ⊢∆,⊺,∆′ =−axΓ ⊢ t = t,∆
Γ, ϕ,ψ ⊢∆ ∧l
Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢∆ Γ ⊢ ϕ,∆ Γ ⊢ ψ,∆ ∧rΓ ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ,∆
Γ, ϕ ⊢∆ Γ, ψ ⊢∆ ∨l
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ⊢∆ Γ ⊢ ϕ,ψ,∆ ∨rΓ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ,∆
Γ ⊢ ϕ,∆ ¬l
Γ,¬ϕ ⊢∆ Γ, ϕ ⊢∆ ¬rΓ ⊢ ¬ϕ,∆
Γ ⊢ ϕ,∆ Γ, ψ ⊢∆ → l
Γ, ϕ→ ψ ⊢∆ Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ,∆ → rΓ ⊢ ϕ→ ψ,∆
1We implicitly allow the possibility of swapping ad lib formulas or collections of formulas in a sequent, paying
attention not to make an antecedent a consequent or the other way round. More precisely, we imply the following
exchange rules:
Σ,Γ,Θ,Γ′,∆ ⊢ Σ′
exl
Σ,Γ′,Θ,Γ,∆ ⊢ Σ′ Γ ⊢ Σ,∆,Θ,∆′,Γ′ exrΓ ⊢ Σ,∆′,Θ,∆,Γ′
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Γ,∀x.ϕ(x), ϕ(t) ⊢∆ ∀l
Γ,∀x.ϕ(x) ⊢∆ Γ ⊢ ϕ(w),∆ ∀r(w ∉ FV (Γ,∀x.ϕ(x),∆))Γ ⊢ ∀x.ϕ(x),∆
Γ, ϕ(w) ⊢∆ ∃l(w ∉ FV (Γ,∃x.ϕ(x),∆))
Γ,∃x.ϕ(x) ⊢∆ Γ ⊢ ϕ(t),∃x.ϕ(x),∆ ∃rΓ ⊢ ∃x.ϕ(x),∆
Σ, t = s,Γ(t) ⊢∆(t),Θ =1
Σ,Γ(s), t = s ⊢∆(s),Θ Σ, s = t,Γ(t) ⊢∆(t),Θ =2Σ,Γ(s), s = t ⊢∆(s),Θ
Definition 9.2. Let IL= be the calculus of intuitionistic logic with identity, containing the follow-
ing rules2, where ϕ, ψ and pr are arbitrary propositions:
id−ax
Γ, ϕ,Γ′ ⊢ ϕ −axΓ,,Γ′ ⊢ pr ⊺−axΓ ⊢ ⊺ =−axΓ ⊢ t = t
Γ, ϕ,ψ ⊢ pr ∧l
Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ pr Γ ⊢ ϕ Γ ⊢ ψ ∧rΓ ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ
Γ, ϕ ⊢ pr Γ, ψ ⊢ pr ∨l
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ⊢ pr Γ ⊢ ϕ ∨r1Γ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ Γ ⊢ ψ ∨r2Γ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ
Γ,¬ϕ ⊢ ϕ ¬l
Γ,¬ϕ ⊢ pr Γ, ϕ ⊢ ¬rΓ ⊢ ¬ϕ
Γ ⊢ ϕ Γ, ψ ⊢ pr → l
Γ, ϕ→ ψ ⊢ pr Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ → rΓ ⊢ ϕ→ ψ
Γ,∀x.ϕ(x), ϕ(t) ⊢ pr ∀l
Γ,∀x.ϕ(x) ⊢ pr Γ ⊢ ϕ(w) ∀r(w ∉ FV (Γ,∀x.ϕ(x)))Γ ⊢ ∀x.ϕ(x)
Γ, ϕ(w) ⊢ pr ∃l(w ∉ FV (Γ,∃x.ϕ(x),pr))
Γ,∃x.ϕ(x) ⊢ pr Γ ⊢ ϕ(t) ∃rΓ ⊢ ∃x.ϕ(x)
Σ, t = s,Γ(t) ⊢ ϕ(t) =1
Σ,Γ(s), t = s ⊢ ϕ(s) Σ, s = t,Γ(t) ⊢ ϕ(t) =2Σ,Γ(s), s = t ⊢ ϕ(s)
We introduce now the classical and intuitionistic Peano arithmetics PA and HA as particular
logical theories.
Definition 9.3. A classical [intuitionistic] theory is obtained by extending the calculus of classical
[intuitionistic] logic with identity CL= [IL=] with some extralogic axioms and with the right and
left composition rules:
Γ′ ⊢ fr Γ, fr,Γ′′ ⊢∆
l − comp
Γ,Γ′,Γ′′ ⊢∆ Γ ⊢∆, fr,∆′′ fr ⊢∆′ r − compΓ ⊢∆,∆′,∆′′
Let’s consider a predicative language for the classical logic, endowed with a constant 0 and the
symbols s, + and ⋅ for the successor, the sum and the product.
Definition 9.4. The classical theory of Peano arithmetic PA is given by the rules of CL=, the
rules of left and right composition l − comp and r − comp, and the following axioms:
Ax1 ⊢ ∀x.s(x) ≠ 0
Ax2 ⊢ ∀x∀y.(s(x) = s(y)→ x = y)
2As before, we implicitly admit the exchange rule.
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Ax3 ⊢ ∀x.x + 0 = x
Ax4 ⊢ ∀x∀y.(x + s(y) = s(x + y)
Ax5 ⊢ ∀x.x ⋅ 0 = 0
Ax6 ⊢ ∀x∀y.(x ⋅ s(y)0x ⋅ y + x
Ax7 ⊢ (fr ∧ ∀x.(fr(x)→ fr(s(x)))→ ∀x.fr(x)
Definition 9.5. The intuitionistic theory of Peano arithmetic HA is given by the rules of IL=,
the rules of left and right composition l − comp and r − comp, and the same list of axioms of PA.
Equivalently, we could define PA as the extension of HA obtained by adding either the Law
of Excluded Middle ϕ∨¬ϕ or the Double Negation ¬¬ϕ→ ϕ to its axioms. Both in PA and HA,
the numeral n is given by the application of the successor s to 0 a number n of times.
9.2 BHK-interpretation and Kleene’s realizability
Kleene’s realizability was first introduced by Kleene in the 1940s with the specific aim of giving
to BHK-interpretation a precise meaning. After its birth, the theory of realizability went through
many changes and reformulations. One of the most successful was Kreisel’s modified realizability
(1959), according to which to every formula ϕ, say in the language of HA, a new formula xmrϕ
(to be read ”x modified realizes ϕ”) always in the language of HA is assigned. Modifying in a
proper way Kreisel’s modified realizability itself, one can obtain the so-called term extraction for
HA and even for Π02-formulas of PA.
The BHK-interpretation (with B standing for Brouwer, H for Heyting and K for Kolmogorov)
is a description of proofs of propositions as (computable) functions. This is otherwise known as
the paradigm of propositions as types and proofs as programs. The name “Brouwer-Heyting-
Kolmogorov” is due to Troelstra, but not everybody agrees with this notation for some contro-
versial historical reasons: Brouwer never explicitly formulated any interpretation of this sort,
and remained against all formalism his entire life, therefore it might be better to use the name
”Heyting-Kolmogorov”. The crucial idea behind the BHK-interpretation is that the meaning of a
formula should not be explained in terms of what makes it true, instead it should be explained in
terms of what counts as a proof of that formula.
Definition 9.6. A proof p of a formula is defined inductively on the complexity of the formula as
follows:
• there is no proof for ;
• a proof p of ϕ ∧ψ consists of a pair p = (p1,p2) where p1 is a proof of ϕ and p2 is a proof
of ψ;
• a proof p of ϕ ∨ ψ consists of a pair p = (k,p′) where k = 0 and p′ is a proof of ϕ or k = 1
and p′ is a proof of ψ;
• a proof p of ϕ→ ψ is an effective method (a functional construction) for transforming every
proof z of ϕ into a proof p(z) of ψ;
• a proof p of ∃x.ϕ consists of a pair p = (k,p′) where k is a natural number and p′ is a proof
of ϕ[k/x];
• a proof p of ∀x.ϕ is an effective method (a functionnal construction) for transforming every
natural number c into a proof p(c) of ϕ[c/x].
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Inside Peano’s (as well as Heyting’s) arithmetic it is possible to represent all partial recursive
functions f ∶ NÐ→ N, using predicates R(n1, ..., nm, k) such that:
f(n1, ..., nm) = k⇔⊢PA R(n1, ..., nm, k)
f(n1, ..., nm) ≠ k⇔⊢PA ¬R(n1, ..., nm, k)⊢PA ∀x1...∀xm∀y∀z.(R(x1, ..., xm, y) ∧R(x1, ..., xm, z)→ y = z)
For convenience, we allow ourselves to write primitive recursive functions as terms, so we endow
the language of PA and HA with terms like f(x1, ..., xm) for every m-ary primitive recursive
function. Also, it can be proved that there is a bijection N ≅ N × N given by a function called
surjective pairing:
⟨−,−⟩ ∶ N ×N Ð→ N(n1, n2) z→ 12(n1 + n2)(n1 + n2 + 1) + n2
whose inverse in given by the projections:
(pi1, pi2) ∶ N Ð→ N ×N
n z→ (pi1(n), pi2(n))
hence it holds that ⟨pi1(n), pi2(n)⟩ = n.
Every natural number can be viewed with two different meanings:
• it can be an input or an output of a function, hence of a program;
• it can indicate, by Go¨del’s coding, the primitive recursive function {n} ∶ N→ N whose input
is given by (m1, ...,mk) and whose output is denoted by {n}(m1, ...,mk),
If t is a term in the language of PA or HA with free variables x1, ..., xk, we denote by
Λx1, ..., xk.t
the natural number standing, according to Go¨del’s coding, for the primitive recursive function such
that, given n1, ..., nk natural numbers, ⊢PA,HA {Λx1, ..., xk.t}(n1, ..., nm) = t[n1/x1, ..., nk/xk].
Also, if e is the coding for a program, we write {e}(x) to mean that the program of code e
converges in x and has {e}(x) as output.
Theorem 9.1 (Kleene’s Normal Form). There exists a primitive recursive function U and for
every n > 0 there exists a primitive recursive predicates Tn such that for all x1, ..., xn:
{e}(x1, ..., xn) = U(µy.Tn(e, x1, ..., xn, y))
Therefore, we can introduce a primitive recursive predicate Tn (which we will simply write T ),
called the Kleene’s predicate, such that, for every e, x1, ..., xn, y natural numbers, T (e, x1, .., xn, y)
claims that there exists a successful computation y for the coded program e when computed with
input x1, ..., xn. U is a primitive recursive function which gives for every successful computation
y the output U(y).
Proposition 9.1 (Padding Lemma). Every partial computable function has infinitely many in-
dices. In particular, there are primitive recursive functions f and g such that for all x and y:
f(y) > y, g(x, y) > x and {y} = {f(y)} = {g(x, y)}.
As a consequence, there are infinitely many programs that require the same inputs and produce
the same outputs, even though they are different since the instructions they contain are not the
same. Even, it is really easy to give an example: it suffices to add meaningless instructions to a
program.
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Theorem 9.2 (s-m-n Kleene’s Theorem). For every m,n ∈ N there exists an injective primitive
recursive (n+1)-ary function smn such that for all e, x1, ..., xn, given the natural numbers y1, .., ym:
{smn (e, x1, ..., xn)}(y1, ..., ym) = {e}(x1, ..., xn, y1, ..., ym)
Corollary 9.1. Let α be an (m+n)-ary partial computable function. Then there exists an injec-
tive m-ary computable function f such that for all y1, ..., ym, x1, ..., xn: α(y1, ..., ym, x1, ..., xm) ={f(y1, ..., ym)}(x1, ..., xn).
We introduce now the so-called Kleene’s realizability. The general idea under the realizability
is that we can award to every ”valid” formula a proof of its ”validity”, which we will refer to as
the realizer of that formula. We would also like to be able to manipulate realizers in the same way
we can manipulate formulas.
Definition 9.7. Let L be a language for Peano’s (or Heyting’s) arithmetic. We define a relation⊩ between natural numbers N and formulas in FormL by induction on the complexity of formulas
as follows:
• n ⊩  ≡  (there is no realizer for );
• n ⊩ ⊺ ≡ ⊺ (⊺ is always realized);
• n ⊩ ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ (pi1(n) ⊩ ϕ ∧ pi2(n) ⊩ ψ);
• n ⊩ ϕ ∨ ψ ≡ ((pi1(n) = 0 ∧ pi2(n) ⊩ ϕ) ∨ (pi1(n) = 1 ∧ pi2(n) ⊩ ψ);
• n ⊩ ϕ→ ψ ≡ ∀k.(k ⊩ ϕ→ {n}(k) ⊩ ψ);
• n ⊩ ∃x.ϕ ≡ pi2(n) ⊩ ϕ[pi1(n)/x];
• m ⊩ ∀x.ϕ ≡ ∀k.({n}(k) ⊩ ϕ[k/x]);
• n ⊩ t = s ≡ (n = 0 ∧ t = s).
Since we can define the negation ¬ as ¬ϕ ≡ ϕ→ , we have:
• n ⊩ ¬ϕ ≡ n ⊩ ϕ Ô⇒  ≡ ∀k.(k ⊩ ϕ→ {n}(k) ⊩ ).
If n ⊩ ϕ we say that n is a realizer and that it realizes the formula ϕ.
We adopt the harpoon-vector notation
⇀
x to denote a list of variables x1, ..., xn. Therefore using∀⇀x.ϕ(x) we mean to say ∀x1, ..., xn.ϕ(x1, ..., xn). In addition, writing Γ(⇀x) we mean that Γ is a
list of formulas in which the free variables are to be found among
⇀
x = (x1, ..., xn).
Definition 9.8. In the propositional language we say that Γ ⊢ ∆ is valid in Kleene’s realiz-
ability (or simply realizable) if there exists a realizer n such that n ⊩ Γ→∆3. In the predicative
language we say that Γ ⊢ ∆ is valid in Kleene’s realizability (or simply realizable) if there
exists a realizer n such that n ⊩ ∀⇀y.(Γ(⇀y) → ∆(⇀y)4. A rule is valid in Kleene’s realizability
(or simply realizable) if assuming the premises realizable, the conclusion is realizable as well.
Theorem 9.3. The rules of IL are valid in Kleene’s realizability.
Theorem 9.4. The rules of CL are not valid in Kleene’s realizability.
3Here by Γ we mean the conjunction of all the formulas in Γ and by ∆ we mean the disjunction of all the
formulas in ∆.
4as before, by Γ(⇀y) we mean the conjunction of all the formulas in it and by ∆(⇀y) we mean the disjunction of
all the formulas in it.
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9.3 Realizability in categorical terms
We define now new categories, where objects are the formulas in a given language L, id est
Ob = FormL, whilst maps between them change according to the meaning we would like to give
to a specific category.
First of all, let’s consider a language L and the formulas in FormL. Given two formulas ϕ
and ψ, we can wonder if there is a derivation from ϕ to ψ in sequent calculus. However, there
can be many different derivations form ϕ to ψ, to be precise there are infinitely many ones, since
useless rules can be added out of anyone’s choosing (for instance you can add an invertible rule
and its inverse, as many time as you like). We define in FormL a relation ≈ in the following way:
given ϕ,ψ ∈ FormL, we say pi ≈ pi′ if both pi and pi′ are derivations from ϕ to ψ. In fact, it is an
equivalent relation, so we can consider the corresponding equivalent classes and the corresponding
quotient set.
Definition 9.9. Given a predicative language L for the classical logic, SeqLCL is the category whose
objects are the formulas in FormL. Given ϕ,ψ ∈ Ob(SeqLCL) = FormL, the maps from ϕ to ψ are{pi∣pi is a derivation ϕ ⊢CL ψ}/ ≈.
From the definition we gather that the set SeqLCL(ϕ,ψ) is a singleton if and only if there is a
derivation from ϕ to ψ.
Definition 9.10. Given a predicative language L for the intuitionistic logic, SeqLIL is the category
whose objects are the formulas in FormL. Given ϕ,ψ ∈ Ob(SeqLIL) = FormL, the maps from ϕ to
ψ are {pi∣pi is a derivation ϕ ⊢IL ψ}/ ≈.
From the definition we gather that the set SeqLIL(ϕ,ψ) is a singleton if and only if there is a
derivation from ϕ to ψ. Thanks to Gentzen Theorem about the elimination of the cut rule, SeqLCL
and SeqLIL are categories.
Let’s consider now two formulas ϕ,ψ ∈ FormL, where L is a language for Heyting arithmetic,
and suppose that there is a realizer e such that e ⊩ ϕ → ψ. A realizer is nothing but a program,
and so there could be many different computations, which may a priori need different inputs in
order to run, giving nevertheless the same outputs. Not all of them are realizers for ϕ→ ψ, though:
we should ask that those programs take realizers of ϕ as inputs, in addition to giving the right
outputs. By Padding Lemma (9.1) there are infinitely many different realizers for ϕ → ψ, which
are programs that need realizers of ϕ as inputs and produce the realizers of ψ as outputs.
We can define on the set of realizers (which is coded in fact by the set of natural numbers N)
the following relation5:
e ≈ e′ def⇔ ∀⇀x∃y∃y′.(T (e,⇀x, y) ∧ T (e′,⇀x, y′) ∧U(y) = U(y′))
This is an equivalence relation on the set of all realizers: it is trivially reflexive, it is symmetric
since the condition that defines ≈ is symmetric, and it is transitive because of the transitivity of
equality. Hence we can take into consideration the corresponding quotient classes and quotient
set.
Definition 9.11. RCL is the category whose objects and maps are defined as follows:
Ob(RCL) ∶= {ϕ∣ϕ is a formula of PA}
and if ϕ,ψ ∈ Ob(RCL) then
RCL(ϕ,ψ) ∶= {e ∈ N∣e ⊩ ϕ→ ψ}/ ≈ .
We refer to the equivalent class of a realizer e as e.
5We notice that this definition is not decidable! In order to work with a decidable equality one must pass on to
type theory.
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Similarly, RIL is the category whose objects and maps are defined as follows:
Ob(RIL) ∶= {ϕ∣ϕ is a formula of HA}
and if ϕ,ψ ∈ Ob(RC) then RIL(ϕ,ψ) ∶= {e ∈ N∣e ⊩ ϕ→ ψ}/ ≈ .
We refer to the equivalent class of a realizer e as e.
For convenience, we will write only R to speak at the same time about both RIL and RCL,
supposing we are working with an appropriate language L, even though we will find that the whole
problem we are going to tackle from now up to the end of this chapter makes sense only in the
intuitionistic case (and we could expect this, since we know from Theorem (9.4) that the rules of
CL= are not valid in Kleene’s realizability). From the definition we gather that the set R(ϕ,ψ)
is a singleton if and only if there is a realizer from ϕ to ψ. The fact that R gives indeed rise to
a category can be shown really easily. The identity map in R is given by the class of realizers
that are programs that returns as output the input they have received. Given e ⊩ ϕ → ψ and
e′ ⊩ ψ → χ, then Ap(e′,Ap(e,−)) ⊩ ϕ → χ. Hence we can define composition and the identity
map in R. Trivially, identity and associativity are respected. Thus, R is indeed a category.R has  and ⊺ as initial and terminal object respectively: given a formula ϕ, any program that
gives a realizer for it is a realizer for → ϕ since it gives a realizer for ϕ starting from a realizer for, that is nothing; any terminating program that takes a realizer for ϕ as input is a map ϕ → ⊺,
since everything is a realizer for ⊺. R has also all binary products: given ϕ and ψ formulas, then
pi1 ⊩ ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ and pi2 ⊩ ϕ ∧ ψ → ψ, and for every map e ⊩ χ→ ϕ, d ⊩ χ→ ψ there is the unique
map ⟨e,d⟩ ⊩ χ→ ϕ ∧ ψ in R making the following product diagram commute:
χ
ϕ ∧ ψ
ϕ ψ
e d
⟨e,d⟩
pi1 pi2
One may wonder if the adjunctions in Theorem (6.2) and in Theorem (6.3) still hold. If this is
the case, then we would be able to describe in detail how realizers change from simpler propositions
to more complex ones. In order to reach this goal, we will stick to the following plan: we will
analyze how realizers of a set proposition can be built starting from the realizers of the simpler
parts it is formed, following the inductive Definition (9.7); then we will define reasonable functors,
trying to mimic the situation of Theorem (6.2) and Theorem (6.3).
First of all, we can define in the special case of the category R of realizers the trivial functor !:
! ∶ R Ð→ 1
ϕ ↦ ●(e ⊩ ϕ→ ψ) ↦ (1● ∶ ●→ ●)
and the diagonal functor ∆:
∆ ∶ R Ð→ R ×R
ϕ ↦ (ϕ,ϕ)(e ⊩ ϕ→ ψ) ↦ ((e,e) ⊩ (ϕ,ϕ)→ (ψ,ψ))
Quite easily, we can mimic from Definition (6.1) the construction of a true ⊺ and a false  functors
as follows:  1 Ð→ R● ↦ (●→ ●) ↦ (1 ⊩ → )
⊺ ∶ 1 Ð→ R● ↦ ⊺(●→ ●) ↦ (1⊺ ⊩ ⊺→ ⊺)
where 1 and 1⊺ are functional programs that give as outputs the same inputs they receive.
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Proposition 9.2. In the case of the category R of realizability, the false functor  and the true
functor ⊺ are respectively left and right adjoint to the trivial functor !: ⊢! ⊢ ⊺
Proof. Let ϕ ∈ Ob(R). There is an isomorphism 1(!(ϕ), ●) ≅ R(ϕ,⊺(●)), that is an isomorphism
1(●, ●) ≅R(ϕ,⊺), sending the identity map 1● into the identity map 1ϕ in R (and this is obviously
a realizer for ⊺). It is trivially natural in ● and ϕ. There is another isomorphism R((●), ϕ) ≅
1(●, !(ϕ)), that is an isomorphism R(, ϕ) ≅ 1(●, ●), sending any constant map into the identity
map of 1. It is trivially natural in ● and ϕ.
From Kleene’s realizability, we know that a realizer of a conjunction is the pair obtained from
the realizers of the two propositions that are part of the conjunction. Let’s suppose that ϕ,ψ, ϕ′
and ψ′ are propositions such that e ⊩ ϕ → ψ and d ⊩ ϕ′ → ψ′. A realizer for ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ′ ∧ ψ′ is a
functional program sending a realizer of ϕ∧ψ into a realizer of ϕ′∧ψ′, which is a couple where the
first component is a realizer of ϕ′ and the second is a realizer of ψ′. If z ⊩ ϕ ∧ ψ, then pi1(z) ⊩ ϕ
and pi2(z) ⊩ ψ. Hence e(pi1(z)) ⊩ ϕ′ and d(pi2(z)) ⊩ ψ′, and we can form a realizer for ϕ′ ∧ ψ′
by pairing ⟨e(pi1(z)),d(pi2(z))⟩. It follows that it is possible to define the following conjunction
functor ∧:(−) ∧ (−) ∶ R ×R Ð→ R(ϕ,ψ) ↦ ϕ ∧ ψ(e ⊩ ϕ→ ϕ′,d ⊩ ψ → ψ′) ↦ (λz.⟨{e}(pi1(z)),{d}(pi2(z))⟩ ⊩ ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ′ ∧ ψ′)
In particular, we can define the conjunction functor when the second proposition of the conjunction
is fixed in this way:(−) ∧ (pr) ∶ R Ð→ R
ϕ ↦ ϕ ∧ pr(e ⊩ ϕ→ ϕ′) ↦ (λz.⟨{e}(pi1(z)), pi2(z)⟩ ⊩ ϕ ∧ pr→ ϕ′ ∧ pr)
Proposition 9.3. In the case of the category R of realizability, the conjunction functor ∧ is right
adjoint to the diagonal functor ∆:
∆ ⊢ (−) ∧ (−)
Proof. Let (ϕ,ψ) ∈ Ob(R ×R). There is a map ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ) = (ϕ ∧ ψ,ϕ ∧ ψ) → (ϕ,ψ) in R ×R: it
suffices to take (λz.pi1(z), λz.pi2(z)) as realizer, since trivially λzpi1(z) ⊩ ϕ∧ψ → ϕ and λzpi2(z) ⊩
ϕ ∧ ψ → ψ.
Let α ∈ Ob(R) and suppose that there is a map (α,α) → (ϕ,ψ) in R ×R, therefore there are
realizers e ⊩ α → ϕ and d ⊩ α → ψ. Given that, we can construct a functional program that
produces a realizer for ϕ∧ψ from a realizer of α: λz.⟨{e}(z),{d}(z))⟩ ⊩ α → ϕ∧ψ. Owing to the
definition of maps in R through equivalent classes, the map we have just found is unique.
A realizer of a disjunction is a pair with first component either 0 or 1 and second component
a realizer for either the first or the second proposition in the disjunction. Let’s suppose that ϕ,ψ,
ϕ′ and ψ′ are propositions such that e ⊩ ϕ → ψ and d ⊩ ϕ′ → ψ′. A realizer for ϕ ∨ ψ → ϕ′ ∨ ψ′
is a functional program sending a realizer of ϕ ∨ ψ into a realizer of ϕ′ ∨ ψ′, which is a couple
where the first component is either 0 or 1 and the second component is a realizer of either ϕ′ or
ψ′. If z ⊩ ϕ ∨ ψ, then there are two possibilities: either pi1(z) = 0 and pi2(z) ⊩ ϕ, or pi2(z) = 1
and pi2(z) ⊩ ψ. In the former, {e}(pi2(z)) gives a realizer for ϕ′; in the latter, {d}(pi2(z)) gives
a realizer for ψ′. Therefore a realizer for ϕ′ ∨ ψ′ is either ⟨0,{e}(pi2(z))⟩ or ⟨1,{d}(pi2(z))⟩,
depending on the form of z. More briefly we can write:⟨pi1(z),{(1 − pi1(z)) ⋅ e + pi1(z) ⋅ d}(pi2(z))⟩ ⊩ ϕ′ ∨ ψ′
It follows that it is possible to define the following disjunction functor ∨:(−) ∨ (−) ∶ R ×R Ð→ R(ϕ,ψ) ↦ ϕ ∨ ψ(e ⊩ ϕ→ ϕ′,d ⊩ ψ → ψ′) ↦ (λz.⟨pi1(z),{(1 − pi1(z)) ⋅ e + pi1(z) ⋅ d}(pi2(z))⟩ ⊩ ϕ′ ∨ ψ′)
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Proposition 9.4. In the case of the category R of realizability, the disjunction functor ∨ is left
adjoint to the diagonal functor ∆: (−) ∨ (−) ⊢∆
Proof. Let (ϕ,ψ) ∈ Ob(R ×R). There is a map (ϕ,ψ) → ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) = (ϕ ∨ ψ,ϕ ∨ ψ) in R ×R: it
suffices to take (λz.⟨0,z⟩, λz.⟨1,z⟩) as realizer, since trivially λz.⟨0,z⟩ ⊩ ϕ→ ϕ∨ψ and λz.⟨1,z⟩ ⊩
ψ → ϕ ∨ ψ.
Let α ∈ Ob(R) and suppose that there is a map (ϕ,ψ)→ (α,α) in R ×R, thus there are realizers
e ⊩ ϕ → α and d ⊩ ψ → α. Given that, we can construct a functional program that produces a
realizer for α from a realizer of ϕ ∨ψ: λz.{(1 − pi1(z)) ⋅ e + pi2(z) ⋅d}pi2(z) ⊩ ϕ ∨ψ → α. Owing to
the definition of maps in R through equivalent classes, the map we have just found is unique.
Let’s consider the case of the implication functor (−)pr and let’s suppose that we have a realizer
e ⊩ ϕ → ϕ′. We would like to find a realizer for (pr → ϕ) → (pr → ϕ′), thus a functional program
producing realizers for (pr → ϕ′) out of realizers for (pr → ϕ). If z ⊩ pr → ϕ and w ⊩ pr, then
e(z(w)) is a realizer for ϕ′. It follows that it is possible to define the implication functor (−)pr:
(−)pr ∶ R Ð→ R
ϕ ↦ pr→ ϕ(e ⊩ ϕ→ ϕ′) ↦ (λw.λz.{e ○ z}(w) ⊩ (pr→ ϕ)→ (pr→ ϕ′))
Proposition 9.5. In the case of the category R of realizability, the conjunction of pr functor(−) ∧ pr is left adjoint to the implication of pr functor (−)pr:
(−) ∨ (pr) ⊢ (−)pr
Proof. Let ϕ ∈ Ob(R). There is a map ϕ → ((ϕ) ∧ pr)pr = (pr → (ϕ ∧ pr)) in R: it suffices to take
λz.λw.⟨z,w⟩ as its realizer.
Let α ∈ Ob(R) and suppose that there is a map e ⊩ ϕ → (pr → α). We need to find a realizer
for (ϕ ∧ pr) → α. Let z be a realizer of ϕ ∧ pr, so pi1(z) ⊩ ϕ and pi2(z) ⊩ pr. It follows that{e}(pi1(z)) ⊩ pr → α and also {e}(pi1(z))(pi2(z)) ⊩ α. In conclusion: λz.{e}(pi1(z))(pi2(z)) ⊩(ϕ ∧ pr) → α. Owing to the definition of maps in R through equivalent classes, the map we have
just found is unique.
Let’s suppose e to be a realizer for the proposition ϕ → ϕ′. Given that, we would like to find
a realizer for the proposition ¬ϕ′ → ¬ϕ, i.e. for the proposition (ϕ′ → )→ (ϕ→ ). If z ⊩ ϕ then
applying {e} to it gives a realizer for ϕ′, hence {w ○e}(z) is a realizer for  everytime w ⊩ ϕ′ → .
It follows that it is possible to define the negation functor ¬(−):
¬(−) ∶ R Ð→ Rop
ϕ ↦ ¬ϕ(e ⊩ ϕ→ ϕ′) ↦ (λw.λz.{w ○ e}(z) ⊩ ¬ϕ′ → ¬ϕ)
Proposition 9.6. In the case of the category R of realizability, the negation functor ¬(−) is left
adjoint to the opposite negation functor ¬op(−):
¬(−) ⊢ ¬op(−)
Proof. Let ϕ ∈ Ob(R). There is a map ϕ→ ¬op(¬(ϕ)) = ¬¬ϕ in R, that is a map ϕ→ ((ϕ→ )→): it is easy to see that λw.λz.{w ○ e}(z) realizes it.
Let α ∈ Ob(R) and suppose that there is a map e ⊩ (ϕ→ ¬α) = (ϕ→ (α → )). We need to show
that there exists a unique map ¬ϕ → α in Rop. So we need to find a realizer for α → (ϕ → ). If
z ⊩ α and w ⊩ ϕ, then {e}(w) ⊩ α →  and {e}(w)(z) ⊩ . Concluding: λz.λw.{e}(w)(z) ⊩
α → ¬ϕ. Owing to the definition of maps in R through equivalent classes, the map we have just
found is unique.
Summing up all we have discovered so far, we can formulate the following result, which is the
correspondent of the Theorem (6.2) in the case of the category R of realizability.
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Theorem 9.5. Let L be a language for the intuitionistic propositional logic IL and let pr be a
fixed proposition. Let R be the category of realizability. Then, in the notation introduced above:
1. the true functor ⊺ is right adjoint to the trivial functor !:
! ⊣ ⊺
2. the false functor  is left adjoint to the trivial functor !:
 ⊣!
3. the conjunction functor (−) ∧ (−) is right adjoint to the diagonal functor ∆:
∆ ⊣ (−) ∧ (−)
4. the disjunction functor (−) ∨ (−) is left adjoint to the diagonal functor ∆:
(−) ∨ (−) ⊣∆
5. the implication of pr functor (−)pr is right adjoint to the conjunction of pr functor (−)∧ pr:
(−) ∧ pr ⊣ (−)pr
6. the negation functor ¬(−) is left adjoint to the opposite negation functor ¬op(−):
¬(−) ⊣ ¬op(−)
One can now wonder whether the above theorem could be extended to the case of classical
logic or not. In order to formulate a corresponding classical result, we should be able to show that
there is an adjunction ¬op(−) ⊢ ¬(−)
and so that ¬op(−) ∶Rop Ð→R is an equivalence. Apparently, this is not possible at all: Theorem
(9.4) states clearly that the rules of CL are not valid in Kleene’s realizability, and this is true
even for the propositional logic, since the rule →R of the classical implication on the right has no
realizer in PA.
More specifically, if ¬op(−) ⊢ ¬(−) then there should be an equivalence
R(¬ϕ,ψ) ≅Rop(ϕ,¬ψ)
for every formula ϕ and ψ. In particular, for ϕ ≡ ¬ψ, we should find a Kleene’s realizer for the
formula ¬¬ψ → ψ if and only if ¬ψ → ¬ψ has one, which is actually trivial (it suffices to take
the identity function λx.x). Now, if ¬¬ψ → ψ is realized for every formula ψ, then there must a
realizer
e ⊩ ¬¬(A ∨ ¬A)→ A ∨ ¬A
For sure, we can produce a realizer for the proposition ¬¬(A∨¬A), no matter what A is, because
we can simply take the function with no output Λ
⇀
x.. For A ≡ ∃y.χT (e,x,y)(e, x, y) = 1, let’s
denote this realizer k ⊩ ¬¬(∃y.χT (e,x,y)(e, x, y) = 1 ∨ (∃y.χT (e,x,y)(e, x, y) = 1→ )). Thus we find
a realizer {e}(k) ⊩ ∃y.χT (e,x,y)(e, x, y) = 1 ∨ (∃y.χT (e,x,y)(e, x, y) = 1→ )
and so we would be able to solve the Halting problem, which is not possible.
Theorem 9.6. Let L be a language for the classical propositional logic CL. Let R be the category
of realizability. In the notation introduced above, there is no adjuntion
¬op(−) ⊬ ¬(−)
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Proof. If this is the case, then we would be able to solve the Halting problem, as we showed
above6.
Let’s extend now the language L to a predicative one and explore the predicative case. As we
did before, we can define the category of realizability R, including this time all possible formulas
with quantified variables too. We introduce the notation R(x1, ...xn) in order to indicate the
subcategory of R where formulas contain free variables among x1, ..., xn.
Let
⇀
x = x1, ..., xn. From Kleene’s realizability, we know that a realizer of the formula ∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y)
is a natural number n such that pi2(n) ⊩ ϕ[pi1(n)/y]. Let’s suppose that e is a realizer and ϕ(⇀x, y),
ψ(⇀x, y) are formulas with free variables among x1, ..., xn, y, such that:
e ⊩ ϕ(⇀x, y)→ ψ(⇀x, y)
A realizer for ∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y) → ∃y.ψ(⇀x, y) is a functional program sending a realizer of ∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y),
say k ⊩ ∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y), into a realizer of ∃y.ψ(⇀x, y). By definition then: pi2(k) ⊩ ϕ[pi1(k)/y]. Hence:{e}(pi2(k)) ⊩ ψ[pi1(k)/y], and so λk.⟨pi1(k),{e}(pi2(k))⟩ ⊩ ∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y) → ∃y.ψ(⇀x, y). We can
define the existential quantification functor:
∃y ∶ R(x1, ..., xn, y) Ð→ R(x1, ..., xn)
ϕ(⇀x, y) ↦ ∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y)(e ⊩ ϕ(⇀x, y)→ ψ(⇀x, y)) ↦ (λk.⟨pi1(k),{e}(pi2(k))⟩ ⊩ ∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y)→ ∃y.ψ(⇀x, y))
Also, we can define the weakening functor of the context of the variables
⇀
x with extra variable y
as follows:
H[⇀x/⇀x] ∶ R(x1, ..., xn) Ð→ R(x1, ..., xn, y)
ϕ(⇀x) ↦ ϕ(⇀x, y)(e ⊩ ϕ(⇀x)→ ψ(⇀x)) ↦ (e ⊩ ϕ(⇀x, y)→ ψ(⇀x, y))
Proposition 9.7. In the case of the category R of realizability, the existential quantification
functor ∃y is left adjoint to the weakening functor H[⇀x/⇀x] of the context of the variables ⇀x with
extra variable y: ∃y ⊢H[⇀x/⇀x]
Proof. Let ϕ(⇀x, y) ∈ Ob(R(⇀x, y)). There is a map ϕ(⇀x, y) ≤ ∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y) in R(⇀x, y) given by the
equivalent class of the realizers λk.⟨y,k⟩. Let now α(⇀x) ∈ Ob(R(⇀x)) and let e ⊩ ϕ(⇀x, y)→ α(⇀x) be
a map in R(⇀x, y). We need to show that there exists a unique map ∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y)→ α(⇀x), so we have
to find a realizer for α(⇀x), given a realizer w of ∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y). By definition: pi2(w) ⊩ ϕ[pi1(w)/y],
therefore {e}(pi2(w)) ⊩ α(⇀x). Concluding, we have found a map λw.{e}(pi2(w)) ⊩ ∃y.ϕ(⇀x, y) →
α(⇀x), which is unique due to the definition of maps in R by means of equivalent classes.
From Kleene’s realizability, we know that a realizer of the formula ∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y) is a natural
number n such that ∀k.({n}(k) ⊩ ϕ[k/y]). Let’s suppose that e is a realizer and ϕ(⇀x, y), ψ(⇀x, y)
are formulas with free variables among x1, ..., xn, y, such that:
e ⊩ ϕ(⇀x, y)→ ψ(⇀x, y)
A realizer for ∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y) → ∀y.ψ(⇀x, y) is a functional program sending a realizer of ∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y),
say k ⊩ ∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y), into a realizer of ∀y.ψ(⇀x, y). By definition then: ∀k.({w}(k) ⊩ ϕ[k/y]).
6To be precise, the proof of the Theorem holds as long as the language L is previously extended to a predicative
language, by introduction of quantification on a countable set of variables. However, the possibility of solving the
Halting problem shows that there is no adjunction ¬op(−) ⊬ ¬(−) not only in the case of a predicative language,
but also in the case of a propositional language.
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Hence: {e}({w}(k)) ⊩ ψ[k/y], and so ∀k.({e}({w}(k)) ⊩ ψ[k/y]) and λw.e ○w ⊩ ∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y) →∀y.ψ(⇀x, y). We can define the universal quantification functor:
∀y ∶ R(x1, ..., xn, y) Ð→ R(x1, ..., xn)
ϕ(⇀x, y) ↦ ∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y)(e ⊩ ϕ(⇀x, y)→ ψ(⇀x, y)) ↦ (λw.e ○w ⊩ ∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y)→ ∀y.ψ(⇀x, y))
Proposition 9.8. In the case of the category R of realizability, the universal quantification functor∀y is right adjoint to the weakening functor H[⇀x/⇀x] of the context of the variables ⇀x with extra
variable y:
H[⇀x/⇀x] ⊢ ∀y
Proof. Let ϕ(⇀x, y) ∈ Ob(R(⇀x, y)). There is a map ∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y) → ϕ(⇀x, y) in R(⇀x, y), given by
the equivalent class of realizers λw.(λy.{w}(y)). Indeed, if w ⊩ ∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y) then ∀k.({w}(k) ⊩
ϕ[k/y]), so λy.{w}(y) ⊩ ϕ(⇀x, y). Let α(⇀x) ∈ Ob(R(⇀x)) and let e ⊩ α(⇀x, y) → ϕ(⇀x, y). We
need to show that there exists a unique map α(⇀x) → ∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y), so we have to find a realizer for∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y), given a realizer z of α(⇀x). However, z is a program depending on free variables among⇀
x, and we can modify it so it depends on free variables among
⇀
x, y, by adding the blind variable
y in the inputs: z ⊩ α(⇀x, y). Thus {e}(z) ⊩ ϕ(⇀x, y) and ∀k.({e}(z(k)) ⊩ ϕ[k/y]), which means
that λk.{e}(z(k)) ⊩ ∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y). Concluding, we have found a map λz.(λk.{e}(z(k))) ⊩ α(⇀x) →∀y.ϕ(⇀x, y), which is unique due to the definition of maps in R by means of equivalent classes.
In the end, we can extend Theorem (9.6) to the predicative case, proving it with the same
argument as before.
Theorem 9.7. Let L be a language for the classical predicative logic CL. Let R be the category of
realizability, enriched with the existential and universal quantification on variables. In the notation
introduced above, there is no adjuntion
¬op(−) ⊬ ¬(−)
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I need to spend few special words for my cool and fantastic scout boys and girls: they have
all helped me to find the optimistic shades in many bad situations and they have taught me that
life is nothing but dreaming together the greatest dreams. You are my hope and bet for a better
tomorrow.
My last enormous thank goes to all my true friends. By no means is friendship the very best
ship I have ever set sail by in the oceans of life. Speaking about being friends, I do not reckon I
am as good as you all are, and I will always be more than grateful for your sheer and profound
love.
Jack, you popped out of nowhere when my soul needed you and my brain was not ready to
realize it, I owe you so much.
Dede, you are my sis even though a thousand kilometers separates us, and your truly loving
me is enough to cover this distance in the blink of an eye.
Scoasse, you make me feel safe and at home in such a noisy and dangerous world and you never
stop proving me you will always be by my side no matter what happens.
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Dani, Pre and Pera, you are my real Power Rangers: somebody I can rely on without any
hesitation, somebody I can breath fresh air with.
Forn, you are my eternity-of-being: we met exactly when destiny had scheduled it, but we have
been strong enough not to drift apart over time, when we began to grow and build our own lives.
Arianna and Lia, you two have been my life line at university and you are becoming an anchor
in my everyday life.
Willy, you and me together have understood that life is more than just meets the eye and have
explored some horizons nobody could even dream about.
I cannot tell how many other names I should have cited, but please believe me: it is just a
matter of ink and space in the sheet. I affectionately hug you all and thank you for choosing to
spend together at least a part of the terrific and surprising adventure that is life.
Only you make my heart beat so strongly and passionately.
Thank you for what you truly, deeply, wonderfully, are.
